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Abstract 
 
The modern world is characterised by socio-economic disruptions, civil unrests, and 
weakening of many societal institutions, amongst many other challenges to our social fabric. 
Therefore, scholars are increasingly scouring a wide variety of conceptual prisms to seek 
explanations and possible solutions to those problems contemporaneously manifesting 
themselves. The pervading force of corruption, across the globe, remains a major concern 
among nations, multilateral agencies, such as Transparency International, and more profoundly 
in major business and public policy discourses. For many developing countries, especially 
those with weak institutions, high levels of corruption are causatively associated with high 
levels of poverty, poor economic performance and under-development.    
Against this background, using the Kingdom of Morocco as a contextual base, this 
thesis explores the growing incidence of corruption, which has stunted the nation’s positive 
development, as well as its triggers, antecedents and consequences. Whilst the literature is 
replete with treatments of corruption across time and space, such treatments have focused on 
social and macroeconomic underpinnings but largely lack rigorous marketing-framed 
explorations. Following on from this lacuna, this thesis situates the treatment of corruption in 
Morocco within the conceptual frame of social marketing — a demonstrably robust platform 
for analysing societal issues and, indeed, a validated behavioural intervention model.  A	 two-pronged	 data	 collection	 method	 was	 applied,	 based	 on	 the	 positivistic	paradigm	 and	 involving	 a	 total	 of	 1,000	 respondents.	 Data	 analysis	 was	 accomplished	through	 the	 use	 of	 logistic	 regression	 and	 propensity	 score	 matching	 techniques	 to	remove	 socio-demographics	 biases.	 Findings	 based	 on	micro-level	 data	 revealed	 salient	socio-demographic	and	societal	factors	of	corruption,	such	as	gender-gap,	in	justifiability	of	 corruption	 and	 corruption	 intention.	Over	 twice	 as	many	men	 (20.5	per	 cent)	 stated	that	they	could	be	tempted	by	corruption,	whereas	the	rate	for	women	was	8.4	per	cent.	In	 terms	 of	 social	 marketing	 campaigns,	 the	 evaluation	 shows	 that	 the	 campaign	 did	manage	 to	 raise	 awareness	 among	 the	 public	 by	 about	 60	 per	 cent,	 it	 also	 changed	perceptions	about	corruption	with	a	modest	but	significant	8.2	per	cent	 increase	among 
population perceiving corruption as immoral. Similarly, respondents exposed to the campaign 
had a 20.8 per cent higher intention to change their proclivity towards corruption compared 
with the population not exposed to the campaign — with family influence reported as the main 
predictor of intention to change. 
  iv 
The uniqueness of this thesis lies in its pioneering and boundary spanning role, context-
specific statistical treatment of data to achieve empirical substantiation and, at the same time, 
this thesis puts the markers in place for future studies. In this regard, the thesis is a significant 
contribution to the empirical literature whilst simultaneously opening up a number of policy 
trajectories for formulating and evaluating anti-corruption campaigns.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction	
 
When President Jacob Zuma of South Africa was accused of corruption he demanded 
that the charges against him be dropped because corruption, according to him, was not a crime 
but merely a “Western paradigm” (News 24, 2014).  For Western academics studying this 
phenomenon from afar, corruption might just be an interesting field of research; however, for 
the PhD student investigating corruption while living in countries where corruption is rampant 
— such as South Africa or, in this researcher’s case, Morocco — it quickly becomes obvious 
that, far from merely being a theoretical concept, corruption is a painful reality. 
In Morocco, stories of corruption are ubiquitous and victims abound. To begin, one 
finds oneself listening to the tales of corruption from people one meets in everyday life: taxi 
drivers stopped by dishonest police officers, teachers who are asked to change the grades of 
well-connected students, a colleague who talks about a surgeon demanding 15,000 MAD 
(approximately 1,500 USD) from the family as they wait outside the operating theatre midway 
through a life-or-death surgery. It is not long before the research student begins to encounter 
such things in his or her own life. Soon one realises that there are very few ways around 
corruption. In Morocco, corruption makes everything a bit more expensive; it can slow things 
down — as when a driver is stopped by the police for no real reason, or when one has to wait 
interminably for a case to be settled in a court of law. It can also speed things up if one is 
waiting for a stamp on an official document or for a nurse in a hospital. A dramatic car crash 
and a dying baby nephew is all it took for this research student to grasp the terrible effects of 
corruption: the ambulance never arrived, as it only existed on paper, and the public hospital did 
not have any staff nor was it properly equipped, all because of corruption. 
And when corruption is endemic, as it is in Morocco, it kills. 
Even when corruption does not kill, there are still victims. Corruption threatens the 
social fabric of the nation. In Morocco, because of the far reaching effects of corruption, 
thousands of children in the impoverished Middle Atlas region face a future without education. 
Schools that have been paid for years ago have yet to be built and likely never will. School 
buses have vanished from the budget and sometimes teachers exist only as names on a 
government list. Although the government has increased funding for education, illiteracy 
remains high. Rampant corruption has funnelled money away from the public education sector 
and into private pockets. 
In Morocco, women in a mostly male-dominated society are the primary victims of this 
disappearance of funding for education, with the female illiteracy rate still hovering over 50 per 
cent in rural areas. Yet women seem to have been entrusted with the development of the nation. 
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Notably, microcredit agencies favour women over men for their loans, which points to 
something significant — while women are trusted to be honest, men are thought to be corrupt 
or, at the very least, less likely to pay back their loan. 
The spread of corruption has not gone unnoticed by the people of Morocco. Though it 
is thought of as something invasive to be put up with on an everyday basis, there was hope for 
change with the recent Arab Spring. Having started in Tunisia, to the east of Morocco, on 
December 10th, 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the flame of the Arab 
Spring eventually reached the Kingdom of Morocco. Many Moroccans are generally wary 
about “things from the East” because of repeated, often violent, confrontations with Algeria on 
the issue of the Sahara as well as the Chergui, a warm, dry wind from the south eastern Sahara 
loaded with sand which damages crops. This time, however, it was a true hope that blew in 
from the East. People marched and chanted in the streets, demanding an end to corruption and 
tyranny. A new constitution was adopted on the basis of a referendum and the newly elected 
government responded to popular demand by launching a massive social marketing campaign 
against corruption. 
The main aim of Morocco’s social marketing campaign was to educate people about 
corruption, but it was immediately and heavily criticized and judged inefficient by 
Transparency Maroc, the Moroccan branch of Transparency International. The campaign 
appears to have been designed without a proper scientific understanding of the issue, and no 
post-campaign impact assessment was carried out. Personal experience showed this research 
student that behind each corrupt act there has been an individual, yet neither personal stories 
nor a corruption index provide an adequate basis for modelling the driving forces behind the 
corrupt behaviour of individuals. The stories one hears first hand are anecdotal and unreliable, 
and perception indexes, such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, do 
not necessarily describe the reality of corruption at the level of the individual. 
 
1.1 Background and Context 
 
Morocco is a country in North Africa which is comparable in size to the state of 
California. It has two neighbouring countries that is shares land borders with, Algeria to the 
east and Mauritania to the south, as well as two Spanish enclave cities, Ceuta and Melilla, in 
the north. The country is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean 
Sea to the north. Around 690 AD, Arab invaders in North Africa established control over the 
local Amazigh tribes. Muslim dynasties ruled the country from 788 AD onwards. The royal 
family that rules Morocco today, the Alaouite Dynasty, dates back from the 17th century. In 
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1860, the north of the country was occupied by Spain, and in 1912 the kingdom was made a 
French Protectorate until independence in 1956.  In 1957, a constitutional monarchy was 
established by King Mohammed V, the grandfather of the current monarch, King Mohammed 
VI (CIA World Factbook, 2015).  
With a population of 32 million, the country has two major ethnic groups, Arabs and 
Amazighs, which represent around 99.1 per cent of the total population. When they colonized 
the country, the French tactically attempted to play one ethnic group off against the other. This 
tactic was unsuccessful and the failure of it was mostly due to the strong religious beliefs that 
unite the country. Gellner and Micaud (1972) showed that Islam supersedes the ethnic divide 
between Berbers (an old, somewhat offensive term for Amazighs) and Arabs, and characterise  
Moroccan unity as being based on the idea of ‘qua Maghrebin Muslim’ in opposition to ‘qua 
Arab or Berber’. This remains the case today: a 2012 survey by a mainstream Moroccan 
magazine, Tel-Quel, shows that 89 per cent of Moroccans feel that Islam guides their lives; 
with over 60 per cent praying five times a day and 39 per cent claiming to recite the Quran at 
home (Tel-Quel, 2012). 
 
 
 
1.2 Demographics of Morocco 
 
The population of Morocco was about 6 million in 1900. It has grown very rapidly over 
the twentieth century, the population growth rate was over 3 per cent per year in the 1950s and 
stabilized to around 1.25 per cent between 2004 and 2014, a growth rate equivalent to the world 
average. In 2014, Morocco officially has 33.8 million inhabitants with 54 per cent of the 
population being rural. There are about 97 men per 100 women nationwide and while there are 
around 103 men for every 100 women in rural Morocco, there are 99 men for every 100 women 
in cities. Regarding age distribution 33.1 per cent of Moroccans are under 15 years of age, 59.3 
per cent are aged between 15 and 59 years and 7.6 per cent were 60 and over. Regarding 
education an older 2004 report (HCP, 2004) reveals that 41.6 per cent of the population aged 10 
and over had never attended a public or private educational institution. For those who attended 
school 11.5 per cent of the population reported having attended preschool, 46.2 per cent 
attended primary schools and 22.6 per cent attended secondary school. In 2015 progress were 
made with  a gross enrolment rate in primary education of 83 per cent overall and 71 per cent 
for girls in Morocco, against 99.1 per cent and 92.9 per cent in developing countries. For 
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middle and high schools rate were 39 per cent overall and 33 per cent for girls, against 48.8 per 
cent and 43.6 per cent in developing countries (HCP, 2016).  
 
1.3 The Makhzen 
 
During the French Protectorate, General Lyautey, the Military Governor of Morocco 
from 1912 to 1915, secured French domination by enhancing the role of the Moroccan ruling 
elites, otherwise known as the “Makhzen.” Moroccans have traditionally used the term 
“Makhzen” to describe Morocco’s ruling system. The Makhzen is a very ancient notion in 
Morocco, approximately coinciding with the beginning of the ancient feudal state, which 
preceded the French Protectorate. Today, the Makhzen refers to the king, the king’s relatives 
and the political and economic elites surrounding him (Catusse and Vairel, 2010). 
Following the independence of Morocco, the rural elites who had sided with the French 
colonial powers were discredited. The bourgeoisie, which included most of the bureaucracy, 
were impatient to increase their political weight and modernize the country. The monarchy, 
however, quickly realised that relying on these elites was fundamental to side-tracking the 
national movement led by the bourgeoisie. Yet solidarity between this movement and 
traditional rural leaders prevented any modernization for many years. The stagnation of the 
kingdom in the fields of education, the economy and governance was near total (Leveau, 1985).  
In 1999, King Mohammed VI inherited the throne from his father Hassan II, who had forcibly 
repressed any political or social protest under his rule, which began in 1961. These years are 
often referred to as “les années de plomb”, or, “the years of lead” (Oufkir and Fitoussi, 2001). 
 
1.4 Social and Political Unrest 
 
After the year 2000 there was increased social and political unrest. Sit-ins, strikes, 
petitions, local occupations, non-payment of water bills and piracy of power lines were not only 
initiated by human rights associations, unions, left-wing political parties, and anti-globalization 
associations, but also by ordinary citizens. However, as Zaki (2008, p. 85) reported, these 
initiatives expressed “a greater sense of abandonment of the population by the central power 
than revolutionary aspirations”. While repressing these conflicts the government embarked on a 
series of reforms to modernize society. The slogan of Mohammed VI was: “A new concept of 
authority”, and this was embodied by the creation of the INDH (L’Initiative Nationale du 
Développement Humain) in 2005, which aimed at “ensuring a better distribution of the fruits of 
growth and to improve the living conditions of citizens” (INDH, 2015). Behind this initiative 
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there was a clear understanding that income inequality fed social discontent and hence socio-
political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, as cited by Knight, 2013). 
Corruption is indeed a source of social inequalities. In a corrupt country, the economy 
stagnates and can even regress, leading to increased levels of poverty and economic disparity 
between citizens (IMF, 2015). Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) demonstrate that 
corruption is most likely to benefit the wealthiest strata of the population at the expense of the 
poor.  Using data from a cross-section of 37 countries, they show that a higher a corruption 
level is commonly linked to a higher GINI index. In China, for example, a survey showed that 
Chinese citizens identified corruption as the main danger to social stability (Broadhurst and 
Wang, 2014), and the Chinese government considered that fighting corruption was fundamental 
to the survival of the country. 
As a result of the creation and implementation of the INDH by Morocco’s new ruler 
some undeniable progress was made. Morocco’s per capita GDP improved steadily from 1,000 
USD in 1991 to around 3,100 USD in 2013 (World Bank, 2015), and the country’s per capita 
GNI increased 92 per cent between 1980 and 2012. However, in terms of human development, 
the country is still struggling. According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Index, in 2005 Morocco was ranked 124th out of 177 countries, in 2011 it ranked 
130th out of 186 countries and two years later in 2013 no net progress was noted with the 
kingdom again ranking 130th out of 187 countries. The poverty level remained high, with nine 
per cent of the population below the poverty line (World Bank, 2011). Furthermore, in 2006 the 
illiteracy rate was as high as 38.5 per cent, with a rate of 46.8 per cent for women and 31.4 per 
cent for men. In rural areas this rate was much higher, with over 54.4 per cent of the population 
being illiterate and women being affected most of all (UNESCO, 2015). 
While the country boasts that it is amongst the most progressive, moderate countries in 
the Arab world, the fact is that its rankings remain low, below Egypt for example, in terms of 
human development, gender equality and political freedom (LeVine, 2012). In particular, 
Morocco’s score on the Corruption Perception Index climbed from 4.7 in 2000 (37th position) 
to 3.4 in 2011 (80th position) (Transparency International, 2012). In comparison, New Zealand, 
one of the least corrupt countries according to the Corruption Perception Index, has a score of 
9.5, while neighbouring Algeria ranks 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco as 
its ranking declined even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le 
Monde, 2012). For Greffrath and Duvenhage (2014), the changes that have been implemented 
are largely cosmetic, since, despite having engaged the nation in a democratic process, the 
Makhzen still relies on policies of divide and rule, clientelism and a strong secret police.  
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1.5 Corruption and Clientelism in Morocco 
 
 
Clientelism, defined as buying the vote of constituencies with gifts and favours (Fujiwara, 
and Wantchekon, 2013), is not a recent issue in Morocco. During the French Protectorate 
stability was mostly secured by maintaining a clientelistic relationship with the rural elites 
(Hissouf, 2016). Later the political parties which were instrumental in liberating the country 
from the French did not promote change, but remained entrenched in their old patron-client 
modus operandi (Liddle, 2010). The clientelistic system persisted under Hassan II, as his 
ambition was to strengthen his political and economic domination of the country. Hassan II’s 
reign has often been described as “authoritarian, patrimonial, violent and repressive, 
clientelistic and subjecting society” (Catusse and Zaki, 2009, p. 76). For Michael and Nouaydi 
(2009, p. 356) corruption in Morocco is the result of this clientelistic system: “the most likely 
systemic cause of corruption in Morocco stems from the exercise of clientelistic and patronistic 
relationships — exercised by the Moroccan monarch — leading to the monopolistic division of 
rents”. Allegedly, King Mohammed VI and his entourage, the Makhzen, sit at the centre of a 
large nexus of people who give favours and opportunities for corruption in order to maintain 
political power and accumulate wealth (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). In a recent article, 
Ahmed Raïssouni — a Moroccan theologian and vice-president of the Unicité et réforme 
mouvement (Uniqueness and Reform Movement), the ideological foundation of the PJD (the 
Islamist Justice and Development Party) currently in power — declared that the separation of 
powers in Morocco is only theoretical and that “Corruption and the hidden state are the power 
in Morocco” (Telquel.ma, 2015a). 
 
 
 
1.6 Islam and Corruption 
 
The very popular and semi-legal (since it does not recognise the monarchy) Justice and 
Charity Association (al-Adl) has been highly critical of the Moroccan throne. Founded by 
Sheikh Abd al-Salam Yassine, the association’s main aim is the Islamisation of Moroccan 
society. Sheikh Abd al-Salam fervently criticises the Palace for the many ills of the nation, and 
in particular corruption. (Dalmasso and Cavatorta, 2011). Under Islamic law corruption is a sin, 
as it is not compatible with Islamic principles because it threatens the equilibrium of society. 
(Egbewole and Ibrahim, 2015). The Qur’an states: 
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“But seek the abode of the hereafter in that which Allah has given 
you and neglect not your  portion  of  the  world,  and  be  kind  even  
as  Allah  has  been  kind  to  you  and seek not corruption in the 
earth, Allah loves not corrupters” (Qur’an 28, verse 77). 
 
However, although proscribed by Islam, corruption may be interpreted very differently. 
In Morocco, government institutions are perceived as slow, inefficient, arbitrary and hostile, 
and whenever a civil servant does his job properly, the citizen feels highly indebted (Hibou and 
Tozy, 2009). In such cases what is commonly deemed corruption is often the only way to 
express one’s appreciation. For some this is undoubtedly a form of corruption, but others feel 
that the civil servant may accept the gift as an expression of the good Islamic morality on which 
the community is built, and in this case the gift is considered to be halal, which means ‘lawful’ 
in Arabic (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). In Islam this custom of gift giving and reciprocity is an 
essential social mechanism on which a community is built (Kochuyt, 2009). The Supreme 
Judicial Authority in Saudi Arabia stipulates: “There is nothing wrong with accepting it (an 
amount of money as a gift), without you (the recipient) longing for that, and you can respond in 
kind if you are able to with an appropriate gift, or you can supplicate for him, because the 
Prophet, sallallaahu alayhi wa sallam, said: ‘Whoever does you a favour, respond in kind …’” 
(Fataawa Al-Lajnah Al-Daa’imah, Islamweb, 2015).	 
1.7 The Arab Spring  
 
 
Although the Arab Spring of 2011 did reach Morocco, with events from Tunisia and Egypt 
impacting Moroccan public opinion, the country remained fairly stable. Demonstrations took 
place in more than 50 cities. These were large, but nowhere near the scale of the protests that 
were taking place in Tunisia, for example. The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior counted 
fewer than 37,000 participants, although estimates from other sources were between 240,000 
and 300,000 (Molina, 2011). There are a number of explanations for the relative stability of the 
country during this period.  
First, the Moroccan monarchy had taken pre-emptive actions to reduce social 
discontent. Salaries were raised for civil servants, jobs were provided for unemployed 
graduates, benefits were granted to the unemployed, and free health care was expanded and 
became available to more citizens (Molina, 2011). The Palace had traditionally paid off its 
subjects by providing substantial subsidies for essential goods, such as bread, gas and 
electricity, but these were reduced in 2009 following the recommendation of the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF). In the midst of the uprising, however, the authorities elected to reinstate 
the subsidies (Zaid et al., 2014).  
Second, protesters were made of various social groups, which ranged from uneducated 
rural Moroccans to students, professionals and religious groups who had unrelated interests, 
and it was therefore problematic for them to organize (Goldstone, 2011). 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the monarchy had cleverly relinquished some of 
its powers to the parliament over the ten years preceding the Arab Spring, unlike other regimes 
in the region, and had already undertaken a series of political and economic reforms, which had 
the effect of deflecting people’s ire away from the king, so that demands were for legislative 
change rather than abdication (Goldstone, 2011). This was the primary reason for the continued 
stability of the country during this period (Gause and Gregory, 2011). The goals of these 
reforms were to decentralize and pluralize the decision centres of the regime, encourage the 
development and proliferation of associations on a level of technocracy, which favoured neutral 
expertise, and an apolitical approach to governance. Associations were perceived by the public 
as taking the relay of the government and gave the impression of a certain level of 
democratization of the country’s political life. Sensitive matters such as corruption, public 
goods, local governance and the question of Amazigh rights and identity, were taken over by 
associations and technocrats, allowing public debate to take place and lessening some of the 
tensions in the country (Hibou, 2011). 
 
1.8 Women and Microcredits as a Way Forward 
 
 
Mohammed VI, publicly known as ‘M6’, is often referred to as the “King of the Poor” 
(Schechla, 2015), and according to Noureddine Ayouch, a close ally of the king in charge of 
Shem’s Publicité, the Palace’s preferred advertising and PR agency, he is “a modern man who 
aspires always to further the cause of democracy… authentic and true, profoundly good to the 
core, obsessed by the eradication of poverty, free society, and liberty” (Gozlan, 2011, p. 103). 
Mohamed VI has thus actively pursued the approach of his father Hassan II, who in 1995 
commissioned Ayouch to launch a microcredit agency, Al-Amana, specifically for women 
(Gozlan 2011). In April 1999, a law asserted the fundamental role of microcredit associations 
in the country’s development and gave them official recognition (Catusse, 2009). Today there 
are twelve microfinance agencies in Morocco, of which Al-Amana is the most important, 
providing a total credit amount of 4.5 billion Moroccan dirhams (about 450 million USD in 
2014) in 2012 (Kaufmann, 2013). It is estimated that in 2012 microcredit agencies served 
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1,278,000 customers, with 40 per cent of them located in rural areas (Kaufmann, 2013). Al-
Amana is the Palace’s key tool for promoting the economic and human development of 
Morocco. Moroccan microcredit agencies favour women, and this is mostly based on past 
experience. Women are believed to be more reliable and to have better repayment rates. For 
example, according to the Féderation Nationale des Associations de Microcrédit (the National 
Federation of Microcredit Associations, or FNAM), 96 per cent of the loans in 2003 by 
Zakoura — another leading microcredit association in Morocco — were made to women, and 
in 2008, 68 per cent of overall loans were to women (FNAM, 2010). However, this unwritten 
policy of favouring women was mostly based on a perception rather than any official statistics. 
 
1.9 Morocco’s New Government 
 
 
Although the Palace had managed to control social dissent through networks of 
microcredit associations like Al-Amana, social issues, such as graduate student unemployment, 
the high cost of living and corruption contributed, to high social tensions that could not be 
subdued (Desrues, 2013a). Social media contributed to an increased public awareness of the 
issue of corruption. In 2007, a YouTube video posted by the “Targuist Sniper”, a Moroccan 
citizen from Al Hoceima, showed police asking for bribes from motorists, and was viewed well 
over a million times (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). One of the primary, most active opposition 
groups during the Arab Spring revolutions was le mouvement du 20 février (“Movement of the 
20th of February” or M20F). Although the movement failed to gather wider support from the 
population due to the lack of heterogeneity of its base, which consisted primarily of young 
Moroccan in their late teens and early twenties (Desrues, 2013a). However, its main 
accusations against the regime of widespread and systemic corruption resonated with public 
opinion (Hibou, 2011). The scale of the unrest led Mohammed VI to grant increased civil 
rights. Constitutional reforms were also implemented (Goldstone, 2011). In March 2011, the 
Palace proposed a new constitution and in November, Moroccan citizens voted massively in 
favour of the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) (Bozonnet, 2015a). Both Islam and 
the monarchy form the basis of the PJD ideological platform. As the PJD does not preach 
madawiyya (return to Islamic values), shumuliyya (full submission to Islamic precepts in all 
sphere of life) or al da'awa al nidaliyya (revolutionary action towards an Islamised society) 
(Bouyahya, 2015), it stands for a 'legitimized Islam', (Amghar, 2007). It is not a revolutionary 
party aiming at social changes nor is it opposed to the Monarchy. It also considers that 
Morocco is a Muslim country which does not need to be Islamicised (Bouyahya, 2015).  
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The newly elected Prime Minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, made the fight against 
corruption one of his government’s top priorities (Bozonnet, 2015a). However, at the same 
time, he made it clear that the campaign against corruption would not lead to a revolution. On 
July 25th, 2012 on Al Jazeera, Benkirane declared: “My policy against corruption, is as 
follows: ‘God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God will take 
revenge from him’” (Morocco World News, 2012). The United Nations supported the new 
Moroccan regime in developing several programs to curb corruption (Fink and Hussmann, 
2013). In 2011, the parliament approved a landmark law providing protection to informers and 
court witnesses (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2014). In 2012 the government, supported by 
the World Bank, launched one of the most ambitious and large-scale social marketing 
campaigns ever undertaken in the kingdom. This was launched nationwide and lasted for over a 
year (Le Monde, 2012). 	 
1.10 Social Marketing Campaign to Fight Corruption 
 
 
Social Marketing has increasingly been used to address a wide spectrum of social ills, 
including corruption. The World Bank has long favoured social marketing in its crusade against 
corruption, with over 600 anti-corruption campaigns funded since 1996 (Banerjee, 
Mullainathan, and Hanna, 2012). Essentially, the efficacy of such a campaign is measured 
against the following main principles: first of all, the campaign must spread knowledge about 
the issue, educate the target group, inspire an attitude change and finally generate a long-term 
change in behaviour (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998). Another important requirement for 
campaign effectiveness is that the promoter of the campaign should be credible. Kindra and 
Stapenhurst (1998) suggested that a newly elected government might benefit from higher trust 
and would be more likely to enjoy the legitimacy necessary to successfully run an anti-
corruption campaign. Hence, in many respects, the newly elected Moroccan government 
seemed to have all the legitimacy required to successfully launch an anti-corruption campaign. 
The election turnout had been well over 70 per cent, and the Party of Justice and Democracy 
(PJD) headed by Benkirane had gained a substantial majority (Bozonnet, 2015a). When it 
embarked on the campaign, the government claimed that it wanted to “raise the society’s 
awareness about the perils of this scourge [of corruption]”, in the words of Abdelâdim El 
Guerrouj, the Minister Delegate for Public Service (Le Monde, 2012).  
The social marketing campaign was launched on December 10th, 2012, and while 
publicly discussing the campaign, El Guerrouj explained that corruption was a cultural 
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phenomenon widely present in Moroccan society and that it should be eliminated in its earliest 
stages. A leading Moroccan sociologist, Samira Kassimi, also supported the idea that 
corruption had become part of Moroccan culture (Ali, 2012). 
 
1.11 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
 
The Moroccan government sees microcredit as an essential instrument for the 
development of the kingdom, yet an important segment of the population, namely Moroccan 
men, is largely excluded from these programmes. Although there is no scientific evidence, 
Moroccan males are believed to be less reliable and more prone to corruption, hence most are 
barred from taking microcredit loans. Another intriguing aspect of corruption in Morocco is 
that — although 89 per cent of Moroccans stress that Islam guides their lives (Tel-Quel, 2012) 
and that Islam and Islamic teachings are said to be strong deterrents to corruption (Abdul 
Jabbar, 2013) — the score on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) for the Kingdom has never been so high. The expert-based perception surveys on which 
the Transparency International CPI scores are based do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
general population, and so a first set of research questions considers the socio-demographic 
aspect of corruption in Morocco. A second aspect of this research is concerned with the social 
marketing anti-corruption campaign that was carried out by the newly elected PJD 
administration. While anti-corruption campaigns are increasingly popular, their effectiveness 
has not always been proven (Sampson, 2010), and it is remarkable that although the Moroccan 
anti-corruption campaign was an expensive one-year long effort from December 2012 to 
December 2013, no research has been undertaken to measure its effectiveness. Once again the 
current work relies on micro-level data at the level of the Moroccan citizen to investigate how 
effectively the campaign managed to communicate with the target audience in terms of overall 
reach and the clarity and credibility of the message.  Most importantly, the work focuses on 
estimating the extent to which the campaign was successful in generating a shift in attitudes and 
intentions toward corruption. Hence the research questions can be stated as follows: 
 
• Do socio-demographics, personal and social values impact a Moroccan 
citizen’s willingness to engage in corrupt practices? 
• Is the bias of microcredit agencies toward lending policies that favour women 
justified? 
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• Was the social marketing anti-corruption campaign efficient in terms of reach, 
interest generated, comprehension of the message, credibility, recall and changes in 
attitudes and intentions? 
 
1.11.1 Research Objectives 
 
The research objectives of this work are fourfold:  
1. To identify, based on micro-level data, the socio-demographics and cultural 
factors determining the corrupt intention of Moroccan citizens. 
2. To substantiate the decisive role Moroccan women have in the kingdom’s 
development. 
3. To measure the efficiency of the anti-corruption social marketing campaign. 
4. To provide evidence-based recommendations for future anti-corruption 
campaigns as well as potential alternate routes to combat corruption in the 
kingdom.  
 
1.12 Scope of the Research 
 
There are many forms of corruption: petty corruption, grand corruption and political 
corruption. Petty corruption involves low and mid-level civil servants who demand payments 
from ordinary citizens for accessing goods or public services. Grand corruption takes place in 
the higher strata of a government, and involves enacting policies or manipulating the running of 
the nation for the profit of a few individuals in power at the expense of the people. Behind 
political corruption there are government leaders who abuse their political authority to obtain 
and increase personal wealth and/or power at the expense of the nation. In Morocco these forms 
of corruption coexist. For example, the Moroccan political researcher Said Salim reported that 
the Palace had interfered regularly with the referendum for the adoption of the new 
constitution. Imams were instructed to persuade their constituencies in their sermons at the 
Friday prayers to cast a “yes” vote, and entire sections of the constitution were altered the night 
before the referendum (Al-Monitor, 2014). The PJD had made tackling corruption one of the 
main themes of their campaign, adopting slogans from the Arab Spring such as “to fight 
corruption and tyranny” (Salmi, 2015). However, the PJD is by no means a revolutionary party: 
it supports the monarchy, and its leaders would not dream of attacking the King or his advisers 
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(Bozonnet, 2015b). The newly elected government, led by the PJD, “quickly succumbed to 
corrupt lobbies and, instead of confrontation, preferred to take the easier route, adopting a 
demagogic populist rhetoric” (Al-Monitor, 2014). From this point of view, Prime Minister 
Benkirane’s fight against corruption was safely based on addressing petty corruption, targeting 
low-level government functionaries, rather than political or grand corruption, which would risk 
upsetting government officials and high-level business people. The government considered 
corruption to be a cultural phenomenon and trusted that educating citizens would be sufficient 
to address the problem. Hence this work will limit itself to understanding the tenants of petty 
corruption in Morocco and investigate how efficiently the government has managed to tackle it. 
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Chapter 2 Literature	Review	
2.1 Corruption 
 
In the 70s, giving gratuities, otherwise known as “gift giving”, was a standard way of 
conducting transactions for most US companies doing business overseas. Business often 
requires developing connections on a personal level and offering gifts was viewed as a standard 
way of nurturing these relationships (Chaudhuri, 2008). Bribery scandals became almost a daily 
fixture in the US national press, giving the impression that US corporations were bribing 
virtually all foreign governments and companies to facilitate business deals (Vanasco, 1999). In 
1976, the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a series of 
hearings concerning illicit payments which revealed a staggering number of corporate 
malpractices. For example, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was reported to have paid bribes 
in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Colombia, Nigeria, Greece, South Africa, Japan, Saudi Arabia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines (Boulton, 1978). Mounting scandals affected US foreign policy 
and led the US government to adopt the “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” in 1977 (Gutterman, 
2015), which penalizes bribery by US companies in foreign states (Sampson, 2010). As a 
consequence of this act, both the US government and many US corporations became 
increasingly concerned that the act was putting US corporations at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
non-US businesses which could pay large bribes to secure contracts (Ivanov, 2007). In 1976, J. 
Jefferson Staats of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States stated that “if only United 
States corporations are prohibited from bribing foreign officials, the United States corporations 
are likely to lose their competitive advantage vis-a-vis foreign corporations” (Morgan, 1979, p. 
361). Corruption, often in the form of bribery, had become a standard way of doing business 
and Lewis (2016) reported that US businesses were losing billions of dollars worth of contracts 
to foreign corporations and countries that had no qualms about paying expected bribes.  
By the mid-90s, fighting corruption on a global scale had become an economic 
necessity for American businesses and the US government. The US embarked on a campaign to 
promote its anti-corruption agenda on the global stage (Pearson, 2001).  The IMF and the 
World Bank soon followed suit and backed the US anti-corruption agenda. Although the global 
fight against corruption was clearly initiated to protect US businesses, the message was 
conveyed differently. James Wolfensohn, the World Bank President, declared in his pivotal 
speech to the World Bank in 1996 entitled “Cancer of Corruption” that the campaign against 
corruption originated from the people themselves: “In country after country, it is the people 
who are demanding action on this issue” (Ivanov, 2007, p. 31). In 1993, led by Peter Eigen, a 
former World Bank executive, Transparency International initiated the Corruption Perception 
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Index to increase awareness of the issue (Transparency International, 2016). The premise that it 
was the people who wanted corruption eradicated led to the idea that public involvement was 
essential. Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998, p.11), from the Economic Development Institute of 
the World Bank, maintained that “anti-corruption campaigns could not succeed without public 
support”. 
 
2.1.1.1 World Bank and Transparency International Definitions 
 	Nowadays, the definition of corruption most frequently employed by anti-corruption 
practitioners is that of the World Bank (Kearns, 2015). For the World Bank, corruption is 
defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 2000). Transparency 
International, the leading non-governmental anti-corruption organization, definition broadens 
the concept of corruption by replacing “public office” by “entrusted power”, highlighting the 
fact that corruption could be found across society as a whole. For Transparency International, 
corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (TI, 2015). The World Bank 
definition, as well as many other established definitions — such as “the abuse of public power 
for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance” (Kindra and 
Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 2); or “the misappropriation of a public office for personal profit” 
(Treisman, 2007, p.213) — are by and large derived from an economic perspective on 
corruption with little thought to other possible perspectives of definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1.2 A Wide Spectrum of Definitions 
 
The reality is that corruption research falls under a wide spectrum of disciplines, 
including criminology, sociology, philosophy, public administration, economics, political 
science, history and psychology, and as a result, different theoretical standpoints are used 
(Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar (2010) identify eight 
different perspectives to define corruption: Weberian Ideal-typical, Structural Functionalist, 
Institutional Economics, Ecological, System Theoretical, Institutional Design, Criminological 
and Post-Positivist. 
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In the Weberian Ideal-Typical approach, corruption is rooted in a defective public 
service sector. As mentioned by Kerkhoff, “the more bureaucratic a society becomes, the less 
political corruption will occur because of the growing amount of and adherence to bureaucratic 
rules and regulations and (possibly) because of coinciding evolving ideas on neutrality, 
common good and public versus private interest” (2013, p.290).  
The Structural Functionalist approach states that every societal occurrence has a 
purpose. For example, in South Africa the poorest people are more likely to be the victims of 
corruption and to bribe a corrupt official to get access to services such as the water supply or 
health services (Justesen and Bjørnskov, 2014).   
In the Institutional Economics approach, corrupt officials are rational agents who try to 
maximize their utility (Lambsdorff, 2007). The individual is depicted as a rational person who 
considers engaging in corruption when the gains outweigh the disadvantages (De Graaf, 2007). 
As long as the gains which accrue from corruption exceed the costs, the person becomes 
corrupt (De Graaf, 2007). These costs can be separated into three types: the economic cost 
associated with the risk of being penalized or dismissed from employment if caught; the social 
cost resulting from society’s condemnation and rejection; and finally, the moral cost 
represented by the psychological stress generated by breaching one’s own moral convictions.  
In the Ecological approach, the term ‘social-ecological-system’ refers to the 
interdependent relationship between people mediated through interaction with biophysical and 
non-human biological units (Anderies, Janssen and Ostrom, 2004). For example, investigations 
of police corruption have shown that police malpractice is significantly correlated to the 
neighbourhood setting in which the police operate (Lee et al., 2013). 
In the System Theoretical perspective, abuse occurs when the boundaries between the 
judiciary and the political or economic system are loose (Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). 
Scott (2013) shows that in Hong Kong civil service departments are highly independent, with 
each department establishing rules for the discretion allowed to employees.  
From the Institutional Design point of view, corruption is based on the principle that 
any institution’s organization (or lack thereof) may favour certain forms of corrupt behaviour. 
In a society where the state is perceived as failing its citizens in terms of infrastructure, 
education, health and security, individuals are more likely to see corrupt behaviour as an option 
(Gambetta, 1993, Lambsdorff and Cornelius, 2000). Lee, Moore and Kim (2013) showed that 
disorganization in the police forces results in a lack of rigour in the appointment of officers, 
insufficient coaching or slack supervision, which makes it the key dynamic behind police 
corruption. In the same vein, businesses may consider corruption a sine qua non for a business 
to operate (Khanna et al., 2010 as cited by Godinez and Liu, 2015) or simply as a “lubricant” 
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when administrations are too slow or incompetent (Meon and Weill, 2010 as cited by Godinez 
and Liu, 2015). 
Criminology is the scientific study of crime. Criminal law identifies four different 
methods of unlawfully obtaining the property or personal wealth of others, and for the 
criminologist corruption is one of these four methods (Zimring and Johnson, 2005). This 
perspective uses criminological theories to provide a causal explanation of corruption. 
Corruption is seen as the interaction of individual drive, opportunity and various forms of 
control at the level of the individual, the organization and the external environment (Huisman 
and Van de Walle, 2010). 
The Post-Positivist perspective, finally, treats corruption as a social construct. For 
Sissener (2001), corruption can only be understood with reference to the social environment in 
which it takes place and so the meaning of corruption may differ from culture to culture, with 
some communities not seeing corruption as a social curse but rather as a mechanism to foster 
solidarity between the members of a group (Tänzler, Maras and Giannakopoulos, 2007).  
 
2.1.2 Post-Positivist Approach to Corruption 
 
The various approaches to researching corruption described above have logically 
prescribed institutional reforms to tackle corruption. However, a growing body of evidence has 
repeatedly illustrated the ineffectiveness of such reforms (Barr and Serra, 2010, Fisman and 
Miguel, 2007). Recently, after having rigorously analysed various public sector reforms, 
Andrews observed a near systematic failure, and concluded that corruption is most often 
entrenched in a society’s culture (Andrews, 2015). 
In the Post-Positivist approach, corruption is socially constructed and is considered to 
be a malpractice only by those who see it as such within the context of a specific time and place 
(Graaf, von Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). Dimant, Krieger and Redlin (2014) analysed 
migration flows in 207 countries and demonstrated that immigration originating from countries 
with a high level of corruption would tend to increase corruption in the receiving countries. The 
parking violation experiment by Fisman and Miguel (2007) illustrates this point. In an 
intriguing research paper, they found a strong correlation between the number of parking 
offences committed by foreign diplomats residing in New York and the corruption level in their 
country of origin. Diplomats from countries with higher corruption levels would tend to breach 
the law more often than diplomats from countries with low levels. However, when sanctions for 
parking violation were increased, parking offences fell by over 98 per cent. This experiment 
clearly showed that the root causes of corrupt behaviour on the part of diplomats were indeed 
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cultural, but that such behaviour could be reversed once an appropriate set of sanctions was 
imposed. Their behaviour resulted from the conflict between the intrinsic norms they had 
learned and imported from the culture of origin and the institutional social norms in the new 
environment. At the end of their experiment, Fisman and Miguel (2006) concluded that “norms 
related to corruption are apparently deeply ingrained” and questioned if sanctions could modify 
corruption intention over time. 
Haller and Shore’s (2005) research on corruption in various countries around the globe 
— including India, Bolivia, Portugal, Russia, Romania and the US —  shows the diversity of 
perceptions of corruption from culture to culture and Banuri and Eckel (2012a) have published 
an impressive list of research papers that found correlations between culture and corruption 
(Banuri and Eckel, 2012b, Barr and Serra, 2009, Barr and Serra, 2010, Cameron et al., 2009, 
Fisman and Miguel, 2007, Husted, 1999, Porta et al., 1997, Lambsdorff, 2006, Lipset and Lenz, 
2000, Serra, 2006, Treisman, 2000, Uslaner, 2004), all of which points back to Andrews’ 
original observation: corruption is most often entrenched in a society’s culture. 
 
2.1.2.1 Culture and Corruption 
 
Culture encompasses a wide spectrum of concepts, and has been defined in conflicting 
ways. Sometimes it is defined as tangible elements such as trust, religiosity or institutional 
rules; sometimes as abstract factors, such as values, norms or morals (Banuri and Eckel, 
2012a). Defining culture is by no means a simple task, as anthropologists Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn showed in 1952 by compiling a list of 164 different definitions. Perhaps the earlier 
1870 definition of the British anthropologist Tylor is the most suited of all as it provides the 
level of abstraction necessary for such a theoretical concept: “Culture ... is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871: 1, as cited by Avruch, 1998, p. 
6). 
Swidler theorized that culture provides a “tool kit” or a “repertoire of habit” from 
which an individual may choose certain cultural elements to achieve certain adaptive 
“strategies of actions” (1986, p. 273). For example, in the culture of the hyper-repressive state 
of Burma, Kyi (1992, p. 11) suggests that fear lies at the heart of corruption. Of the four kinds 
of corruption or “a-gati” defined by the author, “bhaya-gati” — corruption due to fear (“bhaya” 
is the worst fear) — will “stifle and slowly destroy all sense of right and wrong”. Kyi (1992) 
identifies many fears – the fear of poverty, the fear of being surpassed, and the fear of being 
humiliated. In Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s police commissioner, identified a strong 
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relationship between fear of poverty and corruption (Werlin, 2005). Faull (2007) noted that 
corruption was prevalent in many police organizations around the world, and that fear of 
authority/police, which might normally deter a citizen from engaging in corrupt behaviour, may 
on the contrary foster corrupt actions (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2008).  
There are indeed various forces — at times interrelated, at times competing — that 
determine an individual’s disposition toward corruption: the demographics of each individual 
with his/her diversity of value systems, principles and morals, and the social forces outside the 
individual’s own personal convictions. Social norms originate in the various groups to which an 
individual is affiliated, such as family, friends, colleagues, religious group or nation. Four main 
forms of normative control have been identified: Values, Social Capital, Civil Society and 
Civic Culture (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013), all of which are helpful in any Post-Positivist discussion 
concerning corruption. 
 
2.1.3 Normative Controls and Corruption 
 
2.1.3.1 Values 
 
Values are defined as dominant societal norms of universally accepted ethical 
principles such as justice and honesty. A number of studies posit the values of an individual as 
the locus of behaviour. For Kamakura and Novak (1992), value systems are an essential 
component of the consumer decision process. For Parks and Guay (2009), personal values are 
principles guiding individual behaviour. For Feather (1992), the motivation that one individual 
has to attain a specific goal is determined by his or her value system, which assigns value to the 
attractiveness of each goal. Individuals thus tend to have a ranking in their value system, and 
individual behaviour will be the result of competing personal values, with values that are 
considered more important than others dictating behaviour (Parks et al, 2009). For Feather (as 
cited by Eccles and Wigfield, 2002, p111), values are defined as a set of “general beliefs about 
what is desirable”. These values are the results of complex interactions between an individual’s 
personal values, resulting from the individual’s inner psychological needs, and his or her social 
values, which in turn result from the norms of society (Feather, 1992). In the case of corruption, 
one may use the concept of “selective moral disengagement”, a term first coined by Bandura 
(2002, p101). 
The Theory of Moral Disengagement was developed primarily to explain political and 
military violence, although Bandura noted that individuals may also use moral disengagement 
“to further their own interests or for profit” (Bandura, 1990b, p. 43). In the Theory of Moral 
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Disengagement, an individual may engage in immoral acts by using cognitive mechanisms to 
turn off the moral values that would normally regulate his or her action. Moore (2008) 
proposed that when corruption is systemic, individuals would use moral disengagement to push 
aside their own ethical values and conform to the behaviour of the group, with the individual’s 
personal responsibility and feeling of guilt being allayed by the de facto norm established by 
the group. 
 
2.1.3.2 Social Capital 
 
Social Capital is the relationship that weaves society around common values, interests 
and goals (Callahan, 2005). An individual who violates society’s common norms exposes 
himself or herself to various sanctions such as the feeling of guilt (internal sanction) or to legal 
consequences, exclusion from society or, to a lesser extent, negative gossip (external sanctions) 
(Dong, et al., 2012). According to Torgler (2006, p.5), “guilt arises when individuals realize 
that they have acted irresponsibly and in violation of an internalized rule or social standard”. 
Honest behaviour, or “incorruption”, is accepted as being a dominant norm in societies (Dong 
et al, 2012). Rothstein and Torsello (2014) also found that bribery in preindustrial societies is 
mostly condemned. Integrity becomes mutually enforced and individuals weigh the costs of 
straying from the norm (Zhang, 2015). Corrupt behaviour transgresses against the dominant 
social norm and brings shame and guilt to the perpetrator (Elster, 1989). However, Mishra 
(2006) noted that in some societies, corruption is widespread and has been tolerated over long 
periods, which may indicate that corruption has become a norm in and of itself while Rose-
Ackerman demonstrated that most people would justify a corrupt act by citing the prevalence of 
corruption in the society (2008). And in a society where corruption is rife, corruption is not 
only socially correct, but a citizen who behaves honestly may feel as if he or she is the only 
“sucker” around (Persson, et al., 2013). 
 
2.1.3.3 Civic Culture 
 
Civic Culture refers to the involvement of citizens through the media or social 
movements. In Morocco, the well-known “February 20th Movement” (M20F) could have 
forced the Palace into taking concrete action against corruption. However, M20F was rapidly 
neutralized and, therefore, failed to gather enough momentum to enforce change (Desrues, 
2013a).  
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Regarding civic engagement through the media, the Palace’s infamous monitoring of 
most of the press, radio and television stations has lead Moroccans to become particularly 
sceptical of their national media (Cantrell, 2014). Although the press in Morocco is notoriously 
muzzled, social media in the Arab world — and in Morocco, particularly — have enjoyed 
relative freedom. It is well documented that social media was one of the main factors leading 
up to the 2011 Arab Spring (Howard et al., 2011, Ghannam, 2011, Wolfsfeld, Segeva and 
Sheafer, 2013). A vast number of Moroccans were exposed to corruption on social media by 
the notorious Targuist Sniper — less well-known under the name of Agueznay Mounir — who 
became an instant celebrity by publishing several videos from July 2007 to 2013 demonstrating 
the corruption in his region. The Targuist Sniper hid along the road to film corrupt 
“gendarmes” or police officers demanding bribes from motorists. The video became major 
news, and while the police harassed the blogger (Al-Monitor, 2012) and the authorities sued the 
sniper for defamation (Telquel, 2015), the video remained online and was viewed well over a 
million times over the course of 2009 (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Citizen engagement via social media; The Targuist Sniper (Youtube, 2015). 
 
2.1.3.4 Civil Society: Religion and Corruption 
 
Civil Society is defined by the World Bank as “the wide array of non-governmental 
and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and 
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values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or 
philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 2015).  
Muslims consider bribery and corruption to be immoral acts. One hadith stipulates that 
benefits derived from sinful activities are unlawful: “the flesh that grows out of unlawful 
income has no place in the hereafter but hell” (Alhabshi, 2009). Similarly, in Sharia Law, 
corruption is considered tazwir (a crime against society).  Furthermore, the Qur’an clearly 
condemns corruption. The Qur’an states: “And do not consume your property among 
yourselves wrongfully, nor seek access to judges by means of it in order that you may sinfully 
consume a portion of people’s wealth, while you know (what you do)” (al-Baqarah, 2:188). 
Marquette (2010, p. 41), in a working paper entitled “Corruption, Religion and Moral 
Development”, considers religion a source of rules and a code of ethics to guide an individual 
in his or her everyday life, and since “fairness and honesty are basic to the teachings of many 
religions” (2010, p. 41), religious guidance should deter individuals from corrupt behaviour. 
Sommer, Bloom and Arikan (2013) claim that religion is a synonym for behavioural integrity 
and virtuousness, since it provides clear guidelines about what is good or what is evil 
behaviour. Forbes and Zampelli (1997), by analysing a sample from more than 30 countries, 
found that the higher the level of religiosity of participants, the higher the level of their morality 
with regard to paying taxes. For Flavin and Ledet (2008), religions in general, including 
polytheistic ones, require their adherents to abide by rules and guidance advancing moral 
conduct and the welfare of the community at the expense of personal gain and self-interest. In 
the same vein, Voert, Felling and Peters (1994) claimed that increased secularization would 
lead to individuals being more self-centred, more corrupt and much less fearful of social 
disapproval. 
Various NGOs, such as Christian Aid and Islamic Relief, endeavour to fight corruption 
(Marquette, 2012) and many developing countries have decided to involve religious leaders and 
institutions in their fight against corruption. Such decisions have the aim of exploiting the 
potential influence of religious models in order to influence the behaviour of devout citizens 
and encourage ethical conduct in societies (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007). 
In Nigeria, to reduce the rate of corruption and regain the trust of its citizens, the 
government recruited Imams as civil servants. Likewise, some political leaders have issued 
multiple invitations to religious institutions to help them eradicate corruption. In South Africa, 
Du Plessis and Breed (2013) suggest the Church as a potential initiator of a great anti-
corruption movement. For instance, the Zambian Vice President, Nevers Mumba, called for the 
support of the Church to help his government in its battle against corruption (Heywood, 2014). 
In Romania, Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Oancea (2009) showed that the Church, media and 
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schools have a positive impact on the reduction of corruption. As an explanation of this 
connection between initiatives by religious institutions and ethical behaviour, Sommer, Bloom 
and Arikan (2013) argue that the presence of religious ideas among citizens tends to increase 
their belief in the existence of a supernatural watcher who will reward them for good conduct 
and punish them for evil or unethical behaviour. Therefore, in societies where religious 
concepts are present, citizens are likely to have higher levels of moral behaviour. 
 
The impact of religion on cultures of corruption is not just felt by those who prescribe 
to a religion. In fact, the presence of religious initiatives in the social environment has been 
shown to have an impact on both devout and secular citizens (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). 
Religion creates a norm by which non-religious citizens will also abide. Sommer, Bloom and 
Arikan (2013) showed that secular citizens tend to behave in accordance with the most 
common religious standards prevalent in the society, but of course one has to be careful about 
the political context in which religion evolves. Though scholars have shown that higher 
political and civic engagement is generally synonymous with reduced corruption (La Porta et 
al.,1999), this is not always the case. Hence in democratic countries religion will indeed 
contribute to a reduction of corruption, while in non-democratic countries, religion is often 
linked to increased corruption (Sommer, Bloom and Arikan, 2013).  
Interestingly, La Porta, et al (1999) showed that hierarchical religions such as 
Catholicism, Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy are linked to higher levels of perceived corruption. 
In a hierarchical religion, such as Catholicism, challenges to church officials are not welcome 
and the hierarchical structure is generally maintained by a high level of secrecy. On the other 
hand, in an egalitarian religion, such as Protestantism, a culture of equality and transparency 
encourages the questioning and challenging of the clergy and thus, perhaps, a lower finding of 
perceived corruption. These finding are also supported by Paldam (1999), who demonstrates 
that the least corrupt countries are more likely to have a Protestant or Anglican religious 
context, while countries with Catholics, other Pre-Reform Christians, or Buddhists seem to 
suffer from a higher level of perceived corruption. 
Husted (1999) used the “Power Distance Index” (PDI) as defined by Hofstede (1998) 
of 44 countries while controlling for other explanatory variables to show that a higher PDI 
leads to higher levels of corruption. “The power distance index measures the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept 
that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1998, p. 479). Another interesting finding is 
that more religiously divided countries have a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour 
than countries in which one religion is prevalent (Paldam, 2001). Finally, Marquette (2010) 
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observed that the most corrupt countries are also some of the most religious, and that religion is 
not by any means the fundamental factor influencing moral or corrupt behaviour.   
This observation might well fit Morocco’s image as both a religious and a corrupt 
society. In the kingdom, Islam, as a religion, is ever-present in the everyday Moroccan life. 
According to a recent report, 89 per cent of Moroccans claim that religion guides their lives: 
two-thirds pray five times a day and 39 per cent claim to read the Qur’an at home (Tel-Quel, 
2012). Mustapha Ramid, the Minister for Justice and Liberty, appealed to the Islamic faith held 
by most Moroccans in an effort to curb corruption. In an interview with the Moroccan 
magazine L’économiste published on November 12th, 2012, he declared, “Avoid corruption, as 
it is haram” (L’économiste, 2012b). In Arabic, haram signifies all things proscribed as 
outlawed by the Qur’an (Al-Qaradawi, et al., 1985). However, abundant examples of posts in 
online forums in Morocco reveal the ambiguous nature of corruption for many Moroccans. The 
following question from Chanid, an online participant on Bladi.net, one of the most popular 
online communities in Morocco (Bladi.net, 2015), is a good example of the dilemma faced by 
Moroccans in their understanding of corruption with respect to religion:  
“We all know that corruption is haram in Islam is that there are cases 
where it can be considered that this is not corruption? For example when 
considering my driving license, I made a small mistake which sentenced 
me to fail! So I decided to give money to the examiner for ‘close your 
eyes’ ... but he did not want is that it is corruption in this case? it is 
haram?” (Bladi.net, 2015, this passage is the original language of the 
online participant). 
 
2.1.4 Corruption and Development 
 
The World Bank considers corruption to be one of the major limitations to a country’s 
development and, since 1996, the organization has funded over 600 anti-corruption campaigns 
(Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna, 2012). Like many developing countries, Morocco has 
long been relying on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost its development (Haddad and 
Harrison, 1993). The World Bank estimated that FDI as a percentage of GDP grew steadily 
from 2.5 per cent in 2011, to 2.9 per cent in 2012, 3.1 per cent in 2013 and finally to 3.3 per 
cent in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). FDI generally enables local companies to have access to 
foreign capital and technology, hence improving their productivity and overall competitiveness 
(Haddad and Harrison, 1993). However, in the case of a corrupt country, Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) found that corruption would lead to a reduction in local and foreign investment, 
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impairing its economic development. Gray and Kaufman (1998) demonstrated that corruption 
not only reduces the flow of domestic and foreign investment but also leads to “inefficient 
economic outcomes”. Essentially, it siphons capital away from infrastructure and public service 
and undermines a country’s development (Robinson, 1998). Kwok and Tadesse (2006) showed 
that multinational enterprises will avoid investing in countries that are considered corrupt out of 
concern about the additional costs linked to corruption. More recently, Barassi and Zhou (2012) 
also demonstrated a negative correlation between the level of corruption and the flow of FDI.  
Not surprisingly, the kingdom of Morocco wants to polish its image vis-à-vis the 
international community, primarily because Morocco’s economic development relies heavily 
on foreign direct investment. In 2008, Morocco was the second largest recipient of FDI flows in 
the FEMIP (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) region, which 
includes Algeria, Egypt, Gaza/the West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and 
Tunisia (EIB, 2015). FDI represented nearly 3.3 per cent of the country’s 100 billion USD GDP 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). It is against this background that in 2011 Morocco ratified the UN 
convention against corruption (UN, 2015), and is a member of the Arab Anti-Corruption and 
Integrity Network (ACINET, 2014 as cited by Sutherland, 2015). 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, FDI outflows to North Africa were drastically 
reduced, with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reporting 
a 50 per cent drop in FDI for the region. Interestingly though, Morocco suffers unflattering 
corruption perception scores year after year, it does not seem to lose its attractiveness to foreign 
investors. The kingdom has remained one of the ten best African countries for FDI investment 
and in 2015 was ranked the fifth best country on the continent for investment, just behind 
Egypt, Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique (Financial Time, 2015). 
In most cases, corruption is seen as a deterrent to FDI; however, (2008) maintained that 
it is the type of corruption a business faces that matters when making decisions about investing 
in a transition economy. Cuervo-Cazurra distinguishes between “pervasive” corruption and 
“arbitrary” corruption. Pervasive corruption is defined as a type of corruption that is definite 
and generalized, while arbitrary corruption is a form of corruption that is uncertain. Analysing 
FDI data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
corruption data from the World Bank and the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), 
Cuervo-Cazurra found that foreign businesses seemed not to be deterred from investing in 
transition economies with a high level of “arbitrary” corruption such as Morocco, but shy away 
from countries with a high level of “pervasive” corruption. This possibly explains the case of 
Morocco, which by displaying on the international stage its determination to fight corruption, 
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reassures investors that organized corruption is being tackled, while Moroccan citizens 
continue to feel the effects of day-to-day arbitrary corruption.  
  
 
2.1.5 Morocco’s Fight Against Corruption 
 
Until 1995, addressing the subject of corruption was considered taboo in Moroccan 
society. It was only in 1996 that “Maroc 2020”, a Moroccan advocacy group, broke the public 
reserve about the subject by organizing several public seminars on corruption. Since then, 
several notable actions and reforms have been made. In December 1998, a Dahir (royal decree) 
enforcing rules on public procurement was passed. Then in 1999, the World Bank worked 
alongside the Moroccan government to organize a high profile conference on corruption 
(Denoeux, 2000). In 2003 the UN Convention on the fight against corruption was signed and 
eventually ratified in May 2007. A money laundering law was also passed in 2007 while the 
draft law on wealth declaration was formally adopted by the Governing Council in February 
2007. In November 2006, the Government adopted a decree establishing the Central Body for 
the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC or L'Instance Centrale de Prévention de la Corruption) 
which had first been discussed in 2005 (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). Meanwhile, a further 
element of the administrative reforms — initially launched in the early 2000s specifically to 
fight against “petty corruption” — came into effect to avoid uncontrolled contacts between 
officials and members of the public: A single window policy was adopted to replace the 
existing multi-service windows; some types of permit for small businesses were abolished; 
some public services were privatised; and, accompanied by great publicity, many known 
corrupt agents (such as police officers and judges) were fired. Eventually, to combat larger 
forms of corruption, regional investment centres were created and extra powers were given to 
the General Inspector of Finance (Inspecteur général des finances, or IGF) and the Court of 
Auditors (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). However, the efficiency of such measures remained limited 
and corruption scandals continued to surface regularly. 
Clearly, Moroccan citizens felt there was a void between the rhetoric and the action, 
and Moroccans gradually lost faith in their government’s ability or genuine willingness to fight 
corruption (Denoeux, 2000). In 2010, a two-year government anti-corruption plan was 
launched. The plan included 40 anti-graft measures to keep corruption in check. It also set up 
hotlines for the public to report acts of extortion by government officials. Yet despite all these 
actions and public announcements Moroccan citizens remained unconvinced, and the 
kingdom’s ranking on global governance indicators declined steadily. For instance, Morocco’s 
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Corruption Perception Index went from a score of 4.7 in 2000, or 37th place, to a score of 3.4 in 
2011, or 80th position (Transparency International, 2011). By comparison, New Zealand, one 
of the least corrupt countries on the Corruption Perception Index, had a score of 9.5, and 
Algeria ranked 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco: its ranking declined 
even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le Monde, 2012).  At the 
same time, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer in 2010/2011 showed 
that barely 19 per cent of Moroccans believed that the kingdom’s fight against corruption was 
effective. 
  
2.2 Social Marketing 
 
Agencies, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the Asian Development 
Bank, often work at the socio-cultural level to address a wide range of issues. Social Marketing 
has been increasingly popular as an effective tool enabling broader social and cultural change 
to individual behaviour change (Nguyen and Rowley, 2015).  
2.2.1 Defining Social Marketing 
 
Marketing has traditionally been associated with the business field and used as a profit-
generating tool. However, it has also been used to address various social ailments and an 
increasing number of non-governmental associations, governments and other institutions have 
adopted it for non-profit objectives, giving birth to a practice called Social Marketing.  
The sixties saw the first publications on marketing as applied to social issues. In 1965, 
Chandy, et al., from the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta, published a paper on the 
use of marketing to address family planning issues in India. However, the Indian government 
was later criticized by Martin (1968), who stated in his research paper, “The outlandish idea: 
how a marketing man would save India”, that: 
Selling birth control is as much a marketing job as selling any other 
consumer product. And where no manufacturer would contemplate 
developing and introducing a new product without a thorough 
understanding of the variables of the market, planners in the highest 
circles of Indian government have blithely gone ahead without 
understanding that marketing principles must determine the character 
of any campaign of voluntary control. 
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Simon (1968) also addressed family planning issues with marketing concepts in his 
paper entitled “A Huge Marketing Research Task: Birth Control”. But it was Kotler and 
Zaltman in 1971 who first coined the term “social marketing” in their article “Social 
Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change” (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971, as cited by 
Andreasen, 1994). Growing interest from Professor Philip Kotler and other scholars from 
Northwestern University in social marketing arose from the desire to expand and develop the 
study of marketing and incorporate a social component within the discipline (Eliotte, 1991). 
Brown (1986), as cited by Andreasen (1994) claimed that the rise of this new discipline was the 
expected result of a combination of various factors, such as an increased need for marketing 
from non-business organizations and recurrent criticisms of the negative impact of marketing 
on society.  
The increasing number of publications in the field of social marketing reflects the 
growing interest of academics. Van Dao Truong, Professor at the Department of Management, 
Marketing and Entrepreneurship at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, counted 
1,423 articles published in peer-reviewed journals from 1998 to the end of August 2013 (2014). 
Truong also noted that Kotler and Zaltman’s definition of social marketing was one of the most 
cited definitions:  
The design, implementation and control of programs calculated to 
influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations 
of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution and 
marketing research’’. (Kotler and Zaltman, p. 5) 
 
In 1994 Andreasen suggested that Social Marketing be defined as: 
The application of commercial marketing technologies to analysis, 
planning, execution and evaluation of programs designed to influence 
the voluntary behaviour of target audiences in order to improve their 
personal welfare and that of society. (Andreasen, 1994, p. 110) 
 
In Andreasen’s definition, the word “voluntary” should be highlighted. Behaviour 
change should be voluntary if it is to be lasting. Later, Andreasen (2002, p. 7) listed six criteria 
to identify a social marketing approach:  
1. Behaviour-change is the benchmark used to design and evaluate 
interventions. 
2. Projects consistently use audience research to (a) understand 
target audiences at the outset of interventions (i.e., formative 
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research), (b) routinely pre-test intervention elements before 
they are implemented, and (c) monitor interventions as they 
are rolled out. 
3. There is careful segmentation of target audiences to ensure 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the use of scarce 
resources. 
4. The central element of any influence strategy is creating 
attractive and motivational exchanges with target audiences. 
5. The strategy attempts to use all four Ps of the traditional marketing 
mix; for example, it is not just advertising or communications. 
That is, it creates attractive benefit packages (products) 
while minimizing costs (price) wherever possible, making 
the exchange convenient and easy (place) and communicating 
powerful messages through media relevant to—and 
preferred by—target audiences (promotion). 
6. Careful attention is paid to the competition faced by the 
desired behaviour. 
 
 As Stead, Hastings and McDermott (2007) suggested, the fifth point of Andreasen’s 
criteria should be underlined so that it states: “social marketing cannot be effective by 
enforcing or obliging people to do what social marketers want them to do” (Stead, Hastings and 
McDermott, 2007, p. 9). For a social marketing campaign to be effective, marketers should 
highlight the benefits of the intended behavioural change in order for the audience to accept the 
social marketing program (Stead, Hastings, and McDermott, 2007). Andreasen’s definition was 
later criticized for focusing the endeavours of social marketers mostly on behaviour change 
while ignoring their duty to achieve a wider aim, namely the betterment of society (Gordon, 
2011). Moreover, focusing solely on individual behaviour change may lessen the impact of a 
social marketing campaign since individual behaviour is the result of complex interactions 
between personal motivation and the social environment and context (Donovan and Henley, 
2010). Hence for a campaign to be efficient, organizational changes should also be 
implemented (Farrell and Gordon, 2012). The current definition provided by the International 
Social Marketing Association, the European Social Marketing Associating and the Australian 
Associating of Social Marketing includes the notion of contributing to a “greater social good”. 
Social Marketing seeks to develop and integrate marketing concepts with other 
approaches to influence behaviours that benefit individuals and communities for the greater 
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social good. Social Marketing practice is guided by ethical principles. It seeks to integrate 
research, best practice, theory, audience and partnership insight, to inform the delivery of 
competition sensitive and segmented social change programmes that are effective, efficient, 
equitable and sustainable (Saunders, Barrington and Sridharan, 2015, p. 162). 
In other words, social marketing utilises the same principles and techniques as business 
marketing, but differs in its ultimate goal. While business marketing seeks to maximize profit, 
social marketing aims at the betterment of the individual and society as a whole. Social 
marketing uses a combination of market research, customer insight, segmentation of the target 
audience, targeting and value exchanges in order to achieve attitude and behavioural changes 
and sustain positive behaviours (French and Gordon, 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Social Marketing Objectives 
 
Social marketing is not just a standard advertising campaign to raise the public 
awareness about one issue or another. Although it includes classic promotional instruments, 
social marketing also incorporates concepts and techniques from a wide range of scientific 
disciplines with the aim to understand, and ultimately influence, people’s behaviour. 
2.2.2.1 Educate, Inform and Prevent  
 
The World Bank and Transparency International identified mounting awareness of the 
devastating consequences of corruption as the first pillar in establishing a global anti-corruption 
norm (Lawson, 2009). Hence social marketing was promoted as an indispensable tool for “the 
creation of an atmosphere in public life that discourages fraud and corruption” (Kindra and 
Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 1). For Theobald and Williams (1999), the success of an anti-corruption 
campaign depends entirely on educating citizens about corruption and their willingness to 
cooperate. For Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998), a social marketing campaign should first aim at 
alerting citizens about the cost of corruption to the country and its citizens. For Khemani 
(2009), the main objectives of such a campaign are to educate, inform and prevent. In Nigeria, 
the  objective of their campaign was to set their citizens against a complacent attitude towards 
corruption (Khemani, 2009). Likewise, Botswana conducted a campaign through the media 
using slogans declaring: “We blow the whistle on foul play”. This enabled the country to 
heighten society’s awareness of corruption and gain public support against corrupt behaviour. 
Similarly, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong achieved 
remarkable results thanks to a mass media campaign to educate Hong Kong citizens on the 
subject of corruption (De Speville, 1999). This campaign allowed the Commission to influence 
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the public perception of corruption. Gradually, the campaign induced an attitude change toward 
corruption in the people of Hong Kong. Corruption was no longer perceived as normal 
behaviour, but as a crime. Teaching materials were also developed to educate Hong Kong 
youth about corruption, promote social disapproval of corrupt behaviour and increase the sense 
of morality of young people (Manion, 2004). In mainland China, moral education has been at 
the heart of most anti-corruption campaigns (He, 2000), extending beyond its usual remit to 
include shock and theatrical fear techniques to scare potential culprits and set an example to the 
population (Wedman, 2005). 
 
2.2.2.2 Attitude and Behaviour Change 
 
One might argue that education and laws are enough to control individual behaviour. 
However, the efficacy of education as a means of altering individual behaviour was challenged 
by Rothschild (1999), who noted that it might only be effective when dealing with uninformed 
individuals who could potentially be motivated to change their behaviour once they had been 
informed about the issue. In the same way, use of the law is limited since its application is only 
suitable if knowledgeable individuals act upon it. Social marketing has proven its suitability for 
altering individual behaviour when education and laws alone may prove insufficient (Madill 
and Abele, 2007). An individual attitude is defined by the belief that a specific behaviour will 
lead to a specific outcome and an effective evaluation (like or dislike) of the outcome of that 
behaviour. Hence an individual will reflect on these two factors, i.e. his or her attitude toward a 
given behaviour, as well as the perceived social acceptability of this behaviour. Attitude and 
social norm are weighed separately. If the outcome seems beneficial, the individual may then 
intend to or actually adopt a particular behaviour. An individual may perform (or not perform) 
a specific behaviour solely because the social pressure overcomes his or her own negative (or 
positive) evaluation of such behaviour. On the other hand, he or she may decide to ignore peer 
pressure and perform a behaviour which he or she evaluates positively. 
 
2.2.2.3 Campaign Credibility 
 
To gain citizen support and collaboration, the promoters of a campaign should have the 
necessary credibility in the eyes of the audience. In cases where an established government is 
generally considered corrupt, Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) recommend that the promoter of 
the campaign should be either an independent agency specializing in anti-corruption measures 
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or a newly elected government. In Botswana, the anti-corruption agency, the the Directorate 
on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was perceived as biased, treating corruption cases 
associated with powerful politicians and organizations with undue leniency. As a result, the 
anti-corruption campaign was far from successful (Robin et al, 1999). Similarly, the anti-
corruption campaign conducted by the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission was not able to 
achieve the expected results because the commission lost credibility (Otieno, 2005). If an anti-
corruption campaign is not followed by concrete actions against perpetrators, the campaign 
might lose credibility and in turn cause increased public distrust in the government. As noted 
by Chubb and Vannicelli (1988), corruption scandals that are left unpunished lead to a further 
loss of legitimacy for the government. In Russia, anti-corruption campaigns have been 
manipulated and hijacked by politicians to discredit their opponents. Not only does the 
campaign lose all credibility, but citizen trust in their country’s democratic process is broken 
(Coulloudon, 2002). As one of the early supporters of anti-corruption campaigns has admitted, 
global efforts to fight corruption have been ineffective if not counterproductive: “Today, the 
war on corruption is undermining democracy, helping the wrong leaders get elected, and 
distracting societies from facing urgent problems” (Naím, 2005 as cited by Ivanov, 2007, p. 
40). According to Wedman (2005), with only one per cent of Chinese officials being 
investigated and only 0.5 per cent being convicted of corruption yearly, anti-corruption 
campaigns are unlikely to succeed. One may conclude by questioning the actual efficacy of 
anti-corruption social marketing campaigns altogether. Klitgaard, a leading scholar of 
corruption, and colleagues Abaroa and Parris (2000, p. 11) remark that “the history of anti-
corruption campaigns around the world is not propitious”.   
 
2.2.3 Social Marketing Models 
 
Truong (2012) retrieved 1,423 social marketing articles published between 1998 and 
2012 and out of these 1,423, 867 were retained which matched Andreasen’s six social 
marketing criteria (Andreasen, 2002). However, from these 867 articles, none dealt with the 
subject of corruption. Research was mostly conducted on public health and global health 
epidemics (71.4 per cent of published articles). Other areas, such as public safety, 
environmental protection, tourism, leisure and civil society, were rarely investigated. A search 
of the literature shows that the use of social marketing to fight corruption has not been a 
popular research theme to date. One of the most salient articles to date was published in 1998 
by Professor Gurpit Kindra, a marketing professor in the Telfer School of Management at the 
University of Ottawa who joined the World Bank in 1996 to focus on anti-corruption, good 
  33 
governance and parliamentary development, and Rick Stapenhurst, a consultant and adviser to 
the World Bank, under the title: “Social marketing strategies to fight corruption”.  
Although social marketing theories derive from a wide range of disciplines, such as 
health, sociology, political science, psychology and economics, only a quarter out of the 867 
research articles analysed by Truong were substantiated adequately by theory (Truong, 2012). 
An earlier review of 497 articles in the health sector showed that amongst the theories 
employed most frequently were social cognitive theory, Health Believe model, the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and Diffusion Innovation 
Theory (Glanz, Lewis and Rimer, 1997). Truong later confirmed these findings (Truong, 2012). 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) have both 
been applied to the analysis of corruption intention. Unethical behavioural intention in the 
medical profession was found to be accurately predicted by the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Randall and Gibson, 1991). While Chang (1998) found that although both theories could 
predict an individual intention to copy software illegally, the theory of planned behaviour gave 
more accurate results in predicting unethical behaviour. The Theory of Planned Behaviour was 
also successfully applied to one of the most publicized cases of bankruptcy in modern history,  
that of Enron, the energy company (Kulik, O’Fallon and Salimath, 2008). The Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991, Ajzen and Madden, 1986) or the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (Fishbein, 1979) tend to present behaviour as the outcome of complex human 
interaction and social practice. TPB originated from the Theory of Reasoned Action. In TRA, 
intention is defined as the best predictor of behaviour. More specifically, an individual’s 
intention to perform a specific behaviour results from two components: his or her attitude 
toward this behaviour and his or her perception of what others think about this intended 
behaviour, i.e. the subjective norm, which refers to the pressure that society exercises on an 
individual to perform a specific behaviour or avoid it (Ajzen, 2002). 
 
2.2.4 Morocco’s Social Marketing Campaign Against Corruption 
 
In November, 2011, following the Palace’s decision to reform the constitution and 
grant extended rights to the Moroccan people, the citizens of the kingdom voted a new 
government into power. The PJD (Party for Justice and Democracy), which had based its 
campaign on promoting social justice, addressing corruption and strengthening the democratic 
agenda, won 107 out of 395 seats in parliament (BBC News, 2015). The King — as stipulated 
under the new constitution adopted in July 2011 — had no choice but to nominate the prime 
minister from the winning party. In December, 2011, 
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with a sample of 1,000 people aged 18 and over asked Moroccans what the main objectives of 
the new government should be. Fighting corruption unambiguously came first (62 per cent of 
respondents), followed by healthcare with 59 per cent then education with 51 per cent 
(Actuel.ma, 2015). The new Prime Minister, Abdelillah Benkirane, and his government 
embarked on a series of campaigns to address the issue of corruption. The United Nations 
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and the new administration teamed up to 
launch a series of measures to curtail corruption (al-Dahdah and Brillaud, 2008). The most 
recent government action against corruption took place in 2012, when a nationwide social 
marketing campaign was launched (Le Monde, 2012). This campaign was in fact the very first 
social marketing campaign against corruption to be launched in Morocco. El Guerrouj, the 
Minister in charge of the campaign, claimed that educating citizens was the chief objective of 
this campaign and that, therefore, it would be built around broadcasting public information 
clips nationwide in the media. El Guerrouj stipulated that the purpose of the campaign was to 
“educate Moroccans” about the perils of this “plague” (Le Monde, 2012).  
The national education program for the fight against corruption and its prevention had 
two phases. The first phase, launched on December 10, 2012, lasted one year. It aimed at 
presenting and explaining corruption to the public. This stage of the campaign included TV 
announcements, radio spots, the distribution of stickers and pins and the display of posters in 
government and public institutions. The second stage lasted for four weeks beginning in March 
2013 and included public debates about corruption (L’économiste, 2012). During this period, 
clips were broadcast 356 times in both French and Arabic on national television. The campaign 
also appeared on billboards and posters in public offices with the slogan: “Beware of 
Corruption” ( ةﻮﺷﺮﻟا ﻦﻣ  ﻢﻛﺎﯾو) with 75 billboards displayed in Morocco’s major cities and on the 
main roads around the country at a total cost of around 2.5 million MAD (around 280,000 USD 
at Dec 2013 rates, unofficial and estimated) (Nazih, 2012). In addition, in order to be able to 
target a large proportion of the population, the campaign’s billboards presented a 
straightforward message in using a red ‘forbidden’ sign above the sentence “Beware of 
Corruption” (Figure 2): 
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Figure 2 - Anti-Corruption campaign billboard 
 
The newly elected government had won the election with a large majority and seemed 
to enjoy the necessary credibility to address the issue of corruption. A December, 2011 survey 
showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens had “some” or “complete” trust in the Prime 
Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which he was elected 
(Actuel.ma, 2015). However, critics were quick to comment that the “Beware of Corruption” 
was too simplistic a message and would be ineffective or possibly even counterproductive. 
Abdessamad Saddouq, the Secretary General of Transparency in Morocco, characterised the 
anti-corruption campaign as being “an insult to the citizens’ intelligence” (Nazih, 2012); he 
also stated that “this is a wrong and inappropriate response to corruption. The approach can 
only be credible if it is based on something concrete, namely prevention strategy” (Nazih, 
2012). Abdeslam Aboudrar, president of the Moroccan Central Authority for the Prevention of 
Corruption, stated that the campaign had not been launched at the right time and that 
“awareness should either accompany or follow a strategy that defines the roles and 
responsibilities, and not the opposite. Otherwise, the results will be neither effective nor 
successful” (Nazih, 2012). Nazih also quoted a Moroccan citizen as saying, “Corruption cannot 
be fought with slogans. I know a nurse in a public hospital who takes 20 dirhams per patient, 
but a large poster saying ‘No to corruption’ hangs over her head!” (Nazih, 2012). To date, there 
has not been a follow up to the campaign and no measure of the effectiveness of the campaign 
was undertaken.
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Chapter 3 Research	Framework	&	Methodology	
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, to signify the volatile nature of concepts in philosophy and 
science, wrote: “Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no 
heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing 
without their creator’s signature” (1994, p. 5).  
The main purpose of this research is to explore the cultural and socio-demographic 
aspects of corruption in Morocco, as well as the extent to which the anti-corruption campaign 
has been successful at altering citizen attitude and intention toward corruption. This chapter 
will articulate the research design implemented in this research. Toward this objective the 
proposed research frameworks follows Creswell’s (2013) research design guidelines. In the 
first part, this chapter presents the philosophical assumptions underlying the research or 
research paradigm; a second part is centred around the methodologies, or the strategy of 
inquiry; and finally the methods of data collection and analysis will be discussed. Thus, the 
sub-topics that are examined in this chapter are: 
 
• The proposed knowledge claim or research paradigm. 
• The methodology or strategy of inquiry. 
• The data collection methods and analysis procedure. 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
 
In his book, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, one of the most referenced 
scholastic books of all time (Bird, 2004), Thomas Samuel Kuhn refers to paradigms as the 
understanding of scientific advancements taking into account the intellectual frameworks in 
which scientists operate. It must be said, however, that Kuhn, who had been a pioneer in 
bringing this term into the realm of social science, had given the term “paradigm” no less than 
twenty-one different definitions, (Guba, 1990). For Rumelhard (2005), paradigms are set of 
ideas or designs which form a conceptual framework within which one may think, imagine, 
plan experiments, interpret and elaborate theories from the results. The underlying idea is that 
reality and knowledge are socially constructed (Berger, Luckmann, 1966). In other words, 
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one’s perceptions of the world is not based on events themselves but are shaped by the political, 
economic, social, and cultural context in which one evolves. By setting research boundaries, in 
Kuhn's words, a “paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and 
depth that would otherwise be unimaginable” (Kuhn, 2012, p.24). Thus the research paradigm 
sets the framework, or the boundaries within which the reality is to be explored and as such 
impact the research methods (Crotty, 1998). 
 
3.3 Philosophical Underpinning of Paradigms 
 
The first step for any researcher must include a definition of what constitutes knowledge, 
or perhaps more specifically, what constitutes “ontology”. Ontology deals with the subjectivity 
of reality, with the understanding that knowledge is perception-based and socially-constructed 
and hence may vary from individual to individual. As coined by Heron, “Worlds and people are 
what we meet, but the meeting is shaped by our own terms of reference” (Heron, 1996, p. 11). 
In the second step, the researcher must assess how well she or he knows the issue. This 
assessment is best summarized using the term: “epistemology”. Epistemology the study of 
knowledge and is concerned with what it means to say one “knows” or does “not know” 
something. However, epistemology also examines the question of how much knowledge a 
person can retain. 
In the third step, the researcher must question the underpinning values on which 
research the research is based, or “axiology”. The assumption is that any “value”, such as a 
human value like “ethics”, needs to be included in the scope of the research since the social 
scientist is dealing with human beings. 
The fourth step of the research process deals with how the researcher writes about his 
or her research, or “rhetoric”. For example, a qualitative research approach rejects quantitative 
references while a quantitative approach prefers an impersonal style. 
Finally, the methodological assumption, or the process with which the research is carried 
out, needs to be considered. This is best considered using referencing the term: “methodology.” 
Guba (1990) argues that the answers given to the ontological (what is the nature of 
reality), epistemological (what is the nature between the knower and the known) and 
methodological (how should the researchers uncover knowledge) questions form a set of belief 
systems or paradigms guiding the researchers endeavour. Although Guba (1990) and Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) state that ontology, epistemology and methodology are the three defining 
characteristics of a research paradigm, Heron and Reason (1997) contend that axiology must 
also be included within this set. This places the human dimension of research at the core of 
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their argument for the inclusion of the axiological question: “what is intrinsically worthwhile, 
what it is about the human condition that is valuable as an end in itself?” (Heron and Reason, 
1997, p. 10). 
 
3.4 Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research Paradigms 
 	 Traditionally, Quantitative and Qualitative research paradigms have set the main 
boundaries within which social science has operated. The researcher operating under the 
Quantitative Paradigm (also termed Positivist Philosophy) believes that social science should 
be objective and that it is possible for the participant to be shielded from the researcher’s biases 
and emotions (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Advocates of the Quantitative Paradigm 
believe that social science should operate on the same ground as hard sciences, such as physics, 
with the aim to establish reproducible social models and laws (Maxwell and Delaney, 2004). 
On the other hand, social scientists, operating under the realm of the Qualitative Paradigm, 
reject Positivism as they believe that it is impossible to separate the observer from the 
participants or that the knower and the known cannot be estranged because reality is a creation 
from the knower. (Guba, 1990). The Qualitative scientist would argue the superiority of 
Constructivism, Idealism, Relativism, Humanism, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism as 
philosophical viewpoints (Schwandt, 2000). The traditional consensus is that there is an 
irreconcilable divide between the Quantitative and the Qualitative Paradigm (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004) contend that the Mixed Methods 
Paradigm can ease the hermetic boundaries between both Quantitative and Qualitative 
paradigms. Mixed methods combines the use of both Qualitative and Quantitative research 
methods in answering research questions, (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2013). 
 
3.5 Post-Positivism, Constructivism, Advocacy/Participatory, and Pragmatism 
 
Post-Positivism takes its root in the Positivist knowledge claim and, although it follows 
a scientific method, it maintains that one cannot construct a precise mathematical model of 
reality and that absolute truth does not exist. In the Post-Positivist approach, causes may 
determine a particular outcome, and Post-Positivists will attempt to mathematically model a 
certain reality through careful observation and measurement of the world. Yet Post-Positivists 
are also aware that their model is only a partial representation of this reality.  
Constructivism, on the other hand, relies on the participant view of the world and 
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importantly takes into account the participants own context and social setting. The researcher 
establishes a set of broad, open-ended questions in which the participant can describe her or his 
own perception of a given issue.  
The Advocacy / Participatory approach focuses on marginalised individuals or groups. 
At the heart of the Advocacy / Participatory research rests the believe that the outcome of the 
research should include an actionable program to help these marginalised individuals.  
In Pragmatism, researchers draw freely from both Quantitative and Qualitative 
hypotheses. Pragmatism allows for the Mixed Methods researcher the possibility to consider 
different worldviews and utilize various forms of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013).  
Table 1 summarizes these different approaches: 
 
Research Paradigms 
Post-Positivism 
Determination, Experimental observation and 
measurement, reductivism, Theory confirmation 
Constructivism 
Context-based research (Social and historical), 
Theory generation 
Participatory 
Social change oriented and collaborative 
Pragmatism 
Problem-based, and context oriented 
Table 1 - Research Paradigms, Source: Adapted From Creswell, (2013, P. 6) 
 
3.6 Methodologies 
 
Although one should not automatically associate quantitative approaches with Post-
Positivism and Qualitative approaches with Constructivism (Morgan, 2013), there are basic 
strategies for enquiries associated with the Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods 
research approaches (Creswell, 2013). 
Strategies associated with a Quantitative research approach include surveys and 
experiments. Experimental designs include correlation tests, Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) or Propensity Score Matching, used for experimental and non-experimental designs, 
such as a Propensity Score Matching Technique (Dehejia, and Wahba, 2002). 
Strategies associated with a Qualitative research approach can include Ethnographic 
Research wherein the researcher observes the issue in its natural context. Notably, a recent 
study by the World Bank (2006) found that less than two per cent of the research on corruption 
involved an ethnographic component. This is not surprising given the hidden nature of 
corruption. The core base of Ethnographic Research implies building a relationship of trust 
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between the researcher and the participant. Toward this objective, the researcher is immersed 
into the daily life of the group(s) and network(s) of persons under study, (Torsello, 2011). This 
is indeed a time consuming, challenging task and Melhuu, et al. (2010) have reported few 
successes using Ethnographic Research in a corruption study.  
Other strategies associated with a Qualitative research approach include Grounded 
Theory, phenomenological research or narrative research (Creswell, 2013). The Grounded 
Theory approach relies on the collection and sampling of case studies representative of various 
perceptions amongst different social groups. Precupetu (2007) argues that case studies can 
reveal various aspects of corruption; however, the essential difficulty in using this technique is 
the difficulty in such a method does not allow for broader generalizations. In the 
Phenomenological Approach, the researcher attempts to understand the issue by forging a 
strong relationship with a limited number of participants (Creswell, 2013). While the Narrative 
Approach focuses on studying a few stories from the participants. The outcome is a 
combination of points of view from both the participants and researcher(s). Ren (2012) has 
used Narrative Inquiry to assess corruption in the academic sector in China. Ren used 
qualitative selective interviews, which are effective at providing insight about the issue and 
clearly show the complexity of the problem. However, due to the limited number of interviews, 
one must remain circumspect toward the policy agenda suggested by Ren. 
 
3.7 The Case for Quantitative Paradigms in Corruption Research 
 
A Qualitative Approach based on Ethnographic Research could indeed be an ideal 
assessment of corruption as this would provide first-hand observations of corrupt deals by 
impartial witnesses (Andvig et al., 2001). Problematically, such observations are rare and could 
not provide a true measure of corruption as in most cases, in the public service setting, 
observers are not allowed. Alternatively, Qualitative Research, based on the analysis of case 
studies, mostly via court convictions, could be used as a gauge for corruption. However, in a 
country where a high level of corruption is accepted, convictions are rare and consequently the 
accuracy of such a measure is also questionable (Rosenfeld et al., 2014). Gloppen (2013) noted 
that a large proportion of surveys — such as the Afrobarometer (2010); the Latinobarometer 
(2010); the Eurobarometer (2011); TI (2011); GCR (2012); and the World Justice Project 
(2012) — reported that corruption in courts of law was extensive. Another issue with the 
former measurement method is that it may simply reflect the effectiveness of the judiciary 
system, or perhaps the police’s over-zealousness to please the administration rather than the 
actual number of corruption cases (Goel and Nelson, 1998). Media reporting on corruption 
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could also be an indicator of the level of corruption within a country, however, again such a 
measure could be subject to multiple biases, including the level of freedom enjoyed by the 
press or the fact that larger corruption cases pointing to high level officials may be ignored and 
small fish corruption cases over-reported (Andvig et al., 2001).  
In Morocco, the freedom of the press is notoriously poor. According to Reporters 
Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, or RSF for short) in 2013 the kingdom was 
ranked 136th out of 179 countries, behind Zimbabwe (133th) and far behind Finland, which 
tops the list of countries with the highest level of press freedom. In 2015, Morocco’s ranking 
did not improve much with the country placing 130th out of 180 surveyed countries (RSF, 
2015). In Morocco, the Royal Palace controls the majority of radio and television stations and 
journalists who do not self-censor risk both heavy fines and/or incarceration (Cantrell, 2014). 
For example, on September 17th, 2013, Ali Anouzla, director of the news site Lakome.com, 
was arrested for his association with a blog posting a video entitled: Morocco, “Kingdom of 
Corruption and Despotism” (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and, in one of the latest government 
attempts to muzzle the press, Hicham Mansouri, the Director of Programmes at the NGO 
Moroccan Association for Investigative Journalism, was jailed for ten months starting March 
30th, 2015 and fined 20,000 MAD (about 2,000 USD at the time of the fine) for helping to 
report on corruption by politicians. Hence, measuring corruption through the mere observation 
(ethnographies) of corrupt acts through a qualitative research of court cases and/or media 
coverage of corruption cases (Grounded Theory) may prove unsuitable at providing a 
representative sample of corrupt behaviour (Andvig et al. , 2001).  
Until the mid-90s, Quantitative approaches to measure corruption were rarely used. 
Mauro pioneered the use of perception-based measures to assess corruption (Mauro, 1995 as 
cited by León, Araña and de León, 2013). Mauro based his corruption index on the survey of 
journalists, businesspeople and country experts about their suggestive evaluation of corruption 
regarding doing business in a given country (Mauro, 1995 as cited by León, Araña, and de 
León 2013).  
 
 
 
3.8 Research Hypotheses 
 
 The underpinning of Post-Positivism is that reality can never be established with 
certainty (Creswell, 2003) and that the evidence claimed in research are very likely fallible. 
Consequently, the researcher will not try to validate a hypothesis, which would presume that 
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the outcome of the research would lead to establishing a perfect rule. On the contrary, in the 
Post-Positivistic approach, the research questions are stated in term of null hypotheses, that is, 
hypotheses which the Post-Positivist researcher will attempt to refute or nullify (Scherbaum 
and Shockley, 2015) hence implying that other realities might exists outside of the hypotheses. 
The null hypotheses of this research are thus: 
 
H0:  There is no correlation between socio-demographics, personal and social values and a 
Moroccan citizen’s corrupt intention. 
 
H0: There is no correlation between the campaign reach, interest, message comprehension, 
credibility and recall and Moroccan attitude and intention toward corruption. 
 
3.9 Data Collection Methods: Expert-Based Surveys Versus Micro-Level Surveys 
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is based on a survey of 
experts and according to Transparency International: “The index cannot capture the individual 
frustration of this reality, but it does capture the informed views of analysts, businesspeople and 
experts in countries around the world” (2016). The CPI has become a norm to measure 
corruption, yet many question remain about the accuracy of this index in term of describing 
citizen’s everyday reality.  
 
3.9.1 Expert Perception-Based Surveys  
 
Expert Perception-Based Surveys have rapidly become a preferred tool of assessing 
corruption (Treisman, 2007). Today, Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception 
Index” is one of best-known and most widely used indexes to measure corruption (León, 
Araña, and de León 2013). The index is based on surveying the level of corruption perceived 
either by experts or high or middle-level business managers of international or local 
corporations (Andvig et al. (2001).  “The index reflects the views of observers from around the 
world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated” (TI, 
2015). However, recent findings have questioned as to what extent the perceptions of experts 
reflect the view of the common citizen (Lee and Guven, 2013). For example, Razafindrakoto 
and Roubaud (2010), using a common survey in eight sub-Saharan countries that targeted both 
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the general population and experts, discovered that experts would systematically overestimate 
the weight of petty corruption. Treisman (2007) explains this discrepancy by the fact that 
micro-level data based on experience could be noisier and unreliable. Treisman also 
hypothesizes that micro-level data may reflect inferences made by experts and accepted beliefs 
about corruption rather than actual observation by respondents. To date, research investigating 
micro-level corruption using interviews and questionnaires has been infrequent (Alam, 1989; 
Dong, Dulleck and Torgler, 2012 and more recently Lee and Guven, 2013). Data from 
questionnaires, however, needs to be treated with caution, especially when answers to sensitive 
questions are solicited (Catania et al., 1990, as cited by Oloo, et al., 2012). Researchers have 
argued that since such questionnaires are self-reported and based on hypothetical situations and 
choices, an individual who has committed an act of corruption may lessen his or her guilt by 
answering in the questionnaire that corruption is hardly justifiable (Dong, Dulleck and Torgler, 
2012). Others may overplay their degree of compliance with the law (Torgler and Valev, 2006). 
In the same vein, the Theory of Social Desirability suggests that interviewees will tend to avoid 
socially unacceptable responses or will tend to provide answers which he or she perceives to be 
matching the value system of the interviewer (Benstead, 2013). For example, in Morocco male 
respondents were more likely to report more gender egalitarian opinions with a female 
interviewer than with a male interviewer. In a recent study in Morocco, using data from a 
representative survey of eight hundred participants, Benstead shows that observable 
interviewers with traits such as gender and dress, clearly effect the answers of the respondents 
(2014). Religious respondents will tend to give a more religious answer to a question of 
religion to female interviewers wearing hijabs and noticeably less religious answers to male 
interviewers they perceive to be wearing a more Western-style of attire (Benstead, 2014). 
However, Reinikka and Svensson (2006) showed that properly designed surveys can provide 
robust micro-level data on corruption.   
3.9.2 Micro-Level Survey: Establishing the Variables Impacting Corruption 
 
As argued previously, there are various forces — at times interrelated, at times 
competing — that determine an individual’s disposition toward corruption. The forces include 
the demographics of each individual with his or her diversity of value systems, as well as the 
principles, morals, and social forces outside of the individual’s personal convictions. Social 
norms originate from the various groups with which an individual is affiliated, such as his or 
her family, friends, colleagues, religious group or nation. Such factors shall be tested 
independently using a micro-level survey.  
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The table below (Table 2) provides a biographical summary from the previous 
literature review of the research of the factors impacting corrupt intention. 
 
Correlated factors to 
corruption 
 
Reference Brief description of findings 
Poverty / No alternative 
to life 
Kyi (1992) Fear of poverty linked to corruption intention 
Hakeem (2012) High poverty level increase corruption 
Atoyebi and 
Mobolaji (2004) 
As Above 
Werlin (2005) Fear of poverty linked to corruption intention 
(Nigeria) 
Chapra (2008) Providing basic need to reduce corruption 
Lakshmi and Sinha 
(2012) 
Fear of poverty increase corrupt intention 
   
Insecurity for the future 
/ unemployment / low 
career expectation 
Vorster (2012) Unemployment linked to corruption in South 
Africa 
Ionescu (2012) Low career expectation in police departments 
as a cause for corruption 
   
Everybody does it Marquette (2012) Population chose moral disengagement 
Adeyemi (2012) Corruption is endemic (Nigeria) 
   
Trust in the government Uslaner (2004) The higher the corruption the lesser the trust in 
the government 
Hu and Shi (2013) Negative impact of corruption on government 
trust 
Becker, et al. (2014) Trust in the state reduces corruption in courts 
and police Habsburg 
Aladwani (2016) Perceived corruption lead to failure of e-
government project. 
Hakhverdian and Mayne 
(2012) 
Higher level of corruption reduces trust in the 
government (for higher educated citizen) 
   
Help a friend Pekdemir and Turan 
(2015) 
Corruption to help a friend 
Schwartz (2015) Help friend to secure position 
Ledeneva (2014) Moral norm: help friend over corruption 
Smith (2012) Help a friend not corruption 
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Normal to accept / give 
gift 
Marquette (2012) Corruption defined as gift 
Greaves (2001) Gift as corruption to strengthen business ties 
Chaudhuri (2008) As above 
   
Household perception / 
Income inequality / 
unfairness society 
 Shame of poverty as a cause of corruption 
   
Wages Laws, Outlook, and 
Bookmark (1997) 
Low wages as a cause of corruption 
Le, De Haan, and 
Dietzenbacher  (2013) 
Higher wage reduce corruption at low-income 
levels 
Vorster (2012) Low wages and unemployment linked to 
corruption in South Africa 
Gong and Wu (2012) Increasing wages not proven to decrease 
corruption in China 
Ali (2008) Low wages increase corruption 
   
Living Abroad Tyburski (2014) Remittance and experiences living abroad 
impact corruption 
Dimant, Krieger, and 
Redlin (2014) 
Immigration from high level corruption origin 
countries increases corruption in receiving 
country -- 207 countries analysed 
   
Authorities Alford (2012) Increase enforcement to reduce petty 
corruption 
Rosenfeld, et al. (2014) When corruption is endemic, condemnation are 
rare 
Andvig and Fjeldstad 
(2008) 
Corrupt police reduces fear of officers and 
increases corruption 
Faull (2007) Corruption is prevalent in many police forces 
around the world 
Gloppen (2013) Corrupt courts lead to an increase in corrupt 
intention 
   
Personal Convictions Marquette (2012) Population moral disengagement 
Chapra (2008)  
Levine (2005) Shame and social condemnation 
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Lambsdorff, Graf and 
Cornelius (2000) 
Cost of breaching own moral values 
   
Influence of Family Hellstén and Larbi (2006) Corruption as a necessity to help family 
Lakshmi and Sinha 
(2012) 
Family member are the only one trusted and 
favoured (India) 
   
Religion Vorster (2012) Religion to help reduce corruption 
Marquette (2012) Little impact on corrupt behaviour (India and 
Nigeria) 
Chapra (2008)  
Singgih (2012) Propose religion as a way to alleviate 
corruption 
Paldam (2001) Religiously-divided countries have a lower 
propensity to corruption than countries were 
one religion is prevalent 
L’economiste (2012b) Corruption is “Haram” – Mustapha Ramid 
Justice and liberty Minister. 
   
Media Scandals Mo (2013) Public exposure to reduce corruption (China) 
Ferraz and Finan (2012) Media exposure reduces corruption 
Camaj (2012) High level of media freedom link to lower 
corrupton 
Balán (2011) Reducing corruption through media scandals -- 
Argentina and Chile 
Hibou and Tozy (2009) Social media to expose corruption in Morocco 
   
Training / education Hakhverdian and Mayne 
(2012) 
Higher level of education linked to increased 
awareness of corruption 
Warning and 
Dürrenberger (2015) 
Level of education is negatively impacted by 
higher level of corruption 
Table 2 - Biographical summary of the factors impacting corrupt intention 
 
3.10 Instrumentation: The Survey 
 
The first survey in this study tackles two objectives. The first objective is to measure 
the arguments used by Moroccan citizens to justify corruption — taking into account 
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respondent socio-demographics. The second objective is to measure factors that may deter 
respondents from engaging in corrupt acts. The initial investigation into corruption in Morocco 
tested which possible values may motivate or deter an individual towards or away from corrupt 
behaviour. A questionnaire was constructed to measure both Moroccan beliefs about corruption 
as well as their perception of the various norms that respondents may or may not have used to 
justify their intentions towards corruption. In order to increase the reliability of the 
questionnaire and secure more honest answers from the respondents, the questionnaire 
minimized direct queries regarding personal participation in corruption (Torgler and Valev, 
2006). The first part is intended to test the respondent’s personal beliefs about corruption, with 
respondents being asked to rate on a five point Likert scale various possible justifications for 
engaging in a corrupt action. The question was stated as follows: “According to your personal 
opinion, what justifies corruption?” The respondents were given a list of factors to rate on a 
five point Likert scale where “1” signifies that corruption can “never be justified” and “5” 
signifies that corruption can “always be justified”. The factors tested were: perceived poverty, 
household perception (that is, feeling that one’s household is poorer relative to one’s 
neighbour), no alternative to afford life expenses, insecurity for the future, “everybody is doing 
it”, no trust in the government, low career advancement prospects, helping a friend, unfairness 
in society and lastly “it is normal to accept someone’s gift”. Once the respondent’s beliefs 
concerning corruption were tested, the respondents were then given a choice of questions and 
asked if they would personally be willing to accept a bribe from someone or if they would try 
to bribe an official. 
The second part of the survey assesses the potential deterrents to corruption. Again, 
using a five point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to identify the factors that were most 
likely to deter someone from a corrupt act with 1 signifying that the factor was  “never a 
deterrent” and 5 signifying that it was a “likely deterrent”. The factors proposed were: higher 
wages, influence of living abroad, fear of the authorities, personal and moral conviction, 
influence of family and friends, influence of religion, media scandals, and training employees. 
The last part measured some demographic variables of the respondents: level of education, age, 
monthly income, family status, household size, occupation, gender, marital status and work 
sector. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix I. 
 
3.11 Data Collection and Sampling 
 
3.11.1 The Pilot Study 
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Initially, the questionnaire was distributed to thirty participants in and around the city 
of Azrou, a middle-sized town (estimated population: 47,000) in the Middle Atlas region of 
Morocco. The first attempt to distribute the questionnaire by a male non-Moroccan pollster 
resulted in a non-response rate of over 95 per cent. When approached with the questionnaire, 
the potential respondents would enquire about the subject and when informed that it was about 
corruption, they would emphatically decline answering the survey. Some even refused to touch 
the questionnaire fearing that fingerprints might be collected. Two female pollsters were 
engaged and trained to distribute the questionnaire. This action resulted in a more acceptable 
response rate. 
3.11.2 Language Issues 
 
The Language Issue in Morocco is complex. The officially recognized languages of the 
country are Modern Standard Arabic and Amazigh. However, the most spoken language is 
Darija (or Moroccan Arabic) — a combination of Arabic, French and Spanish. Darija is spoken 
by about two-thirds of the Moroccan population, though problematically it is not a unified 
language and there are a number of significant variants of Darija that exist throughout the 
country (Hall, 2015). A large percentage of the population (around 40 to 45 percent) does 
communicate in one of the Amazigh (Berber) languages, but there are three incredibly diverse 
strains of Amazigh in use and a third of those speakers communicate exclusively in their strain 
of Amazigh (Ajbaili, 2011) and do not use Darija at all. Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), 
though used sometimes in official documents, is rarely spoken.  
For this questionnaire, French was chosen for a number of reasons. First, French is 
widely spoken, understood and is one of the two written languages used in official documents, 
with the other being MSA (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Second, though Darija is 
increasingly being used on billboards, TV, and social media, there is no standard writing 
system for it. Currently it is being written in a mix of characters from the Arabic and Latin 
alphabets (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Lastly, the interviewers, like many people in 
Morocco, are more fluent in French than in Modern Standard Arabic, both of the interviewers 
having studied in a Moroccan university where the main language of instruction is French. 
The two female pollsters who were assigned the task of distributing the survey are both 
fluent in French, but being natives of the Middle Atlas region, they also speak Darija and 
Amazigh fluently. In rural communities, the illiteracy rate for women averages 70 per cent 
(Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2012). Hence, the pollsters were often asked to 
translate and explain the questionnaire and record responses on behalf of the respondents in 
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rural areas who could not read or write. The same procedure had to be carried out for 
respondents whose languages were only Darija or Amazigh. Distribution of the questionnaire to 
university students was not difficult as Moroccan universities use French as the main language 
of instruction. 
 
3.11.3 Dress Code Issues 
 
Regarding the dress of the interviewers, as discussed previously, Benstead (2014) has 
rigorously demonstrated the impact of an interviewer’s dress on a respondent’s answers 
concerning religious questions, with respondents adapting their answer to suit the interviewer’s 
appearance. Less religious answers were given to western style dressed interviewers and more 
religious answers were given to interviewers wearing the hijab (Benstead, 2014). Boulanouar’s 
(2010 as cited by Bachleda, Hamelin and Benachour, 2014) research about the clothing of 
Moroccan women shows the existence of four main styles sported by Moroccan women in 
public:  
 
• Western style: tight fitting garments (Jeans, t-shirts, skirts) without headscarf 
• Western style clothing with a headscarf / Hijab. 
• Slack fitting clothes without headscarf (i.e. clothes that do not profile the body with a 
headscarf) 
• Loose fitting outfits with a headscarf / Hijab. 
 
In our case, both interviewers were female. One did not wear a headscarf while the 
other wore the hijab / headscarf. Having the interviewer dress differently at the stages of giving 
the questionnaire could possibly lessen the impact of the interviewer’s appearance on 
respondent answers. Since corruption is considered “haram”, or “forbidden”, by Islam 
(L’economiste, 2015b) pious respondents may be more inclined to reject corruption more 
strongly in their answer than less religious respondents. 
A first batch of 30 questionnaires was printed and tested with the participation of 
students and non-students in the local region of Ifrane. Problematic questions were then 
reworded in French until they became completely unambiguous. Back translation, as 
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recommended by Brislin (1980), was used at a later stage to guarantee the accuracy of the 
English version of the questionnaire, for inclusion in this thesis. 
 
3.11.4 Data Collection 
 
Over 400 questionnaires were printed in November, 2012 over a period of four weeks. 
The objective was to have a response rate of at least 50 per cent. The total number of 
respondents was 200 (including those who completed the questionnaire partially) — thus we 
achieved exactly a 50 per cent response rate. One of the pollsters was wearing the hijab (see 
picture 1 of Itto Bouzzaoui, pollster from Azrou) while the other was not wearing the hijab, 
however, no significant difference was recorded in the data collected by the two pollsters. The 
Non-Probability Intercept Quota Sampling Method was used. The pollsters were given 
directives to gather a minimum sample size of 200 respondents with the aim of gathering 
answers from an equal proportion of men and women living in urban and rural locations.  
The questionnaires were distributed in the large cities of Marrakech and Rabat, as well 
as in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small towns, such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and Azrou, 
so that the number of respondents in rural areas matches the number of respondents in urban 
areas. Marrakech and Rabat are two major Moroccan cities (Rabat is the capital of Morocco 
and Marrakesh is one of the major tourist destinations) with respective populations of around 
600,000 and 900,000 inhabitants. Azrou, Ifrane and Aïn Leuh are smaller rural towns of the 
Middle Atlas region with populations of approximately 47,000, 15,000 and 5,800 inhabitants in 
2015 respectively. 
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Figure 3 - Pollster Itto Bouzzaoui (Left) in Azrou, Middle Atlas, Morocco, August 2013 
 
3.12 Data Analysis 
 
Enumerative statistics or descriptive statistics are conducted to provide details about 
the sample for this study as well as respondent mean scores regarding corruption intention and 
mean score for each factor put forward by respondents to justify corruption. Analytical 
statistics test potential causal relationship between corruption intention and respondents socio-
demographic characteristics, as well a causal relationship between the factors used to justify 
corruption and corruption intention. Logistic regression analysis provides answers on potential 
causality, but is also useful to forecast an outcome and predict trends. For example, logistic 
regression on the data collected will show that there is a correlation between gender and 
corruption intention (causality), that men who feel that there is a high level of injustice in 
society are more likely to engage in corruption (forecasting an outcome) and finally that the 
higher the wage for a male respondent the less likely it is that he will engage in corruption 
(trend forecasting). 
 
3.12.1 Questionnaire Reliability 
 
The reliability of the questionnaire was tested through computing the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha for the totality of the variables included in the study for a sample of 200 
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respondents. The Cronbach’s alpha test is frequently used in this context as it provides a 
reasonably good measure of the reliability of a questionnaire (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). A 
questionnaire is deemed reliable if it generates consistent and stable response even if the 
questions are replaced with similar questions. The alpha coefficient values range from zero to 
one — the higher the value, the more reliable the scale. Churchill's benchmark for Cronbach's 
alpha stipulates that a value of 0.6 or above provides satisfactory proof of questionnaire 
reliability (Churchill, 1979). Cronbach’s alpha values were found to be 0.8489 for the 
“Justifiability of Corruption” part of the questionnaire and 0.6250 for the “Deterrent Factors of 
Corruption” part. This confirms the reliability of the questionnaire used for this study. 
 
3.13 Mathematical Models 
  
In the Positivist Approach, mathematical models are revered since they are considered 
as unbiased and detached from the influences of human interactions. Mathematical models 
support the positivistic idea that reality follows strict patterns and can be described with 
accuracy. The Post-Positivist researcher, on the other hand, is aware that there is nothing such 
as an absolute truth and that the computation of data will not lead to the discovery of an overall 
‘truth’. Post-Positivism is often suspicious of mathematical models and qualitative research 
methods are favoured; yet the Quantitative Approach has remained an important tool to Post-
Positivism. A Quantitative Approach provides explicit information about an issue and 
mathematical modelling is essential to uncover whether or not an issue is numerically 
significant. It also aides in the discovery of potential patterns of behaviour across a variety of 
cases (Ryan, 2016). 
 
 
3.13.1 Justifiability of Corruption 
 
The first model presented in figure 4, tests respondent perceptions about the 
justifiability of corruption along certain societal factors: Poverty; No Alternative; Insecurity; 
Everybody Does It; No Trust in the Government; No Career Expectation;  Help a Friend; 
Unfair Society; It Is Normal to Accept a Gift, and Household Perception (worse off than).  
Because a Pearson's correlation matrix showed a strong correlation between poverty and high 
cost of living we considered poverty to be a main independent variable. We then expressed as 
an odds ratio the probability to accept corruption, with P as the dependent variable = intention 
to be corrupt: 
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Log(P/1-P)  = δ + δ1 (poverty) + δ2 (no alternative) + δ3 (insecurity) + δ4 
(everybody does it) + δ5 (no trust in the government) + δ6 (low career) + δ7 (help a 
friend) + δ8 (unfairness society) + δ9 (normal to accept gift)+ δ10 (household perception) 
+ ε  
 
Figure 4 - Structural model for the justifiability of corruption 
 
3.13.2 Deterrent Factors 
 
In the third model (figure 5), respondent perceptions about deterrent factors are 
analysed. The factors considered were: Higher Wages; Impact of Living Abroad; Personal 
Conviction/Moral. Influence of Family; Influence of Religion; Fear of a Media Scandal and 
Training. The value P in this model is the probability of rejecting corruption. Here, either P = 0 
(decide to accept, meaning participate in corruption) or P = 1 (decide to reject corruption). The 
dependent variable this time is P, intention to reject corruption (i.e. the respondent has the 
intention to reject corruption: yes = 1, no = 0).  Expressed in odds ratio:  
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Log(P/1-P) = Ψ+ γ1(Higher Wages) + γ2(Living Abroad)+ γ3(Fear of 
Authorities)+ γ4(Personal Convictions)+ γ5(Influence of Family)+ γ6(Influence of 
Religion)+ γ7(Media Scandals) + γ8(Training) + ε 
 
Figure 5 - Structural model for corruption's deterrent factors 
 
 
3.13.3 Demographic Factors 
 
In the model below (figure 6), the relationship between socio-demographics and the 
“acceptance” of bribery-corruption is analysed; that is, the respondent’s willingness to involve 
themselves in a corrupt act or participate in such an act if offered is shown. The socio-
demographic factors we considered were: Level of Education; Age; Monthly Income; Family 
Status; Household Number; Gender; Marital Status and Sector of Work. We wrote an equation 
for a prospective relationship between demographic factors and the intention toward corruption. 
Expressed as an odds ratio, P1 is the dependent variable that can take two given values (0 = not 
willing to accept corruption, or 1= willing to accept corruption), β1 is a coefficient 
characterizing the influence of age, β2 is a coefficient characterizing the influence of income, 
β3 is a coefficient characterizing the influence of household size, β4 is a coefficient 
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characterizing the influence of education, β5 is a coefficient characterizing the influence of 
gender and ε is a constant: 
 
Log(P1/1-P1)  = β + β1 (age) + β2 (income) + β3 (household number) + β4 
(education) + β5(gender) + ε 
 
Figure 6 - Structural model for corruption intention vs. demographic factors 
 
 
3.14 Gathering the Data and Changing Objective 
 
This first study was conducted in November, 2012, over a four-week period. The initial 
plan was to then launch a wider scale survey targeting a higher number of respondents to 
increase the accuracy of the findings with the margin of error decreasing with higher sample 
size (Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins, 2001). Based on these results, social marketing strategies to 
address the issue would have been explored. However, on December 10th, 2012, the Moroccan 
government launched a year-long nationwide anti-corruption social awareness campaign. At 
this point, there was indeed the need to understand the impact of the campaign on Moroccan 
citizens and how the campaign would change their attitude and behaviour towards corruption. 
Therefore, the following questionnaire was designed to measure the impact of the anti-
corruption campaign on Moroccan citizens. 
 
3.15 Assessing the Efficiency of the Moroccan Anti-Corruption Campaign 
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3.15.1 Research Framework 
 
Central to an anti-corruption social marketing campaign is the alteration of people’s 
values, attitude and behaviour. Changing people’s attitudes is of foremost importance, as 
attitude is a key driver of behaviour. For Crano and Prislin (2006), as cited by Bailey and 
Spicer (2007, p. 1464), an attitude represents an “evaluative integration of cognitions and 
affects experienced in relation to an object”. Attitudes are the “evaluative judgments that 
integrate and summarize these cognitive/affective reactions”. In other words, an attitude 
towards a given behaviour results from the combination of both an individual’s belief about a 
given behaviour and an affective (like or dislike) evaluation of the outcome of it. The Theory of 
Attitude Change by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) posits that a change of attitude can only 
be met through a particular learning process. In the Message Learning Approach, an individual 
is first exposed to a given message then the message is, perhaps, being considered and found 
interesting or not by the individual. If the message is considered interesting, the person will try 
to understand its meaning and at last may or may not assimilate the message. These steps, as 
defined by Hovland, et al. (1953), are: exposure, consideration, interest, understanding and 
acquisition. In the same vein, Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) describe a very similar learning 
process dubbed: The Information Processing Approach. However, altering attitude is not a 
sufficient condition for altering an individual behaviour as attitude is only one of many factors 
determining behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975). Bandura (2002) for example, showed that 
an individual may disengage himself from his or her moral values and adopt a behaviour in line 
with the prevailing norm.  
Nwankwo (2014) uses the image of the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari (1994) to 
demonstrate that the cause of corruption in Africa is the personalization of the state power by 
the its civil servants. This work postulates that the corrupt civil servant, just like Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987, p.7) rhizome, “ceaselessly established connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles”, 
or in other words, and as hypothesized in this work, an employee continuously navigates 
between his civil servant role, personal values and social norms.  
To verify this hypothesis, the research focuses on two mainstream theories of human 
behaviour: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1985, 1991; Ajzen and Madden 
1986) and the Theories of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Both theories 
tend to present behaviour as the outcome of complex human interaction and social practice. 
Fishbein and Ajzen, (1980, p.55) postulate that an individual’s behaviour is determined by his 
or her intention to perform a particular action. Behavioural intention is the result of the 
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combination of distinctive factors: an individual attitude toward the behaviour and the 
subjective norm with respect to this potential act. Fishbein and Ajzen posit that the attitude 
toward the behaviour is “a person’s general feeling of favourableness or unfavourableness for 
that behaviour” and that subjective norm is an individual’s “perception that most people who 
are important to him think he should or should not perform the behaviour in question” 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980, p. 55). The TPB originated from the Theory of Reasoned Action. In 
the Theory of Reasoned Action, intention is defined as the best predicator for behaviour. More 
specifically, an individual’s intention to perform a specific behaviour results from two 
components: his or her attitude toward this behaviour and his or her perception of what others 
think about this intended behaviour, i.e. the subjective norm. An individual attitude is defined 
by the belief that a specific behaviour would lead to a specific outcome and an effective 
evaluation (like or dislike) of the outcome of that behaviour. Subjective norm refers to the 
pressure that society exercises on an individual to perform a specific behaviour or avoid it 
(Ajzen, 2002). Hence an individual will reflect on a multiplicity of factors, his or her attitude 
toward a given behaviour, as well as the social norms relative to his or her behaviour.  
TRA has been applied fruitfully to forecast a large number of behavioural intentions 
(Hale, Householder and Greene, 2002), and, to a lesser extent, to predict unethical behaviour. 
Chang (2013) used both TRA and TPB theories to predict unethical behaviour. Kulik, 
O’Fallon, and Salimath (2008) used TRB to analyse the cause behind Enron’s high-profile 
corruption scandal and Corral-Verdugo and Frías-Armenta (2006) refer to both theories in their 
research on unsociable behaviour and water preservation. Randal and Gibson (1991) used the 
TPB to assess ethical decision making amongst medical practitioners; they found that attitude 
was the main driving force behind the intention to report a corrupt colleague and that subjective 
norm played a lesser role. The addition of the perceived behaviour control did not increase the 
accuracy of the model, namely because reporting a colleague was under perceived as a purely 
personal decision. On the other hand, Chang (1991) showed that the TPB gave better results 
than the TRA in predicting the copying of pirated software and hypothesized that, in the case of 
corruption or computer hacking, more resources were needed and that an individual could not 
act independently.  
In the present study however, the respondents were questioned anonymously about 
their intention to engage in corruption. From this construct, the respondent’s answer is clearly 
entirely under his or her control; hence in such situations where people have entire volitional 
control over a given behaviour the perceived control behaviour construct becomes irrelevant 
(Ajzen, 1988).  
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3.15.2 Questionnaire Design 
 
The campaign efficiency was measured along four main axes: exposure, interest, 
understanding and recall. A ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question “Have you seen the 
campaign?” measured the respondent exposure. If a ‘yes’ answer was given, a series of 
questions was asked that measured to what extent the participants felt the campaign was easy to 
understand, interesting, and memorable. Each point was measured on a five point Likert scale, 
where one signified ‘strongly disagree’, two ‘slightly disagree’, three ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’, four ‘slightly agree’ and five ‘strongly agree’. The operational construct for the 
questionnaire measuring the campaign efficiency is given in Appendix 1. 
The questionnaire also measured the weight of social norms and to what extent the 
respondents valued the opinion of their family, their friends, and respected the authority of the 
state (police / judiciary) or religious authorities (imams). Each item was measured on a five 
point Likert scale. 
Fishbein’s multi-attribute model was used to measure respondent attitude towards 
corruption. Attitude toward behaviour is the product of an individual’s belief (B) that a given 
behaviour will generate definite consequence, and an affective appraisal of the outcomes (E) 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Both constructs (affect and belief) were measured on a five point 
Likert scale and the details are presented in Chapter 5.  
Respondents were finally asked to rate their reluctance or willingness to resist corrupt 
behaviour (intention towards corruption) on a five point Likert scale as a result of seeing the 
anti-corruption social marketing campaign. 
 
3.15.3 Sampling and Data Collection  
 
In Hong Kong, the fight against corruption was successful mostly due to the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) focus on educating and moralizing the 
younger generation (Manion, 2004). A quota sampling technique was used in an attempt to 
have a picture of the effect of the campaign on the Moroccan population according to age but 
also gender since a large gender difference was recorded in terms of “Justifiability of 
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Corruption” with the previous questionnaire. Hence, the Moroccan population was divided into 
exclusive subcategories of age and gender.  The sampling frame involved building a list of all 
the subcategories and weighting each group according to the formula weight of subcategory i = 
size of subcategory i / overall population. The sample size for each is given by:  sample size per 
subcategory i = n*W(i), where "n" represents overall sample size. In this case, the proposed 
sample size (n) is 800 respondents. The number of Moroccan per age group and gender, the 
subcategory weigh, target sample size as well as the collected sample size for each subcategory 
for a sample size of 800 is provided in table 3 and the following table provide detail results 
from this study. 
A thousand questionnaires were printed and distributed by the two female pollsters in 
the cities of Marrakech, Fez, Meknes, Casablanca, Tangiers and Rabat, as well as an equal 
proportion in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small villages such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and 
Azrou. The same procedure to gather data for the first questionnaire was used when the 
respondents were illiterate or speakers of Darija or Berber only. The questionnaire was also 
uploaded online using surveymonkey.com and kwiksurveys.com. No discrepancy was recorded 
between the data collected online and offline.  Out of a thousand questionnaires, 792 (77 of 
which were online) were fully completed or partly completed.  
 
Age Group Male (in 
thousands) 
Female (in 
thousands) 
Target Sample 
Size Male 
Target Sample 
Size Female 
Total 16, 371 16, 579 400 400 
Less than 20 years 
old 
5,956 5,730 145 138 
Between 20 and 29 
years old 
3,092 3,058 75 73 
Between 30 and 39 
years old 
2,446 2,609 59 62 
Between 40 and 49 
years old 
1,838 2,017 45 48 
Above 50 years old 3,039 3,163 74 76 
Table 3- Moroccan population by age group (HCP, 2013) and associated target sample 
size 
 
  60 
There is a noticeable discrepancy between the targeted quota for each subcategory and 
the data collected. Table 4 shows the sample size for each category. Moreover, findings from 
the previous survey uncovered other factors such as education level, income or age that may 
have an impact on the campaign efficiency. To remedy this issue, a statistical technique, 
Propensity Score Matching, was used. 
 
Age Less than 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 Above 50 Total 
Male 81 200 114 35 7 437 
Female 89 163 73 24 0 349 
Total 170 363 187 59 7 786 
Table 4 - Actual sample size per age collected for this study 
 
3.15.4 Data Analysis 
 
Both descriptive statistics and analytical statistics are used to analyse the data. 
Descriptive statistics or enumerative statistics provide information on our sample, in addition to 
summaries about the measures of respondent beliefs concerning corruption, attitude, and 
intention, as well as a measure about the percentage of respondents having been exposed to the 
campaign, and the percentage of respondents finding the campaign interesting, credible, 
efficient or memorable. Analytical statistics, on the other hand, shall provide causal relationship 
between exposure to the campaign and respondent change in belief, change in attitude and 
intention toward corruption. 
The change of attitude was measured as a function the respondent’s exposure, interest, 
understanding, and trust levels in the campaign. Intention change was measured as a function of 
both the respondent attitude toward corruption as well as the norms to which a respondent may 
abide by.  Figure 7 illustrates the model used in this research. 
 
 
  61 
 
Figure 7 - Structural model of corruption intention (TRA model) 
 
3.15.5 Mathematical Model 
 
The respondent’s attitude was defined by Ajzen and Fishbein, (1975) as such:   
A is the corruption attitude score, Bi is the cognitive evaluation about the significance 
of corruption and Ei is the emotional weight (like or dislike) towards the associated belief. 
Wilkie and Pessemier (1973) evidenced that a condition for an attitude score to be 
meaningful is that the number of attributes tested should be exhaustive (Wilkie and Pessemier, 
1973). The cognitive map about corruption was established from the literature review and 
confirmed in a focus group. 
The beliefs are listed below, belief were measured on a Likert scale (1 min, 5 max), 
while affect was measured on a 6 point  (-3 to +3) Likert scale. 
B1= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering money, E1 = Affective Evaluation 
B1 
B2= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean a gift, E2 = Affective Evaluation of B2 
B3= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering a service, E3 = Affective 
Evaluation of B3 
B4= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting money, E4 = Affective 
Evaluation of  B4 
B5= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a gift, E5 = Affective Evaluation 
of B5 
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B6= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a service, E6 = Affective 
Evaluation of B6 
B7= Cognitive evaluation: corruption can be considered as authorized, E7 = Affective 
Evaluation set to +1 
B8= Cognitive evaluation: corruption is unlawful, E8 = Affective Evaluation set to -1 
B9= Cognitive evaluation: corruption denotes an immoral action, E9 = Affective 
Evaluation -1 
 
NB: When the affective evaluation of one or more of the statement in B1 to B7 is 
positive (score from 1 to +3), the attitude score increases, meaning that the respondents have a 
more lenient attitude toward corruption, whereas a respondent will be less tolerant toward 
corruption if the affective evaluation of one or more of the beliefs in B1 to B7 is negative or 
decreases.  
  
The null hypothesis H0Campaign, “corruption intention is not altered by the efficacy of the 
campaign”, can be expressed as: 
  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 	𝜀 + 𝛽,𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +	𝛽7𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙+ 𝛽:𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
The null hypothesis, H0intention, attitude towards corruption and social norm do not 
impact corruption intent is described by the relation: 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 	𝜀 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽2	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 
 
3.15.6 Propensity Score Matching 
 
Causal inferences can only be made with a random selection of subjects as well as a 
random allocation of the treatment. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is a statistical technique 
initially designed to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment based on non-random samples, as 
is the case in this research. PSM was originally introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
They stated that, while it is possible to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment by comparing 
the effect of the treatment on two probability samples, one treated sample and one untreated 
sample, this is not possible if the samples are non-probability samples. In the former case, 
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direct comparison will lead to uncertain results because subjects from the treated group may 
differ substantially from subjects from the untreated group, and, therefore, the observed 
difference in outcomes may either be due to the treatment or dissimilarities in the subject’s 
characteristics themselves. Hence, to obtain meaningful results, both groups, treated and 
untreated, should be similar in term of all variables that may affect the outcome — except, of 
course, for the recipient of the treatment itself. The PSM technique makes this comparison 
possible by identifying, matching and comparing outcomes for groups of individuals with 
identical characteristics within both groups, treated and untreated (Peikes, Moreno and Orzo, 
2008). Propensity Score Matching has been used in multiple fields of research, originally in 
pharmacology, but also in online banking, finance, human resource management, and migration 
studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
In this study, PSM was used to remove the effect of confounding variables when 
comparing the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on a non-probability sample. Once each 
respondent had a calculated predicted probability of being exposed to the campaign, other 
respondents within the sample with similar characteristics and probabilities — based on 
whether or not they had seen the campaign — were identified and the difference in answers to 
questions from the questionnaire were compared.  
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Chapter 4 Corruption	in	Morocco:	Data	Presentation	and	Analysis	
 
4.1 Data Presentation 
Over 400 questionnaires were used and yielded a 50 per cent response rate. The ages of 
the respondents ranged from 18-65. Of the total, 4.5 per cent were 18-21; 31 per cent were 21-
30; 28.5 per cent were 31- 40; 20.5 per cent were 41-50; and 7.5 per cent were 51-65. In terms 
of education level, 23.5 per cent of the sample reportedly had a high school diploma; 19.5 per 
cent had a two-year college degree; 33 per cent had a bachelor’s degree; 14 per cent had a 
master’s degree; and 6 per cent had a doctorate degree. The sample had a somewhat higher 
level of education than the Moroccan population as a whole given the estimate of the US 
Agency for International Development that only 53 per cent of Moroccan middle school 
students continue to high school, and less than 15 per cent of first grade students graduate from 
high school (USAID, 2015).  
In regard to monthly income level, 18 per cent of respondents earned less than 150 USD per 
month; 18 per cent earned between 151 USD and 300 USD per month; 9.5 per cent earned 
between 701 USD and 900 USD per month; and 13 per cent earned 1,300 USD or more per 
month. When asked about the number of individuals in the household, 62 per cent reported 
living in a household of 3 to 5 people and 24 per cent in a household of more than 6 people. 
When asked to compare their household level of income, 24 per cent said their households were 
better off than most households; 60 per cent said their households were slightly better off than 
most households; and none said their households were much worse off than their neighbours. 
 
4.2 Findings: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 4.2.1 Definition of Corruption 
 
When asked to choose one or more definitions for corruption, 174 of 200 respondents 
defined it as accepting money, while a slightly smaller number (161) defined it as giving 
money. The definitions accepting a service and providing a service also were chosen to define 
corruption, but by a much smaller proportion of respondents, 78 and 79 of 200, respectively. 
The table 5 below shows no significant gender difference in the definition of corruption. 
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How do you define corruption Male Freq. Female Freq. % Male % Female 
Accept money 98 76 25.6 27.0 
Accept service 51 27 13.3 9.6 
Accept gift 45 41 11.7 14.6 
Give money 93 68 24.3 24.2 
Give gift 45 41 11.7 14.6 
Provide service 51 28 13.3 10.0 
Total 383 281 100 100 
Table 5 - Respondent definition of corruption 
 
4.2.2 Who Is Corrupt? 
 
Out of the 200 respondents who answered this question 100 chose to tick the “I don’t 
know”, and some showed obvious signs of anxiety in refusing to answer. Of the 100 who 
responded, nearly half (48 per cent) perceived police officers as being the most corrupt, 
followed by municipal civil servants (14 per cent), customs officials (nine per cent), doctors 
and nurses (nine per cent). Those who respondents perceived to be least likely to be corrupt 
were teachers and professors (one per cent). Out of 200 respondents, 199 answered the question 
about having been solicited for a bribe. 60 male respondents (51.7 per cent) and 39 female 
respondents (47 per cent) admitted having been solicited for a bribe. However only four 
respondents — two males and two females — said they had reported this demand for a bribe to 
a non-governmental organization like Agence Marocaine des Droit de l’Homme (AMDH), a 
local NGO involved in the fight against corruption.    
 
 
 
Respondents who were solicited for a bribe 
 Number of Male / % Number of Female / % Total 
Yes 60 / 51.7% 39 / 47.0% 99 
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No 53 / 45.6% 41 /  49.4% 94 
Do not know 3 / 2.7% 3 / 3.6% 6 
Total 116 83 199 
 Table 6 - Respondents who were solicited for a bribe 
 
 
4.2.3 Gender Versus Corruption Intention 
 
Respondents were asked to rate their corruption intention on a binary scale: zero for 
respondents not considering corruption at all, and one for respondents potentially considering 
corruption. The overall corruption intention was low for both genders, but lower for women. In 
fact, over twice as many men (20.5 per cent) stated that they could be tempted by corruption, 
whereas the rate for women was 8.4 per cent. The mean for males was 0.20 while the mean for 
females was 0.08 (see Table 1). An ANOVA test confirmed that the difference in means was 
statistically significant with F(1, 1.98) = 5.50, p value = 0.0200. A similar gender difference 
was seen in response to questions about accepting corruption, with 74.2 per cent of males and 
25.8 per cent of females reporting that they would accept a bribe.  (Table 7). 
 
 
 Corruption Intention 
Gender Mean (0 = no 
intention, 1 = 
could consider 
corruption 
Standard Deviation Number of 
respondents 
Male 0.205 0.405 117 
Female 0.084 0.279 83 
Total 0.155 0.362 200 
   Table 7 - Corruption intention by gender 
 
A test of the relationship between corruption intention and the socio-economic factors 
(Table 8) showed significance in the model overall (p value = 0.0336 < 0.05), that is, at least 
one of the variables (level of education, age, gender, or household number) was significantly 
related to corruption intention. Level of education and gender were most significantly 
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correlated to corruption intention, but inversely. Thus, as the education level of a respondent 
increases, his or her intention to accept corruption decreases (by 24.7 per cent). Regarding 
gender, based on the binary variable we created (0 = Male, 1= Female), we found a negative 
correlation between gender and the intention to accept corruption. The probability for a female 
respondent to consider corruption is 63.2 per cent less than of a male respondent.  
 
Corruption Intention Coef. P>|z| % 
Level of Education -0.283 0.037 -24.7 
Age -0.071 0.714 -6.9 
Gender 0.999 0.033 -63.2 
Household Number -0.005 0.987 -0.5 
Table 8 - Corruption intentions by socio-demographic factor 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Causes of and Justifications for Corruption 
 
Out of the various factors proposed to respondents as a justification of corruption — 
poverty, no alternative for meeting life’s expenses, insecurity and the general unfairness of 
society (Table 9) — the factors that respondents most frequently identified as justification for 
corruption were: helping a friend and accepting a gift. Although we found no significant gender 
difference for helping a friend, men, more than women, rated accepting a gift as a justification 
(F(1,195) = 3. 92, p value =0.0491). The factor least cited as justification for corruption was: 
everyone does it. Men, more than women, however, rated this as a justification (F(1,198) = 5.01 
p value = 0.0264).  
 
Justification for corruption Mean Std. Err. 
 1 does not justify at all, 5 
completely justifies corruption 
 
Poverty 
Male 2.402 0.156 
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Female 2.209 0.1709 
High cost of living 
Male 2.556 0.154 
Female 2.320 0.170 
Insecurity for the future 
Male 2.052 0.131 
Female 1.876 0.143 
Everybody does it 
Male 2.034 0.144 
Female 1.641 0.132 
No trust in the government 
Male 2.556 0.152 
Female 2.320 0.173 
Low career advancement prospects 
Male 2.443 0.148 
Female 2.111 0.156 
Help a friend 
Male 2.982 0.162 
Female 2.802 0.194 
Injustice in society 
Male 2.504 0.148 
Female 2.160 0.166 
Normal to accept a gift 
Male 2.765 0.157 
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Female 2.308 0.178 
Table 9 - Justifiability of corruption 
 
4.3 Findings: Analytical Statistics 
4.3.1 Justification of Corruption  
 
The second model studied the relationship between societal factors and the tendency 
toward corruption. Using logistic regression, we independently tested the correlation between 
corruption and gender. For men, the overall model was significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.0017 and 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2544), indicating with 95 per cent confidence that at least one of the 
independent variables contributed to predicting corruption intention. In this case, injustice in 
society was the only significant factor and was positively correlated to corruption intention. 
Men who rated society as unfair had a 15.6 per cent higher probability of contemplating 
corruption than those who did not (Table 10). 
 
Corruption Intention (Male) Prob > 
chi2     =     0.0017, Pseudo R2 =  0.2544, 
n =110 observation 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Poverty 0.198 0.216 0.358 
Insecurity for the future 0.046 0.273 0.864 
Everybody does it 0.080 0.213 0.706 
No trust in the government -0.391 0.231 0.091 
Low career advancement prospects 0.275 0.229 0.23 
Help a friend 0.126 0.203 0.536 
Injustice in society 0.579 0.241 0.016 
Normal to accept a gift 0.098 0.190 0.607 
Household perception -0.508 0.489 0.299 
Cons -3.708 1.276 0.004 
        Table 10 - Factors impacting corruption intention for men 
Note: Only Injustice in Society (P>z < 0.05) was found to impact corruption intention for male 
respondents. 
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For women (Table 11), the overall model was significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.017), 
indicating with 95 per cent confidence that at least one of the independent variables contributed 
to predicting corruption intention (see Table 5). For women, accepting a gift and household 
perception were factors correlated to corruption intention. Women who believed that accepting 
a gift is a cultural norm and women who felt that their household is less well off had a greater 
corruption intention, by 507.2 per cent and 97.5 per cent (P>z < 0.05), respectively.  
 
 
Corruption intention (Female) Prob > 
chi2 = 0.017, Pseudo R2 = 0.437, n = 72 
observations 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Poverty -1.024 0.630 0.104 
Insecurity for the future 0.301 0.758 0.691 
Everybody does it -0.559 0.791 0.479 
No trust in the government 0.180 0.578 0.755 
Low career advancement prospects -0.314 0.600 0.6 
Help a friend -0.471 0.400 0.239 
Injustice in society 0.099 0.439 0.822 
Normal to accept a gift 1.803 0.754 0.017 
Household perception -3.690 1.691 0.029 
Cons 2.759 2.305 0.231 
       Table 11 - Factors impacting corruption intention for women 
 
4.3.2 Deterrent Factors  
 
The third model tested correlation between deterrent factors such as higher wages, 
living abroad, fear of authority, personal conviction, influence of family/ religion, fear of 
scandals, training and intention not to be corrupt. For women, the model was not significant 
(Intention with Prob>Chi2 = 0.226), while for men the overall model was statistically 
significant at a p value of Prob > chi2 =0.0001 (Table 6). Thus, at least one of the independent 
variables contributed to the prediction of the intention to be corrupt at the 95 per cent 
confidence level. Only three variables were found to have a significant impact on the intention 
not to participate in corruption (p value of less than 0.05). These variables were Higher Wages 
(p value < 0.05), The Influence of Religion and Training of Employees. In regard to higher 
wages, the positive sign of the standardized coefficient indicates that when there is a one-unit 
  71 
increase in standard deviation in higher wages, the intention to reject corruption increases by 
31.4 per cent (holding constant the effect of the other variables). In regard to Influence of 
Religion and Training of Employees, the negative sign of the standardized coefficient of this 
variable implies that a one-unit increase in standard deviation in influence of religion or 
training of employees decreases the intention to reject corruption (Table 12). 
 
Intention (Male) Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Higher wages 0.541 0.229 0.018 
Living abroad 0.051 0.211 0.809 
Fear of authority 0.247 0.199 0.215 
Personal convictions -0.412 0.320 0.198 
Influence of family 0.445 0.277 0.108 
Influence of religion -0.877 0.278 0.002 
Media scandals -0.364 0.209 0.082 
Training -0.593 0.231 0.01 
Cons 2.096 1.852 0.258 
 Table 12 - Deterrent factors impacting male corruption intention 
Note: The variables Higher Wages, Influence of Religion and Training of Employees (P>z < 
0.05) were found to impact corruption intention for male respondents. 
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Chapter 5 Corruption	in	Morocco:	A	Synthesis	of	Findings	and	Discussion	
 
The null hypotheses were rejected as statistically significant correlations were found 
among the socio-demographic classification, personal and social values, as well as corrupt 
intention of Moroccan citizens. The results pointed to an important gender gap with regards to 
beliefs and intentions related to corruption that substantiates the privileging of women over 
men by Moroccan micro-financing agencies. This gender gap in corruption supports the notion 
that gender equality — in addition to education and development —  is a key factor to 
combating corruption in a country plagued by social problems. Statistical analysis revealed an 
acute gender difference in regard to corruption intention, with 74.2 per cent of males and only 
25.8 per cent of females reporting that they would be tempted by corruption under certain 
circumstances. Similarly, 61 per cent of the respondents who said they would offer a corrupt 
opportunity were men. In the same way, our findings reveal a gender gap in the perceived 
causes of corruption: Men are more likely to consider corruption if they deem society as unfair 
while women are most likely to consider corruption as an exchange of gifts.  
One explanation for these results can be found in Moroccan society. In Morocco, 
women’s sphere of influence is within the private space while men dominate the public space 
(Sadiqi, 2008). Women also constitute the least educated segment of the Moroccan population. 
In 2002, official statistics put the illiteracy rate among Moroccan women overall at 60 per cent, 
with 48 per cent in urban areas and 95 per cent in rural areas, and by 2011, that number had 
decreased to 56 per cent of women above 15 years of age testing illiterate (Direction des 
Statistiques, 2012). Because the greater literacy of men gives them greater awareness of 
societal issues, corruption is often seen among Moroccan men as a way to remedy social 
inequalities. Conversely, for women — who generally manage the family’s resources through 
offering and/or accepting gifts in exchange for services rendered — acts of corruption are seen 
as a way to remedy the lack of state services. Offering gifts (and the correlating need for 
reciprocity) are the most common practices in societies composed largely of communitarian 
solidarity networks. Such solidarity networks of family or extended family are a necessity when 
citizens tend not to trust the state to provide basic services. 
In Morocco the state provides only weak support for local needs. In 2011, Morocco 
ranked 130 of 186 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) and the poverty level 
remained high, with 9 per cent of the population below the poverty line (WHO, 2011). 
Furthermore, in the 1990s only 70 percent of the Moroccan population had access to some sort 
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of health care (WHO, 2011) and although progress was made in 2011, a quarter of the 
population still resides more than ten kilometres away from a rudimentary health facility. The 
illiteracy rate in rural areas is also high at an average of around 50 per cent. In 2006, the 
national illiteracy rate was estimated at 38.5 per cent, with a rate of 46.8 per cent for women in 
urban areas, and 54.4 per cent for women in rural areas. For men the rate was 31.4 per cent in 
rural areas and 27.2 per cent in urban areas (UNESCO, 2015). Needless to say, there is an 
overall lack of state-funded infrastructure in both healthcare and education (AFDB, 2013).  
Furthermore, as of today, Morocco remains a largely patriarchal society. Since the 
introduction of a new family law reform (ةﺮﺳﻷا ﺔﻧوﺪﻣ, or “moudawanat al-usra”) in 2004, women 
have had more legal rights in theory (Eisenberg, 2011). Because the previous moudawanat al-
usra followed the traditional Maliki Sunni law (in which women were considered legal minors 
throughout their lives), until the passing of the new moudawana al-usra in 2004, Moroccan 
women could not legalize contracts without male consent and were subject to discriminatory 
practices in marriage, divorce, and child custody (Eisenberg, 2011). Traditionally, Moroccan 
women are the nucleus of the family. They take care of most personal matters relating to 
marriage, household spending, child health and schooling. Meanwhile, men have authority in 
public spaces (Sadiqi, 2008). In a country that struggles to provide the necessary funding for 
services — particularly housing, health and education (Sadiqi, 2008) — women must rely 
almost solely on solidarity networks to provide for their family. The chronic lack of 
infrastructure and government presence has led to a large trust deficit, or a sense of 
abandonment, among Moroccan citizens in regards to their view of the government (Truex, 
2011). In this societal context, women have little choice but to find help within traditional 
solidarity networks, such as the extended family, and within these networks, exchanges of gifts 
are the norm. 
Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) showed the damaging effect of corruption on 
institutional trust and found it correlated to the level of education. In a corrupt society, more 
educated citizens tend to be better at gauging the levels of corruption at work, consequently 
increasing their scepticism toward their government. Findings from this work showed that the 
more educated respondents were, whether men or women, the less likely they were to take part 
in corruption. If development and corruption are indeed correlated, education and gender 
equality are the key catalysts to reform. 
 Problematically, corruption also affects student perspectives concerning education. 
Warning and Dürrenberger (2015), using data from 170 countries, show that there is a negative 
correlation between corruption and years of schooling. In countries with a high level of 
corruption, young people develop the notion that getting a job is not strictly correlated to 
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academic performance and tend to drop out of academia early. Thus, in countries with high 
levels of corruption, students tend to spend less time at school. 
This study is a first attempt to find an answer to Morocco’s development challenges. In 
a male dominated society, microcredit loans to women lead to women having greater control of 
household resources, with more of those resources diverted to children, food, healthcare, and 
education. Higher levels of education would reduce corruption. However, one must underline 
the necessity of uprooting corruption from within the education system itself as a precondition 
for more education. In a corrupt educational system, children are led to believe that bribing is 
the only way to succeed and they often lose faith and drop out of school (Rumyantseva, 2015). 
Perhaps more importantly, a decreased gender gap in education would activate a positive 
feedback loop, in which the presence of women in political, social, and economic life would be 
largely increased for the betterment of society as a whole. 
This study suggests that education and development are the key factors to combat 
corruption in a country plagued by social ailments. Furthermore, because women in Morocco 
are at the centre of extended family structures and bear the weight of a deficient social system, 
they have a crucial role to play in development. Our findings corroborate the idea that women 
are less tempted by corruption than men and seem to also justify the preference microcredit 
organizations have shown in choosing women as lenders. One might question the causes 
underlying our results. Are the gender differences seen in our findings attributable to women’s 
greater sense of moral behaviour? Or is it that, perhaps, because Moroccan women have less 
access to corrupt opportunities than men based on the limited roles in society that are available 
to them, they are less likely to engage in acts of corruption? Or is it more that Moroccan 
women remain subdued in a male-dominated society and are thus more fearful of the possible 
consequences that could stem from engaging in acts of corruption? Further research is needed 
to answer these questions.  
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Chapter 6 Measuring	the	Efficiency	of	the	Anti-Corruption	Campaign	in	Morocco:	Data	
Presentation	and	Analysis	
 
 
The vast majority of the surveyed population (52 per cent) described their monthly 
earnings as 150 USD or fewer; a modest sum of money to subsist on for such an amount of 
time. The other 48 percent reported the following: 19.6 per cent earned between 151 - 300 
USD, 6.9 per cent earned between 301 - 500 USD, 5.9 per cent earned between 501 - 700 USD, 
7.6 per cent earned between 701 - 900 USD, 2.5 per cent earned between 901 - 1,100 USD 
while only two per cent reported they earned between1,101 - 1,300 USD. 4.2 per cent of the 
public who were approached responded in the questionnaire that their earnings amounted to an 
excess of 1,300 USD. 11.3 per cent of those questioned claimed single status; 70 per cent 
described themselves as married; 11.3 per cent were single; and divorcees, widows and 
widowers made the 18.7 per cent remainder. Regarding gender 437 respondents were male 
(55.5 per cent) and 350 respondents were female (44.5 per cent). Respondent level of 
education: 0.7 per cent admitted having no education, two per cent attended Koranic school, 
14.8 per cent went to primary school, 24.7 per cent attended secondary school, 30.5 per cent 
completed two years of University (DEUG Diploma), 21.1 per cent had earned a bachelors 
degree, 4.3 per cent were at Master level or equivalent, and two per cent reported being at PhD 
level. Regarding age, 170 respondents (or 21.5 per cent) were below the age of 21, 366 (or 46.4 
per cent) were between 21 and 30 years old, 187 (or 23.7 per cent) were between 31 and 40 
years old, and 59 respondents (7.5 per cent) were between 41 and 50 years old and 0.9 per cent 
or seven respondents were older than 50.  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Campaign Awareness 
 
6.1.1. Exposure 
 
The majority (68.3 per cent) of the respondents reported having seen the anti-
corruption social marketing campaign slogans or clips on television or radio; leaving quite a 
high segment of individuals (31.7 per cent) who did not seem to notice the campaign. 
6.1.2 Comprehension 
 
Most respondents answered that they understood the campaign’s aims and objectives 
very well with 41.6 per cent responding positively to this, a further 18.9 per cent maintained 
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that they understood the messages. The second largest percentage group (19.3 per cent) did not 
understand the message at all, 10.2 per cent claimed that they did not understand and a sizeable 
proportion (9.9 per cent) was undecided. See the Table below (Table 13) for an illustration of 
this (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
 
 
I understood the message Number of 
respondents 
% 
Not at all 152 19.29 
Did not understand 81 10.28 
Undecided 78 9.9 
Yes 149 18.91 
Very much so 328 41.62 
Total 788 100 
         Table 13 - Message comprehension 
 
6.1.3 Interest 
 
Over 39 per cent of the respondents did not find the campaign interesting and slightly 
less found the campaign of interest (36 per cent). A significant percentage (23.9 per cent) did 
not wish to take sides (Table 14, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
 
I found the campaign interesting Number of respondents % 
Not at all interesting 176 22.34 
Not interesting 140 17.77 
Neutral 188 23.86 
Somewhat 117 14.85 
Very interesting 167 21.19 
Total 788 100 
            Table 14 - Respondents who found the campaign interesting 
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6.1.4 Perception of the Campaign Effectiveness 
 
There was a highly cynical view of the campaign’s effectiveness with a relatively low 
percentage of respondents considering the campaign effective in any way at all (around 30 per 
cent). A large segment, which comprised 29 per cent of those questioned, was neutral. The 
largest group remained pessimistic with 40 per cent of the respondents deeming the campaign 
inefficient or completely inefficient (Table 15, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 
2014). 
 
I think the campaign is effective Number of respondents % 
Not at all effective 186 23.6 
Not effective 129 16.37 
Neutral 229 29.06 
Effective 99 12.56 
Very Effective 145 18.4 
Total 788 100 
     Table 15 - Respondent perception about the campaign efficiency 
 
 
6.1.5 Recall 
 
35.4 per cent of the public as surveyed using the questionnaire reported some 
recollection of the content of the anti-corruption campaign, however quite a striking majority 
had little or no recollection of it (43 per cent). There was also a large segment (21.7 per cent) of 
the population that was unsure whether they could remember the content of it or not (Table 16, 
Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
 
I remember the campaign Number of respondents % 
Not at all 210 26.65 
Do not remember 129 16.37 
Not sure 170 21.57 
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Somewhat 125 15.86 
Very well 154 19.54 
Total 788 100 
    Table 16 - Respondent recall of the campaign 
 
 6.1.6 Credibility of the Campaign’s Promoter 
 
Here, the percentage of those proclaiming full trust in the campaign promoters, and 
hence, by extension, the government, proved very low with 17.7 per cent espousing this view. 
12.6 per cent agreed that the campaign providers were credible; while 24.5 per cent felt 
uncertain. The highest percentage group was those with no faith in the credibility of the 
government whatsoever (29.7 per cent) while those with a minimal perception of government 
credibility represented 15.6 per cent of the surveyed total, overall 45.3 per cent of respondents 
stated not to trust the government (Table 17, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
 
I trust the government Number of respondents % 
No trust at all 234 29.55 
No trust 124 15.66 
Not sure 194 24.49 
Trust somewhat 100 12.63 
Completely trust 140 17.68 
Total 794 100 
       Table 17 - Credibility of the campaign promoter (trust in the government) 
 
6.1.7 Change in Beliefs Towards Corruption 
 
To gain a better picture of what people’s views were of corruption in light of the anti-
corruption campaign, a questionnaire was used to elicit definitions of corruption as viewed by 
the Moroccan public. Respondents were asked to define their feelings about corruption in the 
form of a concurrence (5) or disagreement (1) (on a five-point Likert scale) to a statement 
concerning corruption.  
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An ANOVA test was carried out in order to produce a number that would infer whether 
or not the views of those who had seen the anti-corruption campaign differed significantly from 
those who had not (comparing the mean standard deviation of the two aforementioned groups). 
Responses with high P values exhibit no statistically significant difference in attitude between 
those exposed and unexposed. Table 17 (Hamelin. N. Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) 
demonstrates that there is no significant difference in responses to questions, except where 
respondents were asked about the status of corruption as an immoral or illegal act. Those who 
were exposed to the campaign also showed quite markedly that they considered corruption gift-
giving. As expected to some degree, corruption was defined by both groups (not 
exposed/exposed) as giving/receiving money, a gift or service.	(Table	18)	 
 
 
What is the meaning of 
corruption?  
(1 Totally disagree to 5 Totally 
agree) 
Average  
(Did not see the 
campaign) / 
Stddev. 
Average  
(Seen the 
campaign) / 
Stddev 
ANOVA test and Pvalue 
Giving a gift is normal 3.33   /   1.61 3.52   /    1.46 P=0.093, insignificant 
difference 
Accepting money 3.13   /   1.56 3.13  /    1.60 P=0.982, insignificant 
Providing a service 3.14  /   1.51 3.18  /    1.57 p=0.613, insignificant 
Receiving a gift 3.13 /    1.53 3.18  /    1.60 P=0.607, insignificant 
Paying money to someone 3.21 /   1.58 3.18  /    1.63 P=0.911, insignificant 
Offering a gift 2.92 /   1.58 3.20 /    1.58 P= 0.022, F (1, 786) = 
5.30 
Offering a Service 3.03 /   1.53 3.26 /    1.58 P=0.068, insignificant 
Corruption is lawful 2.38 /  1.42 2.45  /    1.52 P=0.553, insignificant 
Corruption is prohibited 3.00 /  1.57 3.43 /     1.54 P=0.0001, F (1, 790) = 
14.13 
Corruption is amoral 3.08 / 1.538 3.48  /    1.53 P=0.0059, F (1, 788) = 
11.87 
Table 18 - Change in beliefs toward corruption versus exposure to the campaign 
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6.1.8 Change in Attitude Score 	The	 Fishbein	model	 as	 stated	 above	was	 used	 to	 calculate	 an	 attitude	 score	 for	corruption.	 A	 high	 attitude	 score	 indicates	 a	 person/group	 with	 a	 more	 tolerant	perception	of	corruption,	while	a	 low	score	demonstrates	that	an	individual	(or	several)	believe	 that	 corruption	 is	 something	 negative.	 The	 average	 attitude	 score	 for	 those	 not	exposed	 to	 the	 campaign	 (232	 respondents)	 was	 -7.19	 and	 those	 exposed	 to	 the	 anti-corruption	publicity	was	-11.13	for	the	remaining	496	individuals;	therefore,	attitudes	of	those	who	saw	the	anti-corruption	publicity	campaign	were	affected	by	 the	 information	and	 subsequently	 demonstrated	 a	 lower	 tolerance	 of	 corruption	 (reduction	 of	 attitude	
score	by	3.94,	or	2.98	per	cent).	The	standard	error	for	this	 information	was	2.49	and	t-statistics	were	-1.58. 
 
 6.1.9 Change in Intention 
 An	 ANOVA	 test	 was	 also	 carried	 out	 to	 evaluate	 the	 difference	 between	 those	exposed/unexposed	with	regard	to	their	willingness	to	change	corrupt	behaviour	(Table	8).	 It	 appears	 from	 the	 results	 that	 those	 exposed	 to	 the	 campaign	 showed	 more	willingness	to	change,	with	a	significantly	higher	mean	score	from	respondents:	F	(1,	786)	=	84.02,	p	=0.0000.		See	Table	19	(Hamelin,	Nwankwo,	Filali	Moulay	Idriss,	2014)	below: 
 
Respondents intention to change behaviour 
toward corruption  
Occurrence Average score 
(out of 5) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Did not see the campaign 245 2.316 1.308         
Saw the campaign 543 3.300   1.430 
Total 788 3.000    1.465        
Table 19 - Intention to change corrupt behaviour versus campaign exposure 
 
6.2 Analytical Statistics 
 
6.2.1 Attitude Toward Corruption Versus Campaign Awareness and Credibility 
 
The attitude scores obtained previously (section 8.7) can be considered as a continuous 
variable since it varies between -69 to + 63 (Mauer and Pierce, 1998). Setting prob the p value 
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to 0.05 (i.e. with a 95 per cent confidence level), a significant relationship between the final 
attitude score and the campaign’s awareness and credibility was found. 
The questions pertaining to comprehension of the message and recall (p values 0.006 
and 0.052 respectively) produce a significant negative correlation with the attitude score. Hence 
respondent increased understanding of the campaign leads to a lesser attitude score (higher 
rejection of corruption). Campaign provider’s credibility (p=0.000) was found to be positively 
correlated to the attitude score. 
Thus an increased trust in the government appears to produce a higher attitude score 
(higher tolerance toward a corruption). An R2 was calculated at 10.68 per cent to account for 
the variability of responses around the mean (Table 20, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay 
Idriss, 2014). 
Hence the following relationship is established: 
Attitude toward corruption = -2.413 (Understood the campaign) – 2.110 
(Remember the campaign) + 2.749 (Trust the government). 
 
Attitude score (n=787 respondents, Prob F > 0) 
with -69 <= score <= + 63 
Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Saw the campaign 3.237 2.863 0.259 – not significant 
Campaign is interesting -1.093 1.079 0.311– not significant 
Understood the campaign -2.413 0.852 0.005 – Significant 
Remember the campaign -2.110 1.066 0.048- Significant 
Trust the government 2.749 0.652 0- Significant 
Table 20 - Regression of Corruption attitude score versus campaign efficiency 
 
Government trust and attitude score findings were further corroborated by an ANOVA 
analysis. There was a significant effect of government trust on attitude score at the p < 0.05 
level with [F(4, 787) = 7.99, p = 0]. Respondents with no trust or no trust at all in their 
government have low corruption attitude scores (i.e. higher aversion toward corruption) while 
respondents who trust or completely trust their government are less hostile toward corruption. 
See Table 21 (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) below:  
 
Trust in the government Mean of Attitude score Std. Dev. Number of respondents 
No Trust at all -16.995 33.192 234 
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No Trust -12.322 19.445 124 
Do not know -1.5051 31.326 194 
Trust -5.05 28.018 100 
Absolute Trust -4.95 37.442 140 
Total -8.832 31.727 792 
Table 21 - Attitude score versus level of trust in the government 
 
6.2.2 Validity of the Model 
 
To ensure the regression displayed in the results is valid the conditions of linearity, 
normality and homoscedasticity have to be respected. Absence of multicolinearity should also 
be tested. 
 
6.2.2.1 Linearity 
 
There must be a linear relationship between predictors and outcome variables.  
To test linearity is to chart with residual plot; this also flags nonlinearity within the surveyed 
data. Acprplot command in STATA was used for the questions pertaining to exposure, 
comprehension, interest, credibility and recall; using lowesslsopts (bwidth (1)) options to 
produce lowess smoothing. Throughout graphs 1-4 the fitted lines show that linearity has been 
achieved. 
6.2.2.2 Normality 
 
To fulfil the criterion of normality, one expects errors to be distributed normally. This 
normality can be affirmed by drawing a kernel density plot from the results with the normal 
option and setting the normal density alongside it. A standardized normal probability can also 
be plotted (P-P). It could be seen in the following 2 graphs (figures 8 and 9, Hamelin, 
Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) that there is a small deviation from the normal 
density/probability but that the residuals are sufficiently close to normal distribution to fulfil the 
above criterion.  
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Figure 8 - Normality test 
 
 
Figure 9 - Normal probability plot 
 
6.2.2.3 Homoscedasticity 	
Homoscedasticity of residuals (or homogeneity of variance) should be constant to 
assure that error variance is regular.  The opposite phenomenon is known as heteroscedasticity, 
which would imply that the results lacked significance. Residuals against fitted values were 
plotted to test the significance of the data and results collected and there is a distinguishable 
pattern, which indicates that homoscedasticity has been achieved (Figure 10). These results 
were supported by further Breusch-Pagan tests which produced a p value of Prob chi2 =0.5025; 
further evidence using the null hypothesis that there is homogeneity across the spread of data.  
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Figure 10 - Residuals against fitted values 
 
6.2.2.4 Multicollinearity 	
To assure that there was no multicollinearity – where variables appear a linear 
combination of one-another – A variance inflation factor command or VIF was run. The test 
produced a VIF value of 1.61 (of a possible 10); proving that there was no multicollinearity. 
As can be seen from the reports above, these diagnostics were run successfully to 
ensure reliability of the models previously hypothesized. Provided the chosen predictors are 
deemed valid by a set of tests, the model valid can be considered valid. The command Link test 
was run to test the multicollinearity. Table 22 (Hamelin,  Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) 
shows that the variable _hat is significant whereas _hatsq is insignificant (p-value = 0.606) , 
hence the validity of the model. Subsequently one can conclude that meaningful predictors 
were used for the model and that there is no error of specificity: 
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Table 22 - Model validity test using linktest command in stata 
 
6.3 Impact of Campaign Awareness on Behavioural Intention 	
The relationship was tested using logistic regression and a value of Prob> chi2= 0.0001 
was found i.e. at 95 per cent certainty showing that willingness to change corrupt behaviour is 
correlated to campaign awareness (Table 22). The main significant factors having an impact on 
intention are respondents interest in the campaign, respondent comprehension of the campaign 
and respondent recall of the campaign; the more a respondent remembers, understands and is 
interested in the campaign, the higher his or her resolve to change behaviour. Interest increased 
intention to change corrupt behaviour by 73.2 per cent, comprehension by 26.8 per cent and 
recall by 102.0 per cent (Table 23). McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 resulted in a percentage of 
51.4 per cent, further explaining the variability of response data around the mean.  
 
Intention to change behaviour (783 
observations, Prob> chi2 = 0) 
Coefficient % P>z 
Exposure -0.23623 -21 0.177 
Interest 0.54038 71.7 0 
Comprehension 0.27753 32 0 
Recall 0.70262 101.9 0 
Credibility 0.00286 0.3 0.953 
Table 23 - Impact of  campaign awareness and credibility on respondents ‘corrupt intention 
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 A non-significant Brant test run with the same statistical software shows that the 
parallel regression assumption has not been violated (Table 24), subsequently proving the 
validity of the model. 
 
Variable chi2 p>chi2 df 
All 19.45 0.194 15 
Exposed 8.43 0.038 3 
Interest 3.13 0.372 3 
Comprehension 0.56 0.905 3 
Recall 2.34 0.504 3 
Trust in gov. 2.21 0.53 3 
Table 24 - Brant test for intention to change versus campaign efficiency 
 
6.3.1 TRA: Impact of Attitude and Social Norms on Corrupt Intention  
 
The regression results show that with a 95 per cent confidence level intention to change 
corrupt behaviour is significantly correlated to attitude and social norm. With family opinion 
having the strongest impact on changing corrupt behaviour. While attitude toward corruption 
had a significant, but lesser, impact on behaviour change. This demonstrates that social norms 
play a role in the dislike of corruption — the more concerned an individual is of social norms 
(specifically family opinion) the greater the individual will wish to change corrupt behaviour. 
When all other variables are held constant within the model, the importance of family opinion 
for a respondent increases by 1 unit and intention to change corrupt behaviour increases by 26.1 
per cent. Regarding attitude toward corruption, the lower the score, the higher the respondent’s 
intent is to change corrupt behaviour (0.6 per cent per unit). See Table 25 (Hamelin. N. 
Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss , 2014) below: 
 
Intention to change behaviour (n=782 
respondents, Prob > chi2 =  0.0000) 
Coefficient Percentage P>|z| 
Attitude toward corruption -0.006 -0.6 0.005 
Value opinion of family 0.231 26.1 0 
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Value opinion of friend 0.071 7.5 0.21 
Value opinion of imam 0.062 6.4 0.197 
Fear police 0.002 0.3 0.959 
Table 25 - Intention to change behaviour versus attitude and social norms 
 
When the Brant test was run, a significant result (p>chi2 = 0) was uncovered- thus 
violating the assumption of parallel regression. What this demonstrated was that the model may 
be lacking some predicators to reflect the relationship between every pair of outcome groups. 
(Table 26). 
 
 
Variable chi2 p>chi2 df 
All 53.14 0 15 
Attitude toward corruption 9.14 0.028 3 
Value opinion of family 3.99 0.263 3 
Value opinion of friend 15.91 0.001 3 
Value opinion of imam 5.43 0.143 3 
Fear police 4.01 0.261 3 
Table 26 - Brant test for intention to change behaviour versus Attitude and Social Norms 
 
6.3.2 Effect of Socio-Demographics on Intention to Change Behaviour 
 
Socio-demographic data was also taken into account to assess the possible effect the 
campaign might have on intention to alter one’s corrupt behaviour. With a 95 per cent certainty 
the model was found to be significant and the dependent variables most strongly affecting the 
respondents wishes to alter behaviour were gender, education and income (Table 26). It 
emerged that women displayed a lower probability of intention to change corrupt behaviour 
than men by 34.3 per cent, while those who had a higher level of education also expressed a 
lower probability of a change (15.7 per cent). Those of lower-level incomes also reported a 
lower likelihood that they would change corrupt behaviour by 8.9 per cent. The McKelvey & 
Zavoina's R2 coefficient was measured at 13.3 per cent (Table 27, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali 
Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
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Intention to change 
behaviour, number of 
respondents = 724 
Coefficients P>z % 
Exposed 1.245 0 247.4 
Gender -0.419 0.002 -34.3 
Education -0.171 0.001 -15.7 
Age 0.056 0.471 5.8 
Income -0.093 0.011 -8.9 
Household number -0.054 0.591 -5.3 
Table 27 - Regression of intention to change behaviour versus exposure and socio-
demographic factors 
 
6.4 Propensity Score Matching Methods 
 
Regression analysis do not account for the possibility of bias, as the measured 
difference in outcome between respondents who have seen the campaign and those who have 
not seen the campaign may depend on individualities that impacted whether or not an 
individual was exposed to the campaign rather than being due to the effect of the campaign, per 
se. By carrying the propensity score analysis one can gain a picture of the overall effect of the 
campaign without the socio-demographic element. 
 
6.4.1 Justifying the Use of Propensity Score Matching 
 
What can be seen below (Figure 11, 12, 13 and 14, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay 
Idriss, 2014) illustrates that the campaign was more likely to be seen by those from the 21-30 
age category, those of a higher level of education, males and those under below the 1500 
Moroccan dirhams (MAD) monthly poverty threshold.  
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Figure 11 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of gender 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of education 
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Figure 13 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of age 
 
 
Figure 14 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of income 
 
Those who were exposed versus those unexposed can be further compared using 
logistic regression. At 95 per cent significance the revealed that Moroccan women (p < 0.1) and 
higher wages respondents (p < 0.1) had a lesser exposure to the anti-corruption message, and 
this by a significant degree (Table 28, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
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Exposed (Number of 
respondents = 724), Prob > 
chi2 = 0.004 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Gender 0.274 0.164 0.096 
Education -0.056 0.065 0.389 
Age 0.165 0.098 0.094 
Income -0.139 0.043 0.001 
Household number -0.017 0.121 0.886 
Constant -0.010 0.568 0.985 
Table 28 - Regression results for Exposure to the campaign versus respondent demographics 
 
6.5 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Results 
 	 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was used in an attempt to remove the effect of the 
said confounding variables above. Once each respondent had a calculated predicted probability 
of being exposed to the campaign, other respondents within the sample with similar 
probabilities — based on whether or not they had seen the campaign — were identified and the 
difference on answers to questions presented in the questionnaire were compared.  
Propensity scores were estimated and the balancing property test was found acceptable 
for all the dependent variables. The result of the PSM analysis is provided by the average 
Treatment effect on the treated or the ATT score. In this study the “Treatment” is indeed the 
exposure to the anti-corruption mass-media campaign. 
 
6.5.1 Nearest Score Matching (NN): Intention to Change Behaviour 
 
Next (Table 30), both respondents who have seen the campaign and those who reported 
not having seen the campaign and who received (near) identical propensity scores from the 
intersected region between lowest and highest propensity score for each group of respondents 
were matched using nearest score matching (NN). 
As discovered previously, respondents exposed to the campaign emerged with a higher 
intention to change behaviour: 3.30 versus 2.26 or 20.8 per cent more resolved to change 
behaviour than those who did not see it. The significant t-statistic of 6.1 clearly demonstrates 
this (Table 29, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss (2014): 
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Table 29 - Measurement of respondent alteration in intention to change behaviour using NNPSM 
method 
 
6.5.2 Respondent Alteration in Attitude Score 
 
In the same vein, the nearest neighbour propensity score produced an ATT of -9.605. 
The mean attitude change derived from this was -12.70 or -12.6/132= -9.6 per cent. The model 
also proved significant with t=-2.32 (Table 29, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 
2014). 
  
 
 Respondent 
Demographics 
Have seen the 
campaign (495 
respondents) 
Have not seen 
the campaign 
(233 
respondents) 
Difference 
between have 
seen and have 
not seen 
Standard 
Error 
T-
statistics 
Corruption 
attitude score 
Not matched -11.139 -7.198 -3.940 2.496 -1.579 
Corruption 
attitude score 
Matched with 
ATT 
-11.139 -1.534 -9.604 4.134 -2.318 
Table 30 - Measurement of Attitude scores alteration  using NN PSM method 
 
 
 6.5.3 Respondent Alteration of Beliefs 
 
Variable Respondent 
Demographics 
Have seen the 
campaign  
(494 
respondents) 
Have not seen 
the campaign 
(230 
respondents) 
Difference 
between have 
seen and have 
not seen 
Standard 
Error 
T-
statistics 
Intention to alter 
behaviour (1 not at 
all to 5 very much 
so) 
Not matched 3.303 2.331 0.971 0.110 8.83 
Intention to alter 
behaviour (1 not at 
all to 5 very much 
so) 
Matched with 
ATT 
3.303 2.262 1.040 0.170 6.105 
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What also emerged using propensity score matching was that the part of the sample 
who saw the campaign did espouse the view more strongly that corruption was unlawful 
(+0.421 or +8.39 per cent).  The significance level here was 1.88. There was also a marginal 
increase in the understanding that corruption was an amoral behaviour (0.411, or an 8.19 per 
cent increase; significance level: 1.94). There was no noteworthy difference between 
exposed/unexposed respondents when questioned whether corruption was authorized or not 
(Tables 31, 32 and 33, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014). 
 
 
Belief: Respondent 
Demographics 
Have seen the 
campaign (493 
respondents) 
Have not seen 
the campaign 
(231 
respondents) 
Difference 
between Have 
seen and Have 
not seen 
Standard 
Error 
T-
statistics 
Corruption is 
unlawful 
Not matched 3.414 2.995 0.419 0.125 3.339 
Corruption is 
unlawful 
Matched with 
ATT 
3.414 2.991 0.423 0.225 1.879 
Table 31 - Measurement of respondent alteration in Belief: “corruption is unlawful” using NN 
PSM method. 
 
Belief: Respondent 
Demographics 
Have seen the 
campaign (495 
respondents) 
Have not seen 
the campaign 
(233 
respondents) 
Difference 
between Have 
seen and Have 
not seen 
Standard 
Error 
T-
statistics 
Corruption is 
amoral 
Not matched 3.435 3.086 0.349 0.122 2.839 
Corruption is 
amoral 
Matched with 
ATT 
3.435 3.020 0.415 0.214 1.939 
Table 32 - Measurement of respondent alteration in belief: “corruption is immoral” score 
using NN PSM method 
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Belief Respondent 
Demographics 
Have seen the 
campaign (494 
respondents) 
Have not seen 
the campaign  
(232 
respondents) 
Difference 
between Have 
seen and Have 
not seen 
Standard 
error 
T-
statistics 
Corruption is 
Authorized 
Not matched 2.365 2.329 0.036 0.117 0.309 
Corruption is 
Authorized 
Matched with 
ATT 
2.365 2.220 0.145 0.183 0.788 
Table 33 - Measurement of respondent alteration of beliefs: “corruption is authorized” score 
using NN PSM method 
 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
Descriptive data analysis regarding the campaign effectiveness shows that over 68 per 
cent of the respondents reported seeing the campaign, with the vast majority claiming that they 
had understood the campaign message reasonably well. However, a vast majority of the sample 
considered that the campaign was both uninteresting and ineffective in curbing corruption. In 
the same vein, most respondents reported either being unsure about granting trust or having no 
trust in the campaign promoters whatsoever. A predominant part of the sample also stated that 
they could not remember the content of the campaign. Regarding the alteration in beliefs about 
corruption, the campaign seems to have slightly increased the belief that corruption is illegal, 
immoral and a gift-giving phenomenon. Regarding the attitude score, the results also presented 
a decrease in attitude score toward corruption toward a less favourable evaluation of 
corruption. In the same vein; inclination towards a corrupt intention was lessened for the 
respondents who were exposed to the campaign.  
Regarding the analytical statistics, the null hypothesis H0 stated previously “There is 
no correlation between the campaign reach, interest, message comprehension, credibility and 
recall and Moroccan attitude and intention toward corruption” has been rejected. The results of 
the regressions show that respondents with a higher level of trust in the government are more 
likely to have a higher acceptance of corruption. On the other hand, the higher the 
comprehension, the higher the recall of the campaign; and the higher the credibility of the 
campaign, the less the respondents had a favourable attitude towards corruption. Intention to 
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change behaviour, to become less corrupt, was found to be positively impacted by the 
respondent interest, comprehension and recall of the campaign. When it comes to socio-
demographic factors, it was found that intention for one to change behaviour toward corruption 
is increased if the respondent is male rather than female, is less educated rather than more 
educated, and have a lower income rather than higher income.  
Regarding the Theory of Reasoned Action, social norms (and in particular, the opinion 
of the family) seem to have the most positive impact on an individual intention to alter his or 
her corrupt behaviour with attitude toward corruption having a comparatively lower impact. In 
other words, the more a person values the opinion of his or her family, the more his or her 
intention to become less corrupt. Opinions of friends or religious authorities had no significant 
impact. 
Finally, using Propensity Score Matching, groups with identical socio-demographics 
were created. The effect of the campaign was measured by comparing the difference in attitude 
score, intention to change behaviour and beliefs between groups with identical socio-
demographics. The results show that exposure to the campaign has significantly increased the 
sample intention to change behaviour by 20.8 per cent, and decrease a respondent’s positive 
attitude toward corruption by -9.6 per cent and increase the respondent belief that corruption is 
illegal by +8.4 per cent and immoral by +8.2 per cent.  
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Chapter 7 Measuring the Efficiency of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in Morocco: 
Synthesis of Findings and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses and contemplates the findings from the descriptive and analytical 
statistics of Chapter 6: “Measuring the Efficiency of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in 
Morocco; Data Presentation and Analysis”. The first section examines the results of the anti-
corruption campaign in terms of effectiveness; while the second section provides an evaluation 
of the links between citizen trust in the campaign provider and the campaign effectiveness in 
terms of alteration of corrupt attitude and intention. The third section evaluates the campaign’s 
impact on Moroccan perceptions — has the campaign managed to convince Moroccans about 
corruption is immoral, illegal or even authorized? Finally, this chapter considers the results 
from the Theory of Reasoned Action constructs and examines the importance of the family unit 
on corrupt intention. 	 
 
7.2 Campaign Effectiveness 
7.2.1 Reach and Perceived Effectiveness 
 
Undoubtedly, the reach of the campaign was a success with over 60 per cent of the 
respondents corroborating their exposure to the campaign. However, most respondents rated the 
campaign as ineffective, with 29 per cent of those questioned rating the campaign as neither 
effective nor ineffective, and the majority, 40 per cent of the respondents, evaluated the 
campaign as either “inefficient” or “completely inefficient”. Lang (2006) defines Public 
Service Advertising (PSA) perceived effectiveness as the construct of claim strength and 
emotional content. Claim is the verbal content of the message (in this case “Beware of 
Corruption”), while “claim strength” refers to the perceived effectiveness assessments of a 
verbal claim. Claim strength or the effectiveness of the message has been shown to be linked to 
the message itself. As an example, the message: “marijuana is a gateway drug”, was rated 
highly ineffective while the message: “your parents will be disappointed in you”, was rated as 
highly effective (Yzer, et al., 2003 as cited by Lang, 2006). Lang concluded that stronger 
claims lead to higher effectiveness perception score than weaker claims (Lang, 2006). The 
strength of a claim is defined by the degree of mental elaboration allocated by the message’s 
recipient when considering a message. In line with the elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion of Petty and Caccioppo (2012), “strong” claims are messages that are more carefully 
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considered by the recipient, while “weak” claims are messages considered only superficially by 
the recipient. Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign message has indeed been poorly rated. 
Abdessamad Saddouq, the Secretary General of Transparency International Morocco, qualified 
the anti-corruption campaign as being an affront to Moroccan citizens. “The content is poor,” 
he said, and “It is an insult to the intelligence of Moroccans” (L’economiste, 2012a). Lang 
(2006) also posits that the emotional content of a PSA message plays a central role in a 
campaign’s perceived effectiveness. For example, a high intensity emotional message with a 
weak message claim has often resulted in a boomerang effect, with the recipients actually 
engaging more in the activity that the message was warning against them doing (Lang, 2006). 
That is to say, when recipients received the weak message: “marijuana is a gateway drug”, 
there was a boomerang effect of more people smoking marijuana. Lang’s recommendation for 
optimum perceived effectiveness is to associate a strong claim with an arousing positive or 
negative emotional content. 
 
7.2.2 Campaign Effectiveness and Government Credibility 
 
In summary, the simplicity of the campaign’s message: “Beware of Corruption”, 
provides a first understanding for Moroccans poor rating of the campaign effectiveness. 
Government credibility is undoubtedly another significant factor impacting the perceived 
effectiveness of the campaign. Although a survey undertaken by the magazine Actuel in 
December, 2011 showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens have “somewhat” or “complete” 
trust in the Prime Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which 
he was elected (Actuel.ma, 2015), data from this research offers a more critical picture. An 
astonishing 45 per cent of the eight hundred respondents questioned affirmed having “no faith” 
or “no faith whatsoever” in their government — to which one should also consider the 24 per 
cent of respondents who chose not to voice their opinion. Further analysis using an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) test showed that government credibility and the public’s negative attitude 
toward corruption are negatively linked [F(4, 787) = 7.99, p = 0]. In other words, respondents 
with a lower level of faith in the government tend to be less tolerant towards corruption while a 
higher level of acceptance toward corruption is linked to  a higher level of government trust. 
These findings should be paralleled with the findings of Glaeser, Sacerdote and 
Scheinkman (1996) who analysed crime patterns in the United States of America. They used a 
model of social interaction to show that crime is contagious and that individuals are more 
inclined to commit crime in an environment where the level of criminality is high. In a more 
recent study in Denmark, researchers Damm and Dustmann (2014) found that migrants placed 
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in an environment with a high majority of youth offenders would be more likely to be 
convicted in later life than migrants placed in lower crime environments. Dong, et al. (2012) 
used the Theory of Contagion (or Pro-Social Behaviour) to show that the perception that others 
might be corrupt leads to a more sympathetic attitude towards corrupt behaviour. “Thus, a 
person’s willingness to be corrupt depends on the pro-social behaviour of other citizens. The 
more that others are perceived to be corrupt, the higher the willingness to be corrupt” (Dong et 
al, 2012). In the same vein, Otieno (2005) reported a similar pattern in Botswana and Kenya 
where the lack of public confidence in the integrity of the campaign promoter resulted in the 
failure of the anti-corruption campaigns for both countries. This is very much the case with 
Morocco where, according to a survey by Transparency International, 67 per cent of the 
Moroccan population perceive political parties as corrupt and 73 per cent believed that public 
officials and civil servants were corrupt (Transparency International, 2016). Abdessamad 
Saddouq also pointed out that the campaign “intuits that citizens are the sole persons 
responsible for corruption and petty corruption,” (L’economiste, 2012a). Effectively, in the 
middle of the campaign (June 2012), the government launched an investigation into documents 
that purportedly accused the former finance minister and the national treasurer of granting large 
salary bonuses to one another. The investigation was soon stalled and the enquiry launched by 
Justice Minister Mustapha Ramid was discarded (Bellaoualli, 2014). Hence, by ignoring high-
level corruption at the levels of government and business while solely targeting minor, or 
“petty”, corruption, the government’s credibility in its fight against corruption was further 
diminished. 
 
7.3 Campaign Design, Recall and Attitude Change  
 
Reach and Perceived Effectiveness are only preliminary gauges to measure the 
effectiveness of a social marketing campaign. The effectiveness of a campaign should be 
measured against the goals of that campaign — in this case, an alteration of attitude and 
behaviour toward corruption. This study showed that exposure to the campaign led to a 
decrease in the respondent tolerance of corruption. Using propensity score matching, attitude 
scores decreased from -1.534 out of 132 for the unexposed to -11.139 out of 132 for the 
exposed, that is a 9.6 per cent decrease in tolerance of corruption. Of course, attitude change is 
not a straightforward process. The route to attitude change passes through the following stages: 
Exposure, Interest, Comprehension and Retention (Hovland, 1953). Although 60.0 per cent of 
our sample confirmed they felt they had a good understanding of the campaign, only 30.1 per 
cent of the respondents thought the campaign was interesting. Regarding comprehension, most 
  99 
respondents (60.3 per cent) claimed they understood the message “well” or “very well”, yet 
next to a third of the sample (29.6 per cent) declared they did not understand the message. 
Finally, fewer than 25 per cent reported they could remember the campaign — with a majority 
of respondents (over 65 per cent) saying they could not remember the message or were unsure 
whether or not they could recall it. 
Clearly, the anti-corruption campaign failed to generate interest and maintain retention 
among Moroccan citizens. There are several possible reasons for this. The Memory-Based 
Information Processing Theory postulates that recall is an essential initial step for behavioural 
change to take place, since recall leads to potential attitude change and subsequently attitude 
change may lead to a behavioural change (Choi and Lee, 2013). In a seminal paper titled: “The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion” (or ELM), Petty and Caccioppo (2012) 
maintained that the degree of mental processing of the message is linked to the recipient’s level 
of persuasion and, consequently, linked to attitude change. The authors distinguish two routes 
to persuasion: the central route (which reflects a deeper processing of the message leading to a 
long lasting attitude change) and a peripheral route (where the message is only superficially 
processed and leads to a transient attitude change). In the same vein, the low level of recall 
reported — with only one quarter of the respondents recalling the campaign’s message — can 
be attributed to the manner in which the audience processes the message. Craik and Lockhart 
(1972) posit that there are levels of message processing corresponding to various strengths of 
memorizing the message. Shallow processing generates temporary memory traces that are 
susceptible to rapid decay. On the other hand, messages that are more methodically processed 
produce more stable memory traces and ultimately increased message recall. Till and Baack, 
Wilson and Till, (2005) demonstrated the importance of campaign inventiveness and creativity 
to improve persuasion and unaided recall. Smith, Chen and Yang (2008) ran a set of 
experiments testing advertisement creativity and found that a low level of creativity in an 
advertisement would engender a lower degree of processing and audience response in terms of 
brand awareness and brand liking. In the same vein, emotional and/or creative advertising leads 
to increasingly positive attitudes toward both commercials and brands (Janssens and 
Pelsmacker, 2005). Recent studies in neuroscience confirm the importance of emotion in 
advertising. Aslanbay (2012), for example, demonstrates that effective advertising tends to 
embed a rational message within an emotional envelope. Similarly, LeBlanc, McConnell, and 
Monteiro (2014) illustrate how emotions show positive, strong correlation to attention, 
decision-making and memory. 
The unemotional, naive visual design of Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign — 
portraying a hand giving banknotes to another, with a red illegal sign overlaid and the slogan: 
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“Beware of Corruption”, written across — may very well have contributed to the low level of 
interest, recall and modest attitude change reported in this study. 
 
7.4 Campaign Impact on Beliefs About Corruption 
 
Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign resulted in predominantly poor outcomes 
regarding the change in citizen belief towards corruption. Propensity Score Matching showed 
that respondent beliefs about corruption being authorized or not authorized remained 
unchanged, with a significant portion of the sample (20.15 per cent) reporting they did not 
know if corruption was or was not authorized. Furthermore, a staggering 23 per cent of the 
respondents felt that corruption was authorized. 
The belief that corruption is an illegitimate act was not significantly improved either. 
On average, the score of the respondents, concerning the illegal nature of corruption, increased 
from 2.99 to 3.41 out of 5, or a meagre 8.4 per cent increase. Although the percentage of 
respondents who “agreed” or “agreed entirely” with the fact that corruption was illegal was 
measured at 38.6 per cent for those unexposed and at 50 per cent for those exposed. The 
percentage of respondents who completely disagreed that corruption was illegal remained 
discouragingly high with 23.9 per cent for those not exposed to the campaign to 18.5 per cent 
for those exposed. These findings may be explained in two ways. The first explanation is, 
because the level of processing required by the campaign was simply too low as posited by the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), it was insufficient in persuading a sufficiently large 
proportion of our sample that corruption could be anything but a crime. The second is that these 
findings supported the idea that corruption in Morocco might have indeed become a prevailing 
norm and, for many, corruption was not considered as an unlawful act. Mishra (2006) 
hypothesized that when corruption is widespread in a society, it becomes the norm. Corrupt 
behaviour is then vindicated by blaming the prevalence of corruption in the society (Rose-
Ackerman 2001). 
The campaign seemed to fare better in changing our sample’s perception regarding the 
relation between morality and corruption. Respondents who disagreed or completely disagreed 
with the affirmation that corruption was immoral was recorded at 42.7 per cent for those not 
exposed and at 28.6 per cent for those exposed. Those who agreed or agreed entirely that 
corruption was immoral rose from 42.7 per cent for those not exposed to 51.6 per cent for those 
exposed. The campaign seemed to have a positive impact in awakening people to the 
immorality of corruption. On average, respondent score of perceiving corruption as immoral 
rose from 3.02 to 3.43, a modest, but significant, 8.2 per cent increase. 
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Levine (2005) analyses the psychic meaning of corruption and reveals that corruption 
cannot be linked to a breakdown in morality, but rather a failure of the individual to disengage 
from its “rapacious self”. Levine then posits that there is a psychic opposition between a 
conscious understanding of morality and an unconscious motivation where others are the 
source of what is needed. For Levine, an immoral corrupt act can be perceived as both a 
potential for social condemnation but also as a fast track to better economic standing and thus 
social acceptance (Levine 2005). If we consider the argument of Bayley (1966) — that the 
corruption in developing countries is often a necessary means for a poorly paid civil servant to 
reassert his or her social standing in a traditional society — and Skalli (2001), who investigated 
the issue of poverty in Morocco and has broadened the term “poverty” to include “social 
exclusion”, we can find how a corrupt individual might thus be unable to perceive him or 
herself as such because in these spheres corruption is not seen as an immoral act but rather a 
means to gain economic advantage and consequently social acceptance. This has been 
demonstrated by Shah (2009), who showed that in Jharkhand, India corruption was motivated 
not only by private gain but also a “moral economy”, that is, the wish to graduate into an 
elevated social class or gain social influence. With the concept that corruption can be seen on a 
broader level in rampantly corrupt countries as another way in which to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder, one can see how Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign may have 
provided the necessary awakening to a sense of morality. 
 
7.5 Behavioural Change and Social Norm 
 
The impact of the campaign on the intention to change corrupt behaviour was recorded 
and higher than expected. Intention to change behaviour went from 2.26 out of 5 for those 
unexposed to 3.30 out of 5 for those who had been exposed to the campaign, a 20.8 per cent 
increase in respondent intention to change his or her intentions for the better. The Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) stipulates that intention results from the 
influence of an individual attitude toward the outcome of a given behaviour and the perception 
of what others, the “social norm”, think about this intended behaviour. 
The results of the regression in this chapter show that both the attitudes and the opinion 
of the family have a significant impact on intention to change behaviour. Attitude was found to 
be a significant, although marginal, predictor of intention. A less tolerant attitude to corruption 
leads to an increased intention to change behaviour. The main predictor of intention change was 
reported to be the influence of the family. Family is the strongest normative force as the 
findings show. A respondent’s willingness to change behaviour with respect to corruption is 
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raised by around 27 per cent for respondents who have a superior consideration of the judgment 
of their family. Other aspects of social norms — such as judgment of friends or the imam, fear 
of the rule or public shaming via media exposure — failed to record any correlation with the 
change of intention towards corruption. 
Law enforcement may intuitively appear to be a good deterrent to corruption. Fisman 
and Miguel (2007) showed that the higher the fine, the less unethical the behaviour manifested; 
however, this theory is invalid when the law enforcers are themselves corrupt. A corrupt police 
officer, by corrupt acts such as lowering the payment of the fine, dilutes the dissuasion of 
violating the law (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001). This is very much corroborated by a recent 
survey from Transparency International Morocco that found that 79 per cent of the respondents 
perceived the police forces as corrupt, with 64 per cent of the respondents confessing bribing 
the police during the last 12 months. In the same vein, when it comes to the judiciary system, 
70 per cent of the sample considered the system corrupt and 41 per cent of them admitted 
having paid a bribe to a member of the judiciary during the last 12 months (Transparency 
International, 2013). 
There may be various reasons why religious authority is not perceived as a deterrent to 
corruption. Although Islam condemns corruption (Qur’an 2:188), it remains highly hierarchical, 
alongside other religions, such as Eastern Orthodoxy or Catholicism, and as such has been 
found to be linked to a higher level of perceived corruption (La Porta et al, 1999). Also, 
specific to Morocco, religious authorities operate under the strict control of the government. 
Following the terrorist attacks of 2003 in Casablanca, imams across the breadth of the country 
were required to have their Friday sermon approved by the Ministry of the Interior. Imams are 
thus under government control and, as such, suffer from the same low level of credibility as the 
government (Hamelin, et al., 2010). 
The Theory of Reasoned Action revealed that family opinion was the chief predictor of 
a respondent’s intention to change corrupt behaviour while other social norms were found to be 
uncorrelated. As in many other African countries, Moroccan social norms revolve around one 
main value: shame. For Sayer, “shame” is defined as: “An important mechanism in the 
production of social order, for through it people internalize expectations, norms, and ideals and 
discipline and punish themselves,” (Sayer, 2005 as cited by Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, and 
Smith-Crowe, 2014). For De Sardan (1999), “shame is a key traditional tool for social control 
in Africa,” (p. 46). The feeling of shame results from the condemnation of others, however, the 
disapproval of others is resented more strongly when it takes place within the family circle as it 
is considered more important than other social groups. Outside of the family unit, corruption is 
perceived as a necessary evil to handle a muddled administrative system.  
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7.6 Summary 
 
The campaign’s lack of creativity led to low interest and recall from the respondents. 
This in turn led to a low level of elaboration or mental processing from the audience; hence the 
campaign failed to persuade a sizeable percentage of the audience that corruption was illegal. 
Campaign efficiency was also weakened by the low trust respondents noted for their 
government, the campaign provider. However, the campaign did manage to convince the 
majority of respondents that corruption was immoral. When corruption is widespread, it 
infiltrates and merges into the culture. Corruption becomes a modus operandi and — as fear of 
poverty and social exclusion dominate — fear of reprobation no longer acts as a deterrent to 
corrupt practices; instead, these corrupt practices become the social norm as they offer a 
shortcut to economic security and social acceptance. Due to religious affairs being under 
government control and police forces being perceived as highly corrupt, neither were found to 
have had an impact on reducing corrupt intention. Finally, the Theory of Reasoned Action 
proved to be an acute predictor of corrupt intention and family opinion was found to have the 
highest impact as a deterrent to corruption.  
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Chapter 8 Fighting	Corruption	in	Morocco:	Conclusion,	Recommendations	and	
Limitations	
 
8.1 Conclusion on the Social Marketing Campaign 
 
Owing to an approximate 50 per cent illiteracy rate in the kingdom, there was no doubt 
that the anti-corruption campaign had to be made straightforward and accessible to the masses. 
However, this simplicity came at the expense of generating interest and persuading a huge 
swathe of the population. Those who thought corruption was illegal and authorized were 
affirmed in their beliefs, just as those who thought that corruption was acceptable. Having said 
this, a vast majority of citizens accepted that corruption was immoral; the campaign did manage 
to awaken and strengthen the moral cords of some as exposure to the campaign led to an 
increase in the percentage of citizens convinced of the immorality of the act of corruption. 
However, one might question the government’s understanding of the causes of corruption and 
how it decided to address it. The government was correct in its initial assertions: the “scourge” 
of corruption has become part of the cultural fabric of the nation. But had the promoter of the 
campaign examined the issue of corruption a step further, they would have also discovered the 
general public’s true perception of the problem: corruption is extremely widespread at every 
level of society — from the paltry bribe taken from the local civil servant to large-scale 
corruption in businesses and at the government level. The average Moroccan citizen has no 
more faith in the under-privileged civil servant than they do in the high-ranking government 
official. Although the new government was elected on an anti-corruption agenda, Moroccans 
still perceive this government as corrupt. Trust in the campaign provider is a major element in 
the success of a social marketing campaign, and clearly in the case of Morocco, trust was all 
but present as the campaign provider was the government. 
 
 
 
8.2 Contribution to Policy and Practice: 
8.2.1 Tackling Corruption through Empowering Women and Education 
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This study implies that gender and education are key factors to combat corruption in a 
country afflicted by socials ills. From the first survey measuring the justifiability of corruption 
and corrupt intention, a socio-demographic map of corruption was constructed. Analysis of the 
data showed that Moroccan men have a much higher inclination towards corruption than 
women. Understanding the deep-rooted gender roles in Moroccan society can shed some light 
on these differences. The moudawana al-usra, the new family law introduced in 2004, has in 
fact largely failed to advance the status of women in Moroccan society (Elliott, 2009). Though 
women have had more legal rights in theory, there has been little real progress on the ground. 
Women, for the most part, are still unaware of their new rights and little progress has been 
made for society to consider “women as autonomous and individual human beings with 
intrinsic rights not contingent upon first fulfilling their customary obligations” (Elliott, 2014, p. 
1). The realm of women continues to be the more secluded family home, while men deal with 
the outside world, away from the family nucleus. Lack of an efficient government-led 
infrastructure has resulted in a spirit of mutual support between families where women consider 
corruption as a system of gift-giving in exchange of mutual assistance. Meanwhile, for 
Moroccan men, paying their way to navigate around the hurdles of a heavily corrupt 
administration has become a norm. For the one accepting bribes, corruption is a way to 
augment a meagre salary and gain social acceptance in a society which is perceived by most as 
being unfair. Moroccan society is still utterly unfair to women (Timmerman, Clerck, 
Hemmerechts and Willems, 2014). Women between fifteen and twenty-four years old in the 
countryside are over four times more likely to be illiterate than a man in city. With women, the 
illiteracy rate skyrockets from 29.4 percent in the cities to a staggering 60.5 per cent in the 
countryside. Between 2004, when the moudawana al-usra took effect, and 2011 there has been 
little improvement. The gender gap has persisted and, in some places, even increased. When it 
comes to employment, the gender gap is even more disturbing with an unemployment rate 
reaching 81 per cent for women age over the age of fifteen in cities and an absurd 94 per cent in 
rural areas. In comparison, the unemployment rate for men is 24 per cent and 37 per cent 
respectively (Boutayeb, Boutayeb, and Lamlili, 2012). Women’s empowerment and education 
have been shown to be determining factors against corruption, yet the Moroccan state has made 
little progress in social fairness and as long as women remain an underprivileged class in a 
male dominated society, corruption will not be easily curbed. 
 
8.2.2 Strong Political Will Rather Than Social Marketing Campaigns  
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Citizen trust in the government is an essential factor when it comes to fighting 
corruption (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998) and since Moroccan citizen support for the newly 
elected administration had rapidly deteriorated after the 2011 election (Desrues, 2013b) any 
effort by the government to address corruption was destined to fail. Lack of trust was identified 
as a major limitation to government efforts to fight corruption. Paxton (1999) defined trust in 
institutions as the trust a citizen has towards the police, the regime and judiciary system. As 
Uslaner posited, “Societies with more trust and less corruption have better governance, stronger 
economic growth, spend more on redistribution and have greater respect for the law among the 
citizenry” (Uslaner, 2004, p. 3). A way to palliate citizen wariness would be to set up an 
authentically independent body to address corruption. This was successfully done in Hong 
Kong (De Speville, 1999) and in Singapore. Article 6 from the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption recommends, as a chief measure, the creation of a “tailor-made AC 
investigation and prosecution system (Article 36) that has the powers and resources to pursue 
all cases without fear or favour, has the ‘necessary independence’ and can resist political 
interference (Article 6)” (Painter, 2014). In the same vein, Article 20 of the Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption suggests the creation of dedicated and independent 
bodies to fight corruption (De Sousa, 2010). Although Singapore's Corruption Prevention and 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has the power to investigate any minister or senior civil servant 
and do so, its level of independence is questionable since its main office resides in the Prime 
Minister’s office (Painter, 2014). For Painter, the chief reason why the CPIB has historically 
been so successful in its task is not because it is truly an independent body, but rather because it 
originates from a strong political will to curb corruption. According to Painter, strong support 
of the government, which granted superior powers and resources to the CPIB, was also the 
reason for the success of Indonesia's anti-corruption agency. One may then question 
Benkirane’s true dedication in fighting corruption when he declared: “My policy against 
corruption is as follows: ‘God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God 
will take revenge from him’” (Morocco World News, 2012). The government anti-corruption 
campaign which suggested that “citizens are the sole persons responsible for corruption and 
petty corruption” (L’economiste, 2012a) and consistently avoided to prosecute senior level civil 
servants was, for Moroccan public opinion, further signs that the Prime Minister’s commitment 
to truly tackle the issue was mostly cosmetic in nature. 
Barr and Serra (2010, as cited by Rosenbaum, Billinger, and Stieglitz, 2013) suggested 
that corruption could be curbed by reinforcing social norms built on personal values such as 
selflessness and trust. However, when corruption becomes part of the norm, deterrence is lost. 
In countries where social norms are strong and the government is perceived as weak, as is the 
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case in Morocco, individuals would rather ignore unlikely and loosely implemented legal 
sanctions than face more certain social sanctions by not complying to (questionable) norms 
(Landa, 1981). Hence as Rosenbaum, et al. (2013) posited, top-down reform — such as harsher 
penal sentences aimed at increasing the risk of a dishonest transaction — might be needed. So 
despite widespread evidence of the potency of social marketing campaigns, at this early stage 
of development one should question the opportunity of launching the campaign. 
 
8.2.3 Advancing Democracy and Fostering Social Capital 
 
The poor efficiency of the campaign observed in this study raises the question as to the 
suitability of a social marketing campaign at this early stage of democracy, freedom of the 
press and citizen rights. The kingdom’s relatively early move to establish democracy has 
preserved the country from the chaos experienced by many countries following the 2011 Arab 
Spring revolutions. However, the palace has been accused of maintaining its hold on the 
country, mostly through the implementation of cosmetic measures, and corruption is still an 
endemic and an everyday threat to the economic and social stability of the country. For 
Morocco, advancing democracy — as a concept of enhancing most aspects of a country’s social 
life — might be fundamental to efficiently tackle corruption. In a democratic system, openness 
is the norm. Corrupt acts can be exposed by the press without penal risks, whistle-blowers are 
granted legal protection and the overall the risk for a corrupt agent to be uncovered and charged 
is greater (Treisman, 2000). Morocco has, over recent years, embarked on a path to democracy. 
Time is required for a culture of openness to become the norm and as Treisman (2000) states, it 
is not the degree of democracy, but rather the duration of uninterrupted democracy, that is 
linked to lower levels of corruption. Hence, as Morocco strengthens its democratic institutions, 
corruption should gradually decline. 
La Porta, et al (1997) and Rose-Ackerman (2001) suggested that corruption prospers in 
the absence or dearth of social norms. A number or researchers — such as Warren, Sulaiman. 
and Jaafar, (2014) and Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela, (2012) — posited that social media 
can contribute to increasing a nation’s social capital by promoting stronger social engagement. 
Social media has been instrumental to the mobilization of the Moroccan population and had led 
to some of the successes of the February 20 Movement in 2011 (Zaid, 2016). Previously, the 
palace, under King Hassan II, had exercised strict control over the media and mostly used it to 
promote the regime (Zaid, 2016). Under the reign of Mohamed VI, the modernization and 
liberation of the telecommunication sector was permitted. The kingdom saw an exponential 
growth of Internet penetration. Facebook, the dominant social media channel in Morocco, grew 
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to around 10 million Moroccan accounts in 2015 compared to 860,000 in 2009 (Zaid, 2016). In 
many aspects, social media, since it has reached such a large swath of the population, 
contributes to the creation of a norm as posited by Crawford, “the rapid uptake of social media 
services will result in an accelerated development of norms, habits and conventions” 
(Crawford, 2009, p. 527). The February 20th movement, with its cry to moralise public life and 
end corruption, contributed to the awakening of Moroccan moral values and heightened 
Moroccan society’s aversion to corruption. Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes (2010) suggested that 
social media could be used as tool to create a culture of transparency, openness and anti-
corruption. Just as the “Targuist Sniper” raised public awareness about corruption in the police 
forces by uploading videos of policemen demanding bribes from motorists (the Targuist Sniper 
video’s were viewed over a million times, Hibou and Tozy, 2009), the Moroccan government, 
via an active presence on social media, could open a dialogue with the general public, increase 
transparency and ultimately regain the trust of their citizens. 
 
8.3 Theoretical Contribution and Perspectives 
 
Although this research used a Post-Positivist, quantitative approach to unearth some 
causal relationships linking the corrupt intention of Moroccans to particular socio-cultural 
traits, it is important to underline that the underpinning philosophy of Post-Positivism is that 
findings are speculative. The central tenet of Post-Positivism is that hypotheses are not 
validated, but are “not rejected” (Creswell, 2003). Hence in this work, to acknowledge the 
fallibility of the models, hypotheses were not “validated”, rather they were “not rejected”. This 
is an important difference in particular in the case of socio-demographic factors and corruption 
intention. Using logistic regression, specific factors — such as age, education, and gender — 
were found to have a significant impact on an individual attention toward corruption. Logistic 
regression is often used as a predictive tool (Harrell, 2015). i.e. What is the impact of age on 
corruption intention? In this sense it would be tempting to profile “at risk” individuals based on 
their socio-demographics. The consequences for the society are indeed dire. For example the 
RAND corporation — a "nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making 
through research and analysis", initiated in 1945 by the Douglas Aircraft Company (RAND, 
2016) — used logistic regression to predict suicide attacks (Perry et al. 2013). Similarly, 
Hamelin et al. (2011) used logistic regression as a tool to profile potential terrorists in Morocco. 
Schneier (2015) shows how such mathematical models have been used to build disputable 
discriminatory lists, such as the ‘no fly list’ established by the Terrorist Screening Center 
(TSC), barring individuals from flying in and out of the US on commercial airlines. Moroccan 
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microcredit agencies are already using discriminatory practices by favouring women and the 
temptation is indeed strong for policy makers to use such models and extend discrimination to 
other sectors. However, the resulting increase in unemployment would certainly lead to higher 
level of crime and mistrust in the government (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002) as well as 
corruption (Mocan, 2008). An individual’s nature is highly complex and the context in which 
he or she evolves is constantly changing, in this sense the reductionistic nature of Post-
Positivism must be emphasized. So what are the outcomes of a Post-Positivist approach to 
research on corruption? Outcomes do not need to be about profiling an individual, but rather 
providing a generalized model for deterrence. The research clearly points to the importance of 
education and social justice as major tools to fight corruption. 
 
8.4 Methodological Contribution 
 
Propensity Score Methods (PSM) were first propositioned by Rosenbaum and Rubin in 
1983 as tool to assess the causal effect of a treatment by alleviating the effect of bias due to 
confounding variables. In a randomized experiment both groups – treated and untreated – are 
statistically similar, so there is no need to account for confounding variables (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1993). With PSM, randomization is no longer necessary since the effect of confounding 
variables are removed by comparing treated and untreated groups with similar characteristics.  
PSM has been used in very diverse areas, initially in medicine, pharmacology, epidemiology, 
and later in economics and education, in fields where randomized trials are unlikely. Today, 
PSM has become often used in the field of Marketing. Rubin and Waterman also posit that 
Marketing researchers have traditionally used tools such as regression or data mining leading to 
utterly incorrect findings. “[V]isiting the high-prescribing doctors rather than the low-
prescribing doctors ‘causes’ them to continue to write more prescriptions” (Rubin and 
Waterman, 2006, p. 206). Thoemmes and Kim 2011 systematically reviewed 111 articles using 
propensity score methods in the social sciences and found that out of the 111 articles, 25 of 
them were purely methodological and out of the 86 remaining publications 34, the majority, 
were conducted in the field of Education (39.5 per cent), with 11 (or 12.8 per cent) in the field 
of Public Health, 10 (or 11.6 per cent) in Criminology, 8 in Psychology and the remaining other 
in diverse fields such as Sociology or Family Studies. The use of PSM in Social Marketing has 
been scarce. A few authors (such as Yanovitzky, Zanutto, and Hornik 2005) posited that causal 
effects of public health education campaigns can be properly assessed by using propensity 
score methodology. In a recent book by Banks, De Pelsmacker, and Okazaki, Advances in 
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Advertising Research (Vol. V): Extending the Boundaries of Advertising (2014), PSM is used in 
a few cases but logistic regression remain the main methods employed to investigate causality. 
The novel contribution of this work resides without doubt in providing a statistically significant 
evaluation of the campaign efficiency by removing the socio-demographic biases altering 
respondent response to the campaign.  
 
8.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Although this study is built on the assumption that micro-level data on corruption closely 
reflects secondary data on corruption, as demonstrated by Torgler and Valev (2006), a key 
limitation is still the reliability of respondent information. Corruption is a taboo topic in 
Moroccan society. During data collection a large rejection rate was experienced. The initial 
questionnaire requested that the respondent indicate his or her city of residence. This question 
drove many respondents to abandon the survey. Another limitation was the sample size for the 
questionnaires. To improve validity, it would be suitable for future research to embrace a larger 
number of respondents throughout Morocco with the understanding of the sensitive nature of 
publicly discussing acts of corruption. The Theory of Reasoned Action, which was used to 
predict intention, considers attitudes and subjective norms as distinct uncorrelated objects; 
however, much research has found a clear link between subjective norms and the formation 
attitudes (Bailey and Spicer, 2007). In future research, a causal link between these two entities 
should be tested. Finally assessing the campaign effectiveness was carried out using Propensity 
Score Methods to cancel the impact of socio-demographic disparities on the respondent 
perception of the campaign. This technique is perfectly justified in the field of medicine and 
pharmacology where a patient’s background may impact the effect of the intervention or the 
drug administered. However, in the case of a social marketing campaign, ideas are 
administered, not drugs. Hence factors, such as the individual’s religiosity, personality or 
values, could act as confounding variables that may impact how the campaign is perceived. 
Further research should therefore include, not only the socio-demographics of the respondent, 
but also their psychographics as confounding factors. 
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Appendix	I:	Operational	Construct	for	the	Questionnaire	Measuring	the	Campaign	Efficiency					 
Constructs  Reference Survey Items 
Cognitive  Rate your understanding of corruption: 
Corruption is a standard occurrence 
Corruption is unlawful 
Corruption is an amoral 
Corruption is approved in morocco 
Corruption is the receiving money, 
Corruption is taking - obtaining a gift (2 questions) 
Corruption is accepting -  providing a service (2 questions) 
 
(Not at all       1    2    3    4    5  (Agree entirely) 
Affect  Affective evaluation of the above: 
(Totally Dislike)  -2    -1    0    1    2  (I tolerate) 
 
Social Norms   I value the judgment of my family – friends – Iman : 
(Do not Consider at all)  1    2    3    4    5  (Totally value) 
 
Respect for the justice or the police authority: 
(No respect at all)  1    2    3    4    5  (Totally respect their 
authority) 
Attitude scores (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 
1980) 
Computed with the values from the questions above 
A = © Cognitive x Affect 
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Campaign 
Awareness 
(Hovland, 
Janis, 
Kelley, 
1953) 
I am aware of the anti-corruption-campaign: no or yes 
 
I understand the message in the campaign 
I think the campaign is interesting 
I can recall the campaign 
 
(completely disagree)  1    2    3    4    5  (Totally agree) 
Campaign 
Effectiveness 
 This campaign will change things 
(Not at all)         1    2    3    4    5    (Very much) 
 
This campaign is efficient  
(Not at all)         1    2    3    4    5    (Very much) 
Campaign 
provider 
credibility 
 I trust the Government 
 
(Completely disagree)         1    2    3    4    5    (Completely agree) 
Intention 
Toward 
Corruption 
 I think I will alter my behaviour regarding a corrupt behaviour 
 
(Will stay the same)  1    2    3    4    5  (Will change) 
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Demographic  Q16: you are:  
1Male    2Female 
 
Q17: are you? 
1Single              2Married        3Divorced 
 
Q18: Maximum instruction standard you reached 
1no education   2Koranic School   3Primary School 
4College level  5Bachelor degree 6Master Degree 
7Doctorate 
 
Q19: How old are you:  
1Less than 20 years          2Between 21 and 30     
3Between 31 and 40 4Between 41 and 50 
5More than 50 
 
Q20: What is the approximate revenue of your family:    
1Less than 1500 Dhs      5Between 7001 and 9000 Dhs 
2Between 1501 and 3000 Dhs            6Between 9001- 11000 
Dhs 
        3Between 3001 and 5000 Dh           7Between 11000- 
13000 Dhs 
        4Between 5001 and 7000 Dhs   8More than 13000 
Dhs 
 
Q21:  What do you do in life? 
 1Seeking work    2Student  
3Retired  4Employee 5Self-employed 
 6Others  
Q22: Household Size:   
  153 
1) 2 persons or less       2) From 3 to 5         3)  6  or more 
 
Q23: Do you feel your neighbour is? 
1 richer than you 
2 Same 
3 We are better off.  
 
Q24: Where do you live? 
1 Fez        2 Casablanca     3  Agadir 4   Meknes  5   Tetouan6  
Marrakech           7  Rabat   8   Tangier     9    Other 
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Appendix	II:	Questionnaires	
 
Questionnaire:	Justifiability	of	corruption	(English	Version) 
 
 
1. Personal Factors 
 
1. What is your level of education?  
(1) Coranic School    
(2) No education      
(3) Primary school    
(4) Secondary school       
(5) Deug             
(6) Licence    
(7) Master’s degree or equivalent      
(8) Doctorate    	  
2. What is your age ? 
 
(1)  < than 21 years   
(2) [21 -30] years     
(3) [31-40] years     
(4) [41-50]years      
(5) > 51 years 
 
3. Could I ask how well-off your household is? Do you consider the household to be: 
 
(1) considerably/a lot better off than most households 
(2) slightly better off than most households 
(3) slightly worse off than most households 
(4) considerably/a lot worse off than most households 
 
4. What is your monthly income? 
 (1)	<	1500	DH										(2)	[1501-3000]	DH					(3)	[3001-5000]	DH							(4)	[5001-7000]	DH		(5)	[7001-9000]	DH			(6)	[9001-11000]	DH						(7)	[11001-13000]	DH			(8)	>13000	DH 
 
5. What is your profession? ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
6. Do you work in the private or public sector? 
 
(1) Private sector  
(2) Public sector  
(3) None  
 
7. What is your marital status?  (1)	Single																						(2)	Married																						(3)	Separated	/	Divorced/	Widowed	 
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8. How many people, including yourself, live in your household? 
 
□	2	or	less																			□	3	to	5																										□	more	than	6 
 
II. Perception of corruption 
 
9. It is known in some countries the problem of corruption among government or public 
officials is highly perceived by citizens. Imagine a person who needs something that is 
entitled to him/her by law. Is it likely or not likely that this person would have to offer 
money, a present or a favor (i.e., more than official charge), to get help from:  
 (1)	Likely		 	 (2)	Not	Likely		 (3)	Don”t	know	 
 9	01	Members	of	Parliament	 9	02	Officials	in	ministries	 9	03	Elected	municipal	councilors	 9	04	Municipal	officials	 9	05	Customs	officials	 9	06	Police	officers 9	07	Tax/revenues	officials 9	08	Doctors/nurses	 9	09	Inspectors	 9	10	Teachers/Professors 9	11	Officials	in	courts 9	12	Private	sector 
 
 
10.  According to your personal opinion what justifies corruption. (We use a 1 to 5 likert 
scale questionnaire). 
 
 
Being	Poor 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
No	alternative	to	afford	life	expenses	 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
Perception	of	insecurity	for	the	future 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Everybody	is	doing	it 
 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
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																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
No	trust	in	the	government 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Low	career	advancement	prospects 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
You	want	to	help	a	friend,	a	relative	to	access	service	faster	(Hospital,	Admin	
documents) 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Unfairness	in	society,	hard	work	will	not	make	me	rich 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
It	is	normal	to	accept	someone”s	gift 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
 
11. If you are affected by one of more of these factors would you accept corruption money  
 (1)	yes									(2)	no						 
 
 
12. What factor might prevent corruption? (We use a 1 to 5 likert scale) 
 
Higher	wages	 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Influence	of	living	abroad 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
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Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Fear	of	the	authority 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
 
Personal	&	Moral	conviction 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
 
Influence	of	Familly/Friend	(Hshuma	factors) 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Influence	of	religion/imam 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Corruption	authors	being	cited	on	different	media 
 																								Not	at	all																																																																			A	lot Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
Training	employees	(anti-corruption	and	ethics	seminars	etc.) 
 Low	influence																																																																																															high	influence 
 
 
III. Definition of Corruption 
 
13. How do you define corruption?  
 
(1) Accepting money 
(2) Accepting a service 
(3) Accepting gift 
(4) Giving money 
(5) Giving gift 
(6) Giving a service 
 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
 1  2  4  3  5 
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14. In some areas there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. 
During 2009, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer 
or inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his 
service?  
 
(1) yes (If yes go to question 1a.1) 
(2) no 
(3) don’t know  
 
1a.1	<<	IF	YES	>>	What	type	of	official	was	involved	(The	last	time)? 
(1) government official  
(2) customs officer  
(3) police officer  
(4) inspector 
(5) elected municipal councilors 
(6) municipal officials  
(7) tax-revenue official  
(8) doctor-nurse 
(9) teacher-professor 
(10) officials in courts 
(11) private sector  
(12) other  
 
1a.2	Did	you	report	this	to	the	police?	 
(1) yes 
(2) no 
(3) don’t know  
 
 
 
1a.3	Did	you	or	anyone	else	report	it	to	any	public	or	private	agency?	 
 
(1) Yes (if yes go to question 1a.3.a) 
(2) no 
(3) don’t know  
 
1a.3.a	 <<	IF	YES	>>	who	did	you	report	it	to	the	police?	 
………………………………………………. 
 
Gender	 (1)	Male		 	 (2)	Female	 
	Questionnaire	:	Justifiability	of	corruption	(French	Version) 
 
 
I. Informations personnelles : 
 
1. Sexe :           □ Masculin  1   □ Féminin 2 
 
2. Quel est votre état civil ? 
  159 
Célibataire (1) Marié (e) (2) Divorcé(é)/ veuf (ve) (3) 
3.  
 
3. Quel est votre niveau d’éducation ? 
Sans 
éducation 
(1) 
Ecole 
Coranique  
(2) 
Ecole 
primaire 
(3) 
Lycée 
(4) 
Deug 
(5) 
Licence 
(6) 
Niveau 
Master ou 
équivalent 
(7) 
Doctorat 
(8) 
4.  
 
 
4. Quel est votre âge ? 
Moins de 21 ans 
(1) 
Entre 21 et 30 
ans (2) 
Entre 31 et 40 
ans (3) 
Entre 41 et 50 
ans (4) 
Plus de 50 ans 
(5) 
5.  
 
 
5. Quel est votre salaire mensuel ? 
Moins de 
1500 
DHS (1)          
Entre 
1501 et 
3000 
DHS  (2)  
Entre 
3001 et 
5000 
DHS (3)      
Entre 
5001 et 
7000 
DHS (4) 
Entre 
7001 et 
9000 
DHS (5) 
Entre 
9001et 
11000 
DHS  (6)     
Entre 
11001 
et13000 
DHS   (7) 
Plus de 
13000 
DHS (8) 
6.  
 
6. Quelle est votre profession ? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Travaillez-vous dans le secteur privé ou public ? 
Secteur privé (1) Secteur public (2) 
8.  
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8. Combien de personnes, y compris vous, vivent dans la maison ? 
2 ou moins (1) Entre 3 et 5 (2) Plus de 6 (3) 
9.  
 
 
9.  Est-ce qu”il est probable qu”une personne offre de l”argent, un cadeau ou 
une faveur pour obtenir un service : 
Jamais Je ne sais pas Peut etre 
10.  
 
10. Notez de 1 a 5 les point suivant 
  
Complètemen
t contre 
    
Complètemen
t pour 
J ai peur de la pauvrete      
Je ne vois pas de securite 
pour mon future 
     
Je n ai Pas de confiance 
dans le gouvernement 
     
Je ne vois pas de progres 
dans la carriere 
     
Un amis en dificultes      
La sante       
Il est normal d offire des 
cadeau  
     
Accepter un cadeau fait 
parti de la culture 
     
1.  
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11. Si vous êtes confronté à un de ses facteurs, accepteriez-vous une 
corruption ? 
Non (0) Parfois (1) 
1.  
 
12. Comment faire face à la corruption ?  
 
Comment faire face à la 
corruption ? 
 
Complèt
ement contre (1) 
2 3 4  
Complètem
ent pour (5) 
Des salaires plus élevés peuvent 
prévenir la corruption  
     
La crainte des autorités      
Je pense que c”est moralement 
mauvais 
     
Je vais avoir honte devant mes amis      
Sensibiliser les personnes vulnérables      
Je vais avoir honte si mon nom 
apparait au media (journaux & 
télévision) 
     
Assister à des séminaires et 
comprendre ce fléau 
     
Le Imam nous averti contre la 
corruption 
     
2.  
 
II. Définition de la corruption : 
 
13. Comment définirez –vous la corruption ? 
(1) □ Accepter de l”argent 
(2) □ Accepter un service 
(3) □ Accepter un cadeau  
(4) □ Donner de l”argent  
(5) □ offrir un cadeau  
(6) □ Rendre un service 
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14. Est-ce qu”il vous est déjà arrivé qu”un fonctionnaire du gouvernement tel 
qu”un policier, ou un inspecteur vous a demandé de lui payer un 
baksheese pour un service qu”il vous a rendu ? 
(1) □ Non 
(2) □ Je ne sais pas 
(3) □ Oui 						15	 (1)	 Si	 «	OUI»,	 quel	 type	 de	 fonctionnaire	 a	 été	 impliqué	 (la	 dernière	
fois)	? 
(1) □ Fonctionnaire du gouvernement  
(2) □ Fonctionnaires clients  
(3) □ Policiers 
(4) □ Inspecteurs 
(5) □ Conseillers municipaux élus 
(6) □ Fonctionnaires municipaux 
(7) □ Fonctionnaires des taxes et revenues 
(8) □ Médecins et infirmiers 
(9) □ Enseignants et professeurs 
(10) □ Fonctionnaires des tribunaux 
(11) □ Secteur privé 
(12) □ Autres 													15	(2)	Avez-vous	dénoncé	cet	acte	à	la	police	? 
(1) □ Oui  
(2) □ Non 
	15	(3)	Avez-vous	en	personne	ou	une	autre	personne	dénoncée	cet	acte	à	
un	organisme	public	ou	privé	? 
(1) □ Oui    
(2) □ Non 
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Appendix	III:	Articles	published	during	the	course	of	the	PhD	
 
• Book chapter in: Gray, Doris H. and Sonneveld, Nadia (Eds). Gender, Law and Social 
Change in North Africa. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming, Fall 2016).: 
“Microcredit, Gender and Corruption: Are Women the Future of Development?” 
Nicolas Hamelin, Bouchra Hader, and Sonny Nwankwo.   
 Introduction:	 In	 Morocco,	 microcredit	 agencies	 largely	 favour	 women:	 The	Zakoura	 foundation,	 one	 of	 the	 country’s	 first	 and	 leading	microcredit	 agencies,	estimates	 that	 87%	 of	 its	 beneficiaries	 are	 women.	 	 This	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 the	general	 tendency,	 both	 in	 Morocco	 and	 elsewhere,	 to	 believe	 that	 women	 are	more	 honest,	 trustworthy	 and	 responsible,	 and	 are	 therefore	more	 likely	 to	 use	the	 loan	 money	 judiciously	 and	 repay	 the	 agencies.	 Most	 research	 provides	theoretical	arguments	to	explain	the	preference	for	financing	for	women	but	very	little	 of	 this	 is	 based	 on	 actual	 data.	 	 	 One	 key	 rationale	 is	 that	 women	 are	perceived	 as	 less	 inclined	 toward	 corruption	 than	 men.	 This	 notion	 was	 partly	challenged,	however,	by	the	events	leading	to	the	2011	uprising	in	Tunisia,	where	momentum	grew	with	the	people’s	anger	against	not	only	dictator	Zine	el	Abidine	Ben	Ali	but	also	with	his	wife	Leila	Trabelsi.	The	public	despised	Leila	Trabelsi	for	her	 corrupt	 lifestyle	 and	 her	 involvement	 in	 a	 multitude	 of	 financial	 scandals.			Similarly,	 Suzanne	Mubarak,	 wife	 of	 ousted	 Egyptian	 President	 Hosni	 Mubarak,	attracted	public	 anger	 and	was	 accused	of	 illegally	 accumulating	wealth.	 	 	 Thus,	despite	 the	popular	 idea	that	women	are	 less	prone	to	corruption	than	men,	 the	issue	is		far	more	complex	than	what	preconceived	notions	would	allow.	 This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 a	 study	 of	 beliefs	 about	 corruption	 among	 over	 200	respondents	 in	 the	 Middle	 Atlas	 region	 of	 Morocco.	 	 The	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	qualitative	as	well	as	quantitative	research	that	addresses	the	following	questions:	What	gender	gaps	exists	among	Moroccans	in	their	attitudes	toward	corruption?	What	gender	gaps	exist	in	their	definitions	of	corruption?	What	gender	gaps	exist	in	 perceptions	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 corruption?	 What	 gender	 gaps	 exist	 in	 their	perceptions	of	the	factors	that	are	possible	deterrents	against	corruption?	 
 
 
• “Faking brands”: Consumer responses to counterfeiting. Hamelin, N., Nwankwo, 
S., & El Hadouchi, R. (2013). Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 12(3). 
 Abstract:	 Although	 counterfeiting	 is	 described	 as	 one	 of	 the	 ‘oldest	 crimes	 in	history’,	contextualised	treatments	of	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA	region)	are	rare	despite	growing	interconnections	with	the	global	economy.	Accordingly,	this	 paper	 explores	 consumer	motivations	 to	 purchase	 counterfeit	 products	 and	identifies	 possible	 counter-influences.	 Data	 from	 a	 survey	 of	 400	 respondents	drawn	from	Morocco	was	tested	with	logistic	regression	models	to	determine	the	significant	 factors	 which	 trigger	 responsiveness	 and	 deterrence	 to	 counterfeit	products.	The	 tests	were	conducted	based	on	 three	product	 categories:	 clothing,	cosmetics	and	mobile	phones.	Additionally,	consumer	demographics	and	selected	social	triggers	were	evaluated	to	build	a	profile	of	consumers	typically	most	likely	to	 consider	 buying	 (or	 avoiding)	 counterfeit	 goods.	 Results	 show	 that	 concerns	related	 to	 health,	 disappointment	 risk,	 and	 integrity	 are	 the	 most	 significant	
  164 
countervailing	factors	for	counterfeits.	On	a	socio	demographic	level,	it	was	found	that	 low-income	consumers	are	more	positively	disposed	 to	buying	counterfeits.	Gender	also	seems	to	have	an	explanatory	force.	Women	with	higher	educational	backgrounds	are	less	likely	than	men	to	consider	buying	counterfeit	goods.	For	all	the	 products	 evaluated,	 quality	 and	 price	 are	 consistently	 the	 most	 important	factors	driving	the	intention	to	buy	counterfeits.	The	implications	are	highlighted;	combating	 counterfeiting	 is	 not	 an	 exclusive	 preserve	 of	 any	 single	 entity	(governments,	 business	 or	 para-governmental	 agencies)	 but	 a	 shared	responsibility.	 There	 is	 a	 lot	 at	 stake	 for	 consumers,	 manufacturers	 and	 the	industrial	nations	if	the	menace	is	not	effectively	checked. 
 
• Managing the environment, people and herds: sustainability of the Moroccan 
cedar forest. Hamelin, N., & Nwankwo, S. (2013). World Journal of Science, 
Technology and Sustainable Development, 10(4), 2-2. 
 Abstract:	 The	 cedar	 forest	 in	 Morocco	 occupies	 approximately	 133,	 000	 ha,	distributed	 in	 the	Middle	 Atlas,	 High-Atlas,	 the	 Rif	Mountains	 and	 Tazekka.	 The	cedar	 forest	 of	 the	 middle	 Atlas	 region	 in	 Morocco	 has	 been	 experiencing	 a	dramatic	decline.	 In	the	last	30	years	 it	has	been	estimated	that	over	40%	of	the	Moroccan	 forest	 has	 receded.	 Vast	 amounts	 of	 money	 have	 been	 injected	 by	national	or	international	organizations	to	understand	the	mechanisms	behind	this	decline.	The	research	carried	on	by	the	forest	authority,	or	local	researchers	have	often	attributed	the	causes	of	the	decline	to	climate	change,	and	human	impact	has	been	 deemphasized.	 Using	 the	 available	 data	 and	 linear	 regression	 analysis	 we	proved	 that	 indeed	 climate	 change	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 decay	 of	 the	Cedar	 forest.	 Significant	 correlation	 between	 forest	 decay	 and	 temperature	variation	during	the	1986	to	2006	period	was	found.	However	we	strongly	believe	that	 this	 is	 only	 the’	 feel	 good’	 part	 of	 the	 story.	 Climate	 change	 data,	 such	 as	precipitation	and	temperature	variation	are	easily	measurable	and	often	used	as	a	scapegoat	 to	 conceal	 the	 fact	 that	 authorities	 have	 been	 unable	 to	 curb	 various	revenue-generating	practices	a	lot	more	damaging	to	the	forest,	either	because	of	lack	of	 resources	or	because	 they	are	 too	 involved	 in	deals,	 since.	 Illegal	 logging	and	illegal	grazing	routes	generate	important	revenue.	This	paper	attempts	to	give	a	 comprehensive	 view	 of	 the	 various	 factors	 responsible	 for	 the	 decline	 of	 the	forest.	 Both	 climate	 change	 factors	 and	 human	 factors	 have	 been	 investigated.	Although	climate	 change	 is	no	doubt	part	of	 the	equation,	we	 found	 that	human	factors	are	 indeed	most	 significantly	 correlated	 to	 the	 rapid	decline	of	 the	cedar	forest,	 climate	 change	 solely	 accentuating	 the	 issue.	 Overgrazing	 and	 illegal	logging	 are	 believed	 to	 be	 the	 factors	 most	 severely	 endangering	 the	 forest.		Subsequently	we	discuss	 land	management	solutions	 in	order	to	preserve	one	of	the	last	cedar	forests	of	the	planet. 
 
• Entrepreneurship Education for a Renascent Africa, N. Hamelin, S. Nwankwo, 
" The Routledge Companion to Business in Africa". Chapter 23:  
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Routledge-Companion-Companions-Management-
Accounting/dp/0415635454 
 Introduction:	To	date,	numerous	initiatives	have	been	funded	in	various	locations	around	 the	 world	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 boost	 entrepreneurship	 amongst	 youth.	 Most	entrepreneurship	training	programs	can	be	described	as	‘ad	on’,	that	is	added	on	top	 of	 the	 formal	 curriculum.	 However,	 inappropriate	 pedagogical	modes	 of	 	 in	Entrepreneurial	Education/Training	have	been	shown	to	have	a	negative	 impact	
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on	 entrepreneurship	 intentions;	 and	 as	 Davies	 and	 Gibb	 (1991)	 stated	 using	traditional	 education	 system	 is	 like	 “to	 drive	 using	 the	 rear	mirror”.	 In	western	Africa,	 the	 education	 system	 is	 very	 much	 rooted	 in	 its	 colonial	 past.	 In	 this	research	 we	 have	 conducted	 two	 independent	 surveys	 and	measured	 values	 of	Moroccan	 business	 students	 and	management	 styles	 (based	 on	 a	 survey	 of	 234	students),	and	compared	those	measurements	 to	similar	groups	 from	the	United	States,	Canada	and	China	(963	university	students).	Although	Morocco	gained	its	independence	 in	1956,	 its	educational	system	has	mostly	remained	based	on	the	French	system.	Regarding	values	our	results	-	based	on	a	survey	of	257	(Correct)	Moroccan	 respondents	 showed	 that,	while	US	 students	preferred	 values	 are	 self	respect	 and	 warm	 relationship	 with	 others,	 Moroccan	 student	 consider	 self	respect	and	security	as	their	main	values.	Regarding	management	style	Moroccan	students	 also	 reported	 the	 highest	 Machiavellianism	 scores	 among	 the	 four	countries.	 From	 these	 results	 we	 could	 identify	 a	 possible	 link	 between	educational	 system	 and	 entrepreneurship	 spirit	 and	 show	 that	 to	 be	 efficient	entrepreneurship	 training	 program	 should	 not	 be	 ‘ad	 on’	 to	 a	 the	 standard	curriculum,	but	 should	deviate	 radically	 from	 the	 traditional	 educational	 system	and	educate	students	from	the	ground	up,	by	cultivating,	central	to	their	education	the	values	of	community	and	team	spirit.	 
 
 
• Does religiosity impact Moroccan Muslim women’s clothing choice? Bachleda, C., 
Hamelin, N., & Benachour, O. (2014).. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 5(2), 3-3. 
 Abstract:	Currently	there	is	little	literature	that	explores	the	relationship	between	religiosity	and	a	women’s	choice	of	dress,	outside	of	the	hijab.	This	study	aimed	to	fill	 this	gap	by	exploring	whether	religiosity	 impacts	 the	clothing	style	Moroccan	Muslim	women	choose	to	wear	in	the	public	setting.	Results	indicate	that	religious	commitment	 has	 little	 impact	 on	 choice	 of	 clothing.	 From	 a	 practical	marketing	perspective,	 this	 study	 suggests	 that	 factors	 other	 than	 religiosity,	 such	 as	 age,	marital	 status	 and	 education	may	 offer	 greater	 value	 as	 a	 segmentation	 tool	 for	marketing	 female	 apparel	 in	 Muslim	 countries	 where	 women	 have	 freedom	 to	choose	what	they	wear. 
 
• Consumer values, motivation and purchase intention for luxury goods. Nwankwo, 
S., Hamelin, N., & Khaled, M. (2014). Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 
21(5), 735-744. 
 Abstract:	 There	 is	 considerable	 ambivalence	 in	 how	 different	 societies	 and	cultures	 view	 the	 consumption	 of	 luxury	 goods.	 Whilst	 knowledge	 of	 this	phenomenon	is	fairly	stable	in	most	western	economies,	the	emerging	economies,	with	equally	emerging	‘super	rich’	social	class	constitutes	an	inflection	point	from	which	to	gain	refreshing	insights	into	the	phenomenon.		Of	particular	interests	are	rich	Moslem	 states	where	 the	 concept	 of	 luxury	may	 be	 in	 tension	with	 religio-cultural	 beliefs.	 	 Accordingly,	 using	 Morocco	 as	 a	 contextual	 base,	 this	 paper	explores	consumer	purchase	intentions	towards	luxury	goods.	Based	on	a	sample	of	 400	 respondents	 and	 using	 logistic	 regression	 models,	 the	 papers	 finds	correlations	between	the	intention	to	buy	luxury	goods,	motivation	and	personal	values.	Socio	demographic	factors	were	found	to	strongly	influence	the	nature	of	purchase	 of	 luxury	 goods.	 Paradoxically,	 the	 influence	 of	 religion	 appears	 to	diminish	but	not	completely	obliterated	as	consumer	affordability	of	luxury	goods	increase.	 Whilst	 this	 may	 not	 be	 surprising	 but	 there	 is	 an	 embedded	 gender	
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underpinning	to	it	especially	when	considered	alongside	perceived	gender	biases	in	consumption	decision-making	in	many	Islamic	countries.	Women	were	found	to	be	more	positively	disposed	 to	 impulse	purchasing	of	 luxury	goods	compared	 to	men	while	more	educated	people,	generally,	indicated	a	greater	tendency	towards	rational	than	impulse	buying	decisions. 
 
 
 
• Hamelin. N. Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss (2014): Investigating the efficiency 
of the Moroccan Anti-Corruption Campaign Anti Corruption Research Network 
(ACRN) : http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/featured-articles/acrn-
news/blog/investigating-the-efficiency-of-the-moroccan-anti-corruption-
campaign/view 
 Abstract:	ACRN	Guest	Blogger	Nicolas	Hamelin	discusses	a	recent	investigation	he	conducted	into	a	2012	social	marketing	campaign	against	corruption	in	Morocco.	While	 it	 was	 widely	 publicized	 (reaching	 60%	 of	 survey	 respondents),	 the	campaign	 failed	 to	make	a	real	 impact	 for	 two	key	reasons:	 the	overly	simplistic	nature	 of	 the	 message	 and,	 ironically,	 the	 general	 public	 distrust	 of	 the	government. 
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